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In 1959 the Federal Communications Commission invited economist Ronald Coase to 
testify about his proposal for market allocation of radio spectrum rights. The FCC’s first 
question: “Is this all a big joke?” Today, however, leading policy makers––including the current 
FCC Chair––decry the “spectrum drought” produced by administrative allocation and call for the 
creation of private bandwidth markets. This essay examines marketplace trends driving 
regulators’ change of humor, and considers the path of spectrum policy liberalization in light of 
emerging technologies, theories of unlimited bandwidth, reforms such as FCC license auctions, 
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The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, 
and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s ‘Big Joke’ 
 
An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy 
 
Thomas W. Hazlett 
 
I. RONALD COASE’S ‘BIG JOKE’  
An important speech by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman William 
Kennard on February 28, 2000 exposed the chasm between optimal policy and regulatory 
practice at the FCC.
1 Speaking at a wireless telecommunications trade show in New Orleans, 
Chairman Kennard issued an ironic challenge to the private sector. “Today in America there is a 
spot market for wireline bandwidth,” Commissioner William Kennard lectured, “Why can’t we 
do this for wireless?”
2  
An excellent idea––a Nobel Prize winning idea––as demonstrated decades ago by 
Professor Ronald Coase, winner of the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics. In an important 1959 
paper in the Journal of Law & Economics, Coase explained the failure of FCC radio spectrum 
policy.
3 In work that would lead directly to his Nobel-winning work on the “Coase Theorem” the 
following year,
4 Coase discovered the source of inefficiency to be rules pre-empting private 
ownership––and therefore market allocation––of frequencies.  
Since December 1926 it has been illegal to assert a propertied interest in spectrum.
5 That 
makes Chairman Kennard’s query somewhat of a trick question. Indeed, just days after his 
challenge was issued, Commission staff revealed that they were moving towards a “radical 
overhaul” of FCC policies to make wireless bandwidth markets possible. The story was big 
news, appearing as the front-page lead in the New York Times. Trading radio spectrum like a 
commodity is currently not quite legal.
6 
Bandwidth confined within fiber optic cables is privately owned, and exchanges for this 
capacity are spontaneously emerging. RateXchange, Arbinet, Enron, Pulver.com, and Bandwidth 
Market already operate domestically, with international trading active at Band-X (London), Cape 
                                                         
1 William E. Kennard, “Wire Less is More,” Address to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, New 
Orleans, Louisiana (Feb. 28, 2000), http:www.fcc.gov/Speeches/ Kennard/2000/spwek007.txt. 
2 Bill McConnell, Kennard Makes Waves, BROADCASTING & CABLE (March 27, 2000). 
3 Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. (1959), 1. 
4 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. (1960), 1. 
5 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COL. L. REV. 905 (May 
1997), 925.                 2
 
Saffron (London), and Interxion (Amsterdam).
7 These markets materialize precisely because the 
airwaves are housed in wires––“spectrum in a tube.” While technically identical to wireless, 
wired bandwidth is private property. 
The FCC, in its mandate to regulate airwaves according to “public interest, convenience 
or necessity,” determines what wireless services go where. The traditional approach has 
maintained strict separation of services, “block allocation.” Interference between operators is 
maintained by slotting each type of wireless service into its own reserved slice of spectrum. 
There has been noteworthy progress in reducing micro-management in some bands, where FCC 
licensees have been granted flexibility. Yet a top-down regulatory structure continues to anchor 
spectrum management, blocking entry and innovation. Moreover, the services liberalized 
constitute just a small slice of available airspace. In the prime frequencies under 3 GHz, 
particularly important for mobile uses, only about 6% of frequencies are zoned for flexible use.
8 
Above 3 GHz, the proportion is much less.
9   
Spectrum that could provide a wide range of valuable uses remains off-limits or severely 
under-utilized. This limits competition among existing wireless providers, and deters the 
introduction of innovative services.
10  This is curious in light of sentiments expressed by recent 
and current FCC officials. Reed Hundt, FCC Chair 1993-97, claimed that “for the first time ever 
the FCC truly follows a market-based approach to the allocation and use of spectrum.”
11  William 
Kennard, Hundt’s successor, has warned of a “spectrum drought” squeezing the emerging 
wireless Internet, and has pledged to improve spectrum management by greater reliance on 
market forces.
12  It may seem ironic that the current Commission Chair would aim to achieve 
what his predecessor had already taken credit for accomplishing. In fact, myriad FCC rules and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. to Promote a Trading System to Sell Airwaves, NEW YORK TIMES (March 13, 2000), A1. 
See also, Kathy Chen, FCC May Let Firms Trade Licenses To Ease Congestion of Airwaves, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL INTERACTIVE EDITION (March 14, 2000). 
7 Joanna Makris, Not Exactly Nasdaq, DATA COMM. (May 1999), www.data.com/issue/990507/ brokers.html. 
8 This defines cellular (50 MHz), personal communications services (120 MHz), and enhanced specialized mobile 
radio (about 10 MHz) as regulated in relatively permissive manner.  
9 As estimated by John Williams, Senior Engineer, FCC Office of Plans and Policies. Conversation with the author, 
May 31, 2000. 
10  Bruce M. Owen writes: “For three-quarters of a century, the federal government has specified in great detail the 
way in which the airwaves can be used, for what purpose, and by whom. These rules run 1,330 pages in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, and every one of them affects the ability of communications firms to compete and to adopt 
innovative methods of using the airwaves. And yet no change is possible without the elaborate and ponderous 
process of winning the government’s approval.” Owen, The Internet Challenge to Television  (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1999), 82. 
11  Reed Hundt, “Spectrum Policy and Auctions: What’s Right, What’s Left,” Speech to Citizens for a Sound 
Economy (June 18, 1997), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh734.html. 
12  Jennifer Jones, FCC Chief Prods Internet Industry on Wireless Spectru m, INFOWORLD.COM (May 31, 2000, 10:03 
am PT), http://www2.infoworld.com/articles.                  3
 
regulations are frozen into a daunting mass, and pronouncements by agency officials do not 
typically exert great impact on the glacier’s size, shape, speed, or path. 
Take the case of “wireless cable.” MMDS, as the service is known at the FCC (for multi-
channel, multi-point distribution service), was allocated some 198 MHz of microwave spectrum 
(at 2.1 and 2.5 GHz) beginning in 1963. The band is divvied into 33 channels for subscription or 
educational television service (6 MHz per TV signal). MMDS was recently seen as potential 
competition to cable TV monopolies (hence, the oxymoron, “wireless cable”). Yet, by issuing 
individual channel licenses in a crazy-quilt fashion (to for-profit operators, as well as churches, 
schools and other non-profits that leased them back to pay TV companies), and limiting capacity, 
the technology was severely hampered. As of December 1996, wireless cable served only about 
1.18 million subscribers––less than 2 percent of U.S. households.
13  This would be the industry 
high water mark. 
By 1997, wireless cable’s stock was plummeting in financial markets. Major telephone 
companies that had bought into MMDS exited the market. Analysts downgraded industry debt 
issues, projecting that long run competition with just 33 analog video channels was not 
economically viable.
14  System values plunged and operators scrambled for alternative business 
models. A new plan quickly emerged: broadband wireless access (BWA). By using MMDS 
frequencies for high-speed Internet access instead of cable TV, licensees could profit by 
satisfying demands in the burgeoning telecommunications data market.  
Glitch: MMDS licenses were one-way. Network communications are two-way. That 
MMDS operators could provide two-way traffic within the allocated frequency space did not 
matter: two-way violated license specifications. Some waivers for two-way MMDS service were 
granted, proving that there was no interference spillover. Yet, no general liberalization was 
enacted. In late 1996, CAI Wireless petitioned the FCC to “review the Mass Media Bureau 
decision that wireless cable systems can’t automatically be used for upstream digital data 
transmission.”
15  The policy, wrote CAI, caused firms to apply for “costly and time-consuming” 
rule waivers on a case-by-case basis, “hurting [the] ability of wireless cable to obtain 
                                                         
13  Federal Communications Commission, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, CS Docket No. 98-102, FCC 98-335 (Dec. 23, 1998), C1. 
14  Ibid., par. 84. 
15  WARREN’S CABLE REGULATION MONITOR, Full FCC should review Mass Media Bureau decision that wireless 
cable systems can’t automatically be used…, Warren Publishing (Nov. 27, 1996), 
www.newspage.com/CSTORY/NEW…public/C.d1127027.2c0.dco00000.htm. In fact, the Wireless Cable 
Association, now known as the Wireless Communications Association, has been receiving two-way high-speed 
access to the Internet over MMDS licenses since 1995 due to an experimental permit initially granted by the FCC.                 4
 
financing.”
16  Ultimately, CAI Wireless, Heartland Wireless, Nucentrix, People’s Choice TV and 
other firms filed for bankruptcy protection.
17  While the FCC promised quick turnaround, the rule 
was not approved until September 1998.
18   
MMDS, gasping for air, breathed rich oxygen when permitted to meet market demands. 
The industry’s white cell blood count rose rapidly, particularly after announcements in March 
and April 2000 that long distance carriers MCI/WorldCom and Sprint would purchase nearly the 
entire U.S. wireless cable industry.
19  PCTV shares had dropped to just 15.625 cents in 1998; 
Sprint paid $10 a share for the company in April 2000.
20  Specialized equipment suppliers like 
California Amplifier,
21  Digital Microwave
22  and Hybrid Networks,
23  rebounded as sharply. 
Investment was diverted back into the sector, funding new waves of R&D for applications and 
infrastructure in wireless broadband. 
The misallocation of MMDS frequencies cost society a fortune. For decades, a potentially 
productive swath––198 MHz of prime microwave spectrum––has produced little of value to 
consumers. Yet, these airwaves are anticipated to be extremely valuable in uses unforeseen by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Conversation with Andrew Kreig, President, Wireless Communications Association, July 2000.) Regulatory lag in 
generalizing this policy waiver dates at least from this date.  
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. See also, Michael Grebb, No Strings Attached , UPSIDETODAY (April 13, 2000), http://www.upside.com. 
18  Karen J. Bannan, Wait’s Over in FCC Wireless Ruling, INTER@CTIVE WEEK (Sept. 22, 1998), 
wysiwyg://content.174/http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/dialing/9809221.html; Nancy Gohring, The Miracle Cure, 
TELEPHONY (July 5, 1999), http://www.internettelephony.com/ archive/7.5.99/cover/cover.htm. 
19  Seth Schiesel, Wireless Cable Carriers Finally Cash In, NEW YORK TIMES (July 19, 1999), 
www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/07/biztech/articles/19band.html.  
20  Ibid. 
21  California Amplifier (CAMP) shares closed at $1.84 on March 29, 1999. As the wireless cable deals were 
announced, the stock soared to $3.06 on April 8 and a high of $5.50 on April 13. The stock peaked at $48.38 in 
March 2000. The company has benefited from rapidly rising sales of equipment for direct broadcast satellite in 
addition to the improved prospects for BWA. Source: YAHOO!FINANCE. 
22   Digital Microwave (DMIC) shares hit a low of $2.78 in October 1998, rebounding to an April 1999 high of 
$12.75. The stock continued its ascent, reaching $38.75 per share prior to the tech stock crash in mid March 2000. 
Source: YAHOO!FINANCE. 
23   Hybrid Networks (HYBR) raised $35 million in its Nov. 1997 IPO, but was suspended from NASDAQ trading in 
June 1998 prior to being delisted due to financial reporting irregularities.  Its share value sank to $0.13 in late 1998. 
Despite the firm’s continuing management difficulties (the shares are still not traded on NASDAQ or other 
exchanges), share prices rebounded to $2.88 in 1999-II, $9.03 in 1999-III, and as high as $20.00 in 1999-IV. The 
bounce-back was linked to the MCI/WorldCom and Sprint BWA play in early 1999: “the broadband wireless 
industry, which had historically been under-capitalized, has had a substantial capital infusion. During 1999, Sprint 
Corporation and MCI WorldCom acquired a majority of MMDS wireless frequency licenses in the United States.” 
Hybrid Networks Annual Report, 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (March 24, 2000). In 
fact, there was an explicit financial connection to Sprint’s wireless plans: “In September 1999, Sprint invested $11 
million in purchasing convertible debentures from us and acquired warrants to purchase additional convertible 
debentures. The warrants are in consideration for a commitment by Sprint to purchase $10 million of our products 
by the end of 2000.” Hybrid Networks 10-Q filing, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 5, 2000). See also, 
Hybrid Networks Reaches Settlement with SEC, INTERNET WIRE (June 29, 2000, 3:42 pm EST), 
www.cbsmarketwatch.com.                 5
 
the original spectrum allocation for MMDS.
 24  Of course, who could have sensibly ranked multi-
channel video against wireless Internet access in 1963?  As a 1997 FCC staff paper conceded, 
“No government agency… can reliably predict public demand for specific services or the future 
direction of new technologies.” The study urged the Commission to attempt “substantial 
replication in the spectrum context of the freedoms inherent in property rights [to] allow 
competition to function more effectively, much as it does in those sectors of the economy where 
basic inputs are privately owned.”
25    
This call for spectrum reform was intensely controversial within the Commission. 
Wireless operators tried to kill the report altogether. Liberalizing spectrum access would invite 
competitors to steal market share from established firms. Moreover, if private markets were 
permitted to allocate radio spectrum, regulators’ human capital would diminish.
26    
Ronald Coase learned about the intensity with which regulators and their constituents 
defend the status quo soon after proposing bandwidth markets in 1959. Called to testify at the 
FCC, Commissioner Philip S. Cross opened the questioning with, “Is this all a big joke?” Coase 
was in for even ruder treatment by the Rand Corporation, which had commissioned Coase (along 
with economists William Meckling and Jora Minasian) to write a report on “Problems of Radio 
Frequency Allocation.” Rand funded the research but pointedly declined to publish the study 
when a draft, circulated for comment, received “highly critical” reviews. For instance, one 
anonymous referee wrote: “I know of no country on the face of the globe––except for a few 
corrupt Latin American dictatorships––where the ‘sale’ of the spectrum could even be seriously 
proposed.” More ominously, perhaps, an internal memo warned of the trouble publication would 
                                                         
24  While MMDS licensees now face fewer restrictions than previously, liberalization is far from complete. An 
executive for MCI WorldCom explained in March 2000 that to deal with the regulatory delay the company was 
introducing a limited roll-out of its service with General Wireless Service licenses authorized to operate at 2.3 GHz, 
between the 2.1 GHz and 2.5 GHz allocations used for MMDS. “[T]he company is able to get a feel for operations 
while it awaits long-delayed two-way licenses. That process at the Federal Communications Commission is now 
expected to conclude this summer.” Fred Dawson, MCI Moves Ahead in Wireless Broadband, MULTICHANNEL 
NEWS (March 20, 2000), 48. Moreover, a cloud continues to lurk overhead: the International Telecommunications 
Union is entertaining a proposal to establish MMDS frequencies as mobile bands. Because the FCC may go along 
with such an ITU policy, MMDS licensees, “fear they may get eviction notices in about a year or so.” Curt Harler, 
View from the Hill: 3G’s Spectrum Victims, TOTAL TELECOM (March 1, 2000), wysiwyg://161/htt:// 
ad.uk.doubleclick.ne…live.com; MMDS, ITFS, MSS, Wireless Interests Argue Over Allocation of ‘3G’ Spectrum, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS (Sept. 4, 2000), 19. 
25  Gregory L. Rosston and Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest 
(Federal Communications Commission staff paper, January 1997), 7. 
26  [T]he Commission [is not] likely to support abolition of the public interest standard. Bureaucrats enjoy a highly 
developed instinct for self-promotion and self-preservation. The public interest standard gives the Commission a 
raison d’etre…. The Commission has absolutely no incentive to help facilitate the demise of its public interest 
watchdog duties…” Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of 
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101 (May 1997).                 6
 
prompt in “Rand’s ‘public relations’ in Government quarters and in Congress,” anticipating the 
“fire and counterfire of CBS, FCC, Justice, and most of all—Congress.”
27    
Today, the Chairman of the FCC calls for bandwidth markets in wireless. Indeed, 
Kennard’s speech led to a Commission hearing on May 31, 2000: Public Forum on Secondary 
Markets in Radio Spectrum.
28  Three panels of experts spoke on policy changes needed to enable 
market forces to allocate spectrum.
29  Kennard stated that the FCC “should establish as a goal that 
spectrum become like any other commodity that flows fluidly in the marketplace.”
30    
The FCC’s commitment to liberalization is perhaps more flirtatious than solemn. Political 
inertia, the interests of regulators and regulatees, and the structure of spectrum allocation 
mitigate against reform. Fundamental changes in the marketplace, however, are invigorating new 
options. Nearly 75 years after the initiation of spectrum allocation in the public interest, the FCC 
appears destined to provide its own answer to the question impudently posed to Professor Coase 
some 41 years ago. No joke––but a very long build-up to the punchline. 
II. THE WIRELESS CRAZE   
Financial markets are showering new capital on wireless services.
31  While booming 
valuations of Internet start-ups and dot.com IPOs dominated the financial press throughout 1999, 
the leading gainer among technology issues was a wireless technology supplier––Qualcomm.
32  
Among the large capitalization stocks comprising the Standard & Poor’s 500, all five top 1999 
performers were substantially in wireless––Qualcomm, Sprint PCS (a nationwide wireless 
telephone network), Nextel (a nationwide wireless telephone network), LSI Logic (a chip maker 
                                                         
27  Ronald Coase, Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett: Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did 
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years? 41 J. LAW & ECON. 577, 579-80 (Oct. 1998). 
28  Federal Communications Commission, FCC Announces Agenda for Public Forum on Secondary Markets in 
Radio Spectrum, Press Release, DA 00-1139 (May 23, 2000). 
29  The author was among those to speak at the hearing. Panel presentations are available at: 
http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/presentations/2000/053100/welcome.html. 
30  Federal Communications Commission, FCC Chairman Kennard Urges Three-Pronged Strategy to Promote 
Wireless Web, Press Release (May 31, 2000). 
31  “This is the Wild West  – wireless makes the Internet look tame,” says Donna Oliva, CEO of W-Trade 
Technologies, a company that’s putting banking transactions on cell phones and PDAs [personal digital assistants].” 
Robert McGarvey, Wireless Craze, UPSIDE TODAY (Jan. 31, 2000), www.upside.com. See also: Corey Price, 
Investors See Riches in Wireless Realm, CNET News.com (Mar. 6, 2000), www.news.com; Peter S. Goodman, Tech 
Executives Launch Firm to Invest in Wireless Internet, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2000), E3; Craig Tolliver, 
Guinness Flight's new wireless play: First fund to focus exclusively on the sector, CBS MarketWatch (Mar. 10, 
2000, 11:04 am ET), www.cbsmarketwatch.com. Tally Goldstein, Despite Recent Stock Price Woes, Wireless Sector 
is Poised for Growth, THESTREET.COM (April 24, 2000), www.thestreet.com/pt/markets/earnings/925014.html; 
Cisco Systems, Cutting the Cord: Fixed Wireless Delivers Flexible, High-Bandwidth Solutions, 12 PACKET MAG. 
(First Quarter, 2000), www.cisco.com/warp/public/784/packet/lastmile.html; Reshma Kapadia, AOL Steps Into 
Wireless Fray with Sprint PCS Launch, REUTERS (June 16, 2000).                 7
 
heavily involved in wireless communications), and Nortel Networks (a major 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer substantially invested in wireless and fiber optic 
technologies).
33   
While the general increase in the NASDAQ stock index, dominated by high-technology 
firms, has been impressive in recent years, wireless stocks have done substantially better than 
average. From its low on October 8, 1998 to its close on June 28, 2000, the NASDAQ posted an 
absolute return of 177.7 percent, or 80.7 percent annualized. This was magnificent by historical 
standards. Between October 1984 (when Yahoo!Finance begins its Nasdaq index time series) 
and October 1998, the Nasdaq index registered per annum returns of 13.63%. The Nasdaq’s 
recent runaway performance, however, has been easily exceeded by three wireless portfolios. 
Large wireless equipment providers
34  saw annualized returns of 181.2 percent, mid-cap 
broadband wireless operators
35  returned 177.4 percent for shareholders, and mid-cap wireless 
broadband suppliers
36  rose an incredible 365.9 percent. See Figure 1. 
 


















Historic Nasdaq: 10/11/84 through 10/7/98
Nasdaq
Sector I Large Wireless Equipment Suppliers
Sector II: Wireless Broadband Suppliers
Sector III: Wireless Broadband Operators  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
32  Larry Barnett, The Year in Review: Qualcomm Top Tech Stock of 1999, INTER@CTIVE  INVESTOR, www.zdii.com  
(Dec. 23, 1999, 9:41am).  
33  STANDARD & POOR’S, reprinted from the GILDER TECHNOLOGY REPORT (Jan. 2000). 
34  Motorola, Alcatel, Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson, 3Com, Nortel Networks, and ADC Telecom. This sector had an 
average market capitalization of $101 billion per firm in June 2000. 
35  Metricom, Advanced Radio Telecom, Motient, General Motors-Hughes, EchoStar, Nextlink, Winstar, and 
Teligent. These firms had a mean market cap of 5.2 billion dollars in June 2000. 
36  Adaptive Broadband, Digital Lightwave, Digital Microwave, Andrew Corp., California Amplifier, Proxim, P-
COM, Spectrian, Anaren Microwave, and SpectraLink. The average market cap was $3.9 billion in June 2000.                 8
 
These financial shifts presage widespread tumult in operating markets. Both the boom in 
mobile telephone use and innovative approaches for high-speed Internet connectivity are driving 
pervasive structural realignment for consumers, businesses, and governments.
37  The rising 
importance of wireless telephony is most dramatic. See Table 1. Cellular systems were recently a 
minor footnote in telecommunications. At a press conference announcing the consent decree 
under which AT&T divested the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to settle a U.S. 
Department of Justice antitrust suit in 1984, AT&T CEO Charlie Brown was asked whether 
AT&T got to keep its cellular licenses. He did not know.
38  AT&T had good reason to 
underestimate cellular. In the early 1980s, it hired McKinsey & Co. to estimate U.S. cell-phone 
demand in year 2000. Their prediction: 900,000 subscribers––under 1% of the level obtained.
 39   
 
 
Table 1. U.S. Mobile Telephone Subscribership (Cellular and PCS) 
Year  Subs  Cell Sites  Employees 
1985  91,600  346  1,404 
1990  5,283,055  5,616  21,382 
1995  33,785,661  22,663  68,165 
2000 (E)  107,000,000     
2004 (E)  217,000,000     
Sources: 1985-1995, Federal Communications Commission, Annual Report and Analysis of 
Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Fourth Report, 
FCC 99-136 (June 24, 1999), B-2; 2000 and 2004 estimates, Merrill Lynch, Wireless Internet, 
(June 5, 2000), 8. 
 
Sixteen years after the break-up of Ma Bell, many wireless carriers exceed the valuations 
of the largest wireline carriers. All-wireless Sprint PCS has a market cap of $58 billion. That tops 
the $42 billion valuation investors place on U.S. West, one of the seven RBOCs emerging from 
divestiture.
40  The difference in value would be greater if not for U.S. West’s substantial cell-
phone operations. Remarkably, of AT&T’s market cap of about $107 billion, just over half is 
                                                         
37  Henry Blodget, Wireless Internet , Merrill Lynch & Co. (June 5, 2000), 9. 
38  Peter Huber, Law & Disorder in Cyberspace  (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 106. Huber calls this a “$17 
billion mistake,” referring to the price AT&T was to pay to buy McCaw’s cellular systems, re-entering the wireless 
world in 1994. 
39  Cutting the Cord, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 9, 1999).  
40  Market capitalizations at close of trading, June 16, 2000 on YAHOO!FINANCE.                 9
 
accounted for by its 84.6% ownership stake in AT&T Wireless, spun off in an April 2000 public 
offering.
41    
Explosive growth in wireless has produced a paradigm shift with a name, the Negroponte 
Switch. This is the observation of Nicolas Negroponte of the M.I.T. Media Lab that, while we 
were born into a world in which we made our phone calls on wires and watched our television 
over-the-air, we will die in a world featuring just the reverse.
42  The demands for mobility are 
typically associated with telephone use, while TV viewing is a stationary enterprise.
43  Moreover, 
ordinary phone calls consume a small fraction of the bandwidth used for full motion video. 
Common sense seems to suggest untethered technology to best satisfy mobile, low-bandwidth 
demands, while relying on high-capacity cables (coaxial copper and/or fiber) for fixed services.  
Mobility is not the only factor driving demand for radio-based communications. As seen 
in the MMDS migration from video to BWA, the “race for bandwidth”
44  crosses technologies. 
Vast increases in the quantities of digital information jamming into communications networks 
are fueling further increases in demand for still more information.
45  All conduits are being 
pressed into action. This is partly due to the increasing power and functionality of the 
computerized devices attached to communications channels, and partly due to the “network 
effect.” The per capita utility of the Internet––a network of networks––grows with the number of 
users.
46   
                                                         
41  Market capitalizations at close of trading, June 16, 2000 on YAHOO!FINANCE; Steve Gelsi, AT&T Wireless to Ring 
IPO Bell, CBS MarketWatch (April 24, 2000, 1:30 PM ET), www.cbsmarketwatch.com. 
42  Nicolas Negroponte, Being Digital  (NewYork: Vintage; 1996), __. The author credits George Gilder with 
popularizing his prediction, upgrading it to a paradigm shift in the process. 
43  Some scholars take the passive nature of TV viewing quite seriously. “Interactive entertainment on the Web or 
elsewhere can never substitute fully for conventional television because it cannot satisfy the need to be entertained 
passively… Part of the allure of television is freedom from choice. It is a respite from an active world.” John P. 
Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey, Time for Life: The Surprising Ways Americans Use Their Time  (University Park, 
PA: Penn. St. Univ. Press, 1997), 312. See also: Bruce M. Owen, The Internet Challenge to Television  (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1999).  
44  Corey Grice, Tricks of the Bandwidth Trade, CNET N EWS.COM (Dec. 18, 1999), http://news.cnet.com/category/0-
1004-200-336591.html; John Borland and Ben Heskett, Is the Fiber-Optic Boom Nearing the End?, CNBC.COM 
(Jan. 29, 2000), wysiwyg://12/http://www.cnbc.com/commenta…ntary_full_story_stocks.asp?StoryID=12306; 
Corey Grice, Start-up Carrier Dives into Crowded Bandwidth Market, CNET N EWS.COM (April 13, 2000), 
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-1692223.html. 
45  Corey Grice, Study: Fiber-optic Demand to Keep Pace with Supply, CNET N EWS.COM (May 16, 2000), 
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-1885771.html. Despite huge new investments in fiber infrastructure, the 
“glut” of communications capacity forecast by some has not materialized. One consulting firm, TeleGeography, 
estimates “demand for bandwidth could grow 25 times over the next five years,” and that “for every 50 percent 
reduction in the cost of bandwidth, ISPs [Internet service providers] have purchased 100 percent more capacity.” 
Ibid. 
46  See Carl Shapiro and Hal R.Varian, Information Rules  (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 173-
225; Stanley J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J. LAW, ECON. & 
ORGAN. 205 (1995).                 10
 
Massive investments in high capacity fiber optic transmission lines (radio spectrum in a 
tube) are the most visible manifestation of the bandwidth race. See Table 2. Wireless operators 
compete directly with landline systems in providing “last mile” connectivity for high speed 
Internet access.
47  The “wireless web” feeds both the demand for ubiquitous (mobile) 
connectivity and the general demand for high-speed last-mile network access.  Virtually all 
major software and hardware suppliers now support wireless applications, anticipating new 
generations of wireless computers and devices.
48  Analysts project extremely rapid growth in 
wireless Internet usage in the U.S. and worldwide. Over $100 billion in global wireless e-
commerce is anticipated annually by 2005, for instance. See Table 3. Spectrum is increasingly 
vital to productivity. As one analyst puts it: “Wireless Internet usage represents the convergence 
of two enormous communications trends––the Internet and mobile telephony.”
49  This marked 
trend creates inevitable policy tension. Business and residential customers ravenous for high-
speed access to computer networks are taxed by policies that inefficiently restrict spectrum use. 





                                                         
47  Note that Nextlink, one of the major fiber capacity suppliers in Table 2, is the U.S.’s largest holder of wireless 
FCC licenses (licenses weighted by MHz per capita). The company uses fiber and wireless solutions 
interchangeably for local access, with fiber dominant in city-to-city links. (It should be noted that Nextlink changed 
its name to XO Communications in late 2000.) 
48  Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Sun, Oracle, Dell, Compaq and IBM have all announced major wireless initiatives within 
the past two years. Corey Grice, Microsoft Committed to Wireless, Gates Says, CNET N EWS.COM (Feb. 28, 2000, 
1:30 pm PT), http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1004-200-1559479.html. Company Press Release, Cisco Extends 
Broadband Fixed Wireless Leadership Through Addition of New World Ecosystem Partners (June 28, 2000), 
http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/000628/rpt_ca_cis.html; Joe Wilcox, Dell Hustling Toward Wireless Internet Access, 
CNET N EWS.COM (June 28, 2000, 8:20 am PT), http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1006-200-2165270.html. Wylie 
Wong, IBM Jumps Into Wireless Pool, CNET N EWS.COM (Feb. 29, 2000, 8:00 am PT), 
http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1003-200-1560139.html.  
Stephen Shankland, Sun Set to Announce Partnership With Palm, CNET N EWS.COM (Feb. 28, 2000, 4:50 pm PT), 
http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1006-200-1559908.html. Small wireless companies are also switching gears, 
ramping up to provide broadband wireless access to the net. Corey Grice, Wireless Boom Leads Firms to Swap 
Strategies, CNET N EWS.COM (Feb. 29, 2000, 7:10 am PT), http://news.cnet.com/category/0 -1004-200-
1560128.html.  
49  Merrill Lynch, Wireless Internet: Industry Overview (June 5, 2000), 9. 
50  “Demand for spectrum, which is required to run all mobile communications devices, has increased and wireless 
companies are running out of space to offer new services. The wireless phone industry signs up a new customer 
every two seconds. And as the Internet moves from desktop computers to portable devices such as Palm’s popular 
handheld unit, demand will intensify. ‘Put these two things together and you’ve got this extreme pressure on this 
spectrum resource,’ said Dale Hatfield, chief of the FCC Office of Engineering and Technology.” FCC to Consider 
New Market for Wireless Spectrum, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 30, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-
1983203.html.                 11
 
 
Table 2. Fiber Optic Conduit Suppliers (April 13, 2000) 
 
Supplier  Miles Planned  Miles Installed  Estimated Cost 
Aerie  20,000  0   $3.5 billion  
Williams  33,000  26,000   $4.7 billion  
Qwest  25,500 (all No. America)  25,500   n.a.  
Level 3  16,000  9,334   $13 billion (European, 
Asian, U.S. costs)  
Broadwing 18,000  17,000   n.a.  
Enron 
Broadband 
15,000  14,600   n.a.  
Nextlink   5,000  (metro areas  only; 
links shared with Level 3) 
4,235   n.a.  
Global Crossing  16,000  14,000   n.a.  
360Networks  24,100 (all No. America)  15,000   n.a.  
Source:  Corey Grice, Start-up Carrier Dives into Crowded Bandwidth Market, CNET 





Table 3. Worldwide Wireless Internet Market 
 
  1999E 2000E  2001E  2005E 
WW Wireless Subs (mm)  472  670  907  2,038 
Proportion Internet-Enabled   0%  5%  15%  80% 
No. Internet Enabled  1  34  136  1,631 
WW B2C Commerce Spending      $99  $463 
% Transacted through Wireless      5%  24% 
Wireless e-Commerce Spending      $5  $111 
Subscribers in millions, $ in billions, E = estimated 
Source: Merrill Lynch, Wireless Internet (June 5, 2000), 6. 
 
III. THE BROADCAST TV FADE  
One wireless industry is a lonely bystander to the sector’s upward economic spiral: 
traditional broadcast media. Off-air TV and radio, historically dominant in the business and 
politics of the wireless world, are increasingly pushed to the margins. New digital technology is 
being deployed by TV stations, but the transition is a costly defensive tactic designed to slow 
gains by cable and satellite TV video competitors. High-Definition Television (HDTV) policy, in                 12
 
fact, underscores the decline of broadcasting’s dominance among video and other wireless 
industry segments.
51  
In 1987 the FCC began a rule making for “Advanced Television” (ATV).
52  It was 
ostensibly undertaken to promote a transition to HDTV, a highly touted system delivering crisper 
pictures by transmitting signals of higher resolution. In fact, the proceeding was prompted by the 
political interests of TV station owners, who were not interested in HDTV, but were quite 
concerned that the FCC would re-allocate vacant UHF channel space to other uses. In particular, 
land mobile interests had, beginning in 1985, requested that the Commission make additional 
UHF frequencies available for mobile wireless services. The first re-allocation of UHF TV 
spectrum involved channels 70-83 (78 MHz @ 6 MHz per channel). This allowed the creation of 
two cellular licenses, with each allocated 25 MHz. As cellular telephone service was proving 
popular beyond expectation, pressure arose for the Commission to allow additional entry. 
TV broadcasters blocked re-allocation. While not using the requested frequencies, they 
coveted “spectral Lebensraum.”
53  Leaving “TV spectrum” vacant provided an inventory of 
valuable inputs should expansion one day prove profitable. The enabling mechanism was the 
FCC rule making. Once begun, unoccupied UHF radio waves were frozen so that HDTV might 
use them in the future.
54    
While providing the pressure to initiate the Advanced Television proceeding and the 
momentum to keep it slowly rolling forward, the TV industry remarkably opposed actual 
creation of HDTV broadcasting at almost every turn.
 55  Stations did not perceive consumer 
demand for higher resolution pictures that would justify the cost of providing them. The cost of 
HDTV included outlays for physical equipment (everything from cameras to transmitters to 
home receivers had to upgrade to new technological standards), investments in programming in 
the new format, and the opportunity cost of radio spectrum. Increasing picture resolution 
consumes more bandwidth, ceteris paribus. Broadcasters discovered that using digital technology 
to deliver standard definition (STV) signals
56  could be done in a fraction of the spectrum space 
                                                         
51  HDTV spectrum allocation is separately discussed below.
   
52  Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Inquiry, MM Docket No. 87-268, 2 FCC Rcd 5125. 
53  George C. Calhoun, Digital Cellular Radio  (Norwood, MA: Artech House, 1988), 48. 
54  Thomas G. Donlan, Super-Tech  (Homewood, IL.: Business One Irwin, 1991); Cynthia Beltz, High-tech 
Maneuvers: The Industrial Policy Lessons of HDTV  (Wash. D.C.: AEI Press, 1991);. See also, Thomas W. Hazlett 
and Matthew L. Spitzer, Digital Television and the Quid Pro Quo, __ BUSINESS & POLITICS (forthcoming, 2000).  
55  Joel Brinkley, Defining Vision: How Cunning, Conceit, and Creative Genius Collided in the Race to Invent 
Digital, High-Definition TV  (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.; 1997). 
56  The analog format for standard definition is NTSC, an acronym for the National Television Standards Committee.                  13
 
consumed by one HDTV signal. The compression ratio is somewhere between 4-1 and 10-1 
depending on the programming.
57  
As the ATV rule making pushed into the mid-1990s, it was clear that it had performed its 
function: UHF spectrum not used by analog TV broadcasters remained untouched. But 
constituents of the HDTV idea––primarily technology suppliers and set makers––were pushing 
for deployment. The broadcast lobby was still dubious about the economic merits of the HDTV 
business model. It would not generate net revenues (i.e., additional advertising) unless it 
expanded audience size. Until viewers bought new HDTV-compatible equipment, that would not 
happen––and there was no evidence that either consumer enthusiasm for higher resolution, or 
efficiency gains to drive down very high set prices, would soon be observed.
58  The broadcast 
industry knew that its transition to new technology would cost billions of dollars, but the payoff 
was highly uncertain. 
The industry deserted HDTV, and soon thereafter so did the FCC. In late 1996, just 
months before awarding licenses to stations, the Commission substituted a generic digital 
standard in place of one mandating high-resolution video.
59   Stations would each receive a 
(second) license, free of charge, on which to transmit. The new channel licenses mandated digital 
transmission; HDTV, in digital format, was an option but was not required. Indeed, the FCC 
allowed broadcasters to use some of the allocated 6 MHz for data or other services besides 
television, so long as at least one STV signal were broadcast digitally. Broadcasters, issued DTV 
licenses in April 1997, took advantage of the ruling by abandoning HDTV.
60     
The rule change eased the potential economic damage of an industrial policy forcing 
customers to pay for a particular resolution quality (1080 lines per inch) in a system devised in 
                                                         
57  For instance, talking head TV shows consume relatively little bandwidth; football games with lots of movements 
consume relatively large amounts. Live broadcasts consume more bandwidth than recorded programs, which can be 
compacted prior to being televised. 
58  Digital television sets cost between $5,000 and $10,000, and only 600,000 will have been sold in the U.S. by year-
end 2000, according to TV manufacturers (with a vested interest in optimistic forecasting). Associated Press, Bumpy 
Press Slows Digital TV Release, CNET N EWS.COM (April 11, 2000, 10:40 am PT), http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1006-200-1681018.html. By contrast, there are about 220 million analog sets in use in approximately 100 million 
U.S. television households. 
59  FCC Is Set to Adopt Standard for HDTV, Speeding Introduction, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 26, 1996), 11. 
60  “Multichannel DTV is good…and HDTV is expensive.” This was the bottom line at an industry seminar just four 
months after the FCC issued DTV licenses. Glen Dickson, Low Blows Against High-Def, BROADCASTING & CABLE 
(Aug. 18, 1997), 46. “Hig h-definition TV is starting to get the short shrift as stations decide they’d rather use their 
newfound digital real estate to create multiple standard-definition channels.” John M. Higgins, HDTV Falling Out of 
Favor, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 18, 1997), 4. Jim Davis, Broadcasters to Send Data Over Digital TV 
Airwaves, CNET N EWS.COM (March, 2000, 9:45 am PT), http://news.cnet.com/ category/0-1006-200-1581932.html.                   14
 
Washington.
61  The shift to DTV by both policy makers and television stations, moreover, reveals 
the disintegration of the old broadcasting cartel. Broadcasters previously stood firmly against 
head-to-head competition, with the FCC in lock step. Here, HDTV is abandoned in favor of 
multiple STV channels––increasing rivalry among off-air TV stations. The (high-definition) 
signal is that broadcasters consider the threat posed by new media has flipped the old regulatory 
equilibrium. In the past, broadcast TV’s dominance led it to restrict competition between 
licensees. Now the cartel is anemic. Cable, satellite, and Internet-distributed video stand as 
greater threats to broadcaster profits than station rivals. As an ABC executive commented, the 
network is foregoing HDTV to “occupy more shelf space in the television marketplace.”
62  That 
indicates a sea change in sector economics that is rippling throughout the spectrum allocation 
system.  
 The eclipse of traditional broadcasting is seen in the maturation of cable television and 
the explosive growth of direct broadcast satellite. Combined, the two technologies were 
subscribed to by 81.4% of U.S. households as of June 1999.
63  Viewing audiences are deserting 
broadcast TV in favor of basic cable networks. See Table 4. And while radio and television 
broadcasters have maintained strong revenue growth over the past twenty years, the rate of 
increase pales in comparison to subscription services. See Figure 2. These trends are firmly 
established, and there is no evidence that they will reverse. As Bruce Owen writes: “[T]wo 
things are clear: the government-created artificial scarcity of spectrum will cease to be a defining 
factor in the television industry, and the days when most viewers do not pay for most programs 
are numbered.”
64  The new competition from fee-based entertainment services is shifting the old 
advertising-supported media to a multi-channel video delivery market. This undercuts the easy 
profitability associated with control of the conduit to customers, forcing renewed emphasis on 
content.   
                                                         
61  The Grand Alliance technical standard, eventually adopted by the FCC, was itself a creation of scientific work in 
laboratories around the world. It is important that the Commission, when looking for complex solutions, is often best 
served by sponsoring private competitions rather than attempting to manufacture systems in-house. In fact, most 
FCC rule making relies heavily on the adversarial process generated by allowing private Comments and Replies to 
be filed in response to Commission notices. The FCC nonetheless acts as the ultimate decision maker, using public 
interest criteria to set the rules of the competition and to determine when, and how, proffered solutions are 
implemented. 
62  Dickson, Low Blows, supra note __, 46. 
63  Multi-channel video subscribership grew 5.5% between 1998 and 1999. Federal Communications Commission, 
Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 
99-230 (Jan. 14, 2000), par. 6. 
64  Bruce Owen, The Internet Challenge to Television  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 37.                 15
 
 
Table 4. Viewing Shares for Broadcast TV and Cable-only Channels 
 
    1988  1993  1998 
Commercial Broadcast TV 
Network Affiliates and Independents 
  78   73   57  
Public TV    3   4   3  
Basic Cable Channels   17   26   41  
Pay Cable Channels    7   5   6  
Source: National Cable Television Association, Cable Television Developments, www.ncta.com .  
Note:  Shares may sum to more than 100% due to multiple television sets per household. 
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Sources: www.census.gov/statab/www/part2.html 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, pp. 565, 569  
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994, pp. 568, 571  
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995, pp. 572, 575 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981, p. 563 
No Broadcast TV data, 1981 through 1989 
No Radio data, 1980 through 1989 
 
Broadcasting’s one-time dominance is rapidly fading in the market for news & 
information, as well. According to a 2000 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and 
the Press, only 30 percent of U.S. adults regularly watch TV broadcast network evening news 
shows––a 50% decline since just 1993.  Fifty-six percent report regular viewership of local TV 
news, down from 77 percent in 1993.  Conversely, Internet and cable network news sources are                 16
 
luring vast new audiences. One third of U.S. adults regularly use computer networks for online 
news, while 33 percent regularly watch CNBC, MSNBC, or the Fox News Channel. (Two of the 
three were not yet created in 1993.
65 ) And 37% regularly tune into either Discovery or the 
History Channel. The exodus from broadcasting has been triggered by competition simply 
yielding preferred consumer choices, coupled with the fact that, as Pew finds, only one-third of 
U.S. “adults say they believe most of what they see on ABC, CBS, and NBC.”
66    
Among wireless communication services, the relative decline of television is even 
sharper. Cellular and PCS growth is explosive in comparison with the comparatively stable 
revenue picture in broadcasting.  Current projections are for the torrid pace of wireless telephone 
subscribership to continue, with a doubling of U.S. users between 2000 and 2004. See Figure 3. 
In the broader market yet, the information technology sector, the race for bandwidth is furious. 
Demand for communications conduits intensifies as networks expand, technologies upgrade, 
applications mount, software improves, and customer acceptance of e-commerce grows. All 
these trends point in the same direction: broadcasting, which so long reigned supreme in 
spectrum policy making, is fast becoming just another industry. 
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Source: Merrill Lynch,  Wireless Internet  (June 5, 2000), 8.  
                                                         
65  Paul Kagan Associates, The Economics of Basic Cable Networks  (July 1993).                 17
 
This changes policy. The licensing bargain struck between broadcasters and regulators 
was a political accommodation that drove the 1927 Radio Act and has determined essential 
aspects of spectrum allocation ever since. The bargain relied on spectrum regulation to create 
gains for both parties.
67  Allocation and “technical” rules protected broadcasters from competition 
as well as from fees or competitive bidding (for licenses), and gave political incumbents (both in 
congress and the executive branch) the opportunity to leverage “public interest” discretion for 
some measure of control over content. Given the ban on regulation of free speech in the U.S. 
Constitution, this was a formidable regulatory achievement.
68  As the rents accruing from 
parsimonious spectrum allocation policies (licensing many fewer broadcast competitors than 
could utilize the airwaves) were substantial in the golden eras of radio and television 
broadcasting, the incentives for radio and TV interests to play the quid pro quo game were high. 
Likewise for policy makers, who consider the publicity generated by mass media outlets as key 
inputs into the “political support functions” which ultimately determine career success.   
Prior to the advent of cellular telephone service, licensed 1984-1989, the FCC’s spectrum 
allocation policies were almost solely focused on broadcasting. No other wireless service 
assumed sufficient economic or political importance to rival broadcasting’s hegemony over 
spectrum policy. While AT&T wielded considerable regulatory clout over telecommunications, 
AT&T-backed initiatives to re-allocate UHF spectrum for mobile services were rebuffed, due 
largely to broadcaster opposition, for decades.
69  It is also noteworthy that, within markets not 
directly involving broadcasters, spectrum allocation policies thawed.
70    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
66  Michael Kelly, Network Snooze, WASH. POST (June 14, 2000), A39. 
67  See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum 33 J. LAW & ECON. 133 
(April 1990).  
68  See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions 
Take 67 Years?, 41 J. L. & ECON. (Oct. 1998) 529.  
69  When mobile phone service debuted in 1946, it proved popular and AT&T petitioned the Commission for 
additional air channels. Yet, “the Commission’s decision on the 1949 docket was a total victory for the broadcast 
interests. They rejected Bell’s ideas and refused to allocate any portion of this valuable spectrum to mobile 
telephony.” Not until 1968 did the FCC begin to allocate UHF spectrum for telecommunications, and not until the 
1980s were licenses finally issued to cellular operators. See Calhoun, Digital Cellular Radio , supra note __, 46-49, 
63.  
70  In point-to-point microwave for long distance service, important liberalization was instituted in the 1970s. The 
1988 FCC decision to allow cellular operators to voluntarily adopt digital standards was another key precedent (if 
too late to avoid inefficient deployment of analog cellular). The relatively liberal rules used in the PCS allocation 
demonstrate the most far-reaching deregulation of a major service category – in common carrier 
telecommunications, not broadcasting. Indeed, broadcasters continue to block flexible use of 700 MHz spectrum in 
the ongoing battle over relocation of TV channels 60-69. See discussions below.                 18
 
The broadcast sector fade undermines regulatory micro-management.
71   Increasingly, 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers, computer software and hardware companies, 
networking firms, application service providers and silicon chip makers are drawn to wireless. 
These interests are generically progressive where broadcasters are generically conservative; they 
promote enhanced availability of spectrum where radio and television broadcasters seek to 
sequester it. The New Economy companies typically profit from expanding bandwidth, driving 
access costs down, increasing functionality and expanding the size (and therefore utility) of 
networks. The FCC’s professed interest in liberalization is not a mystery in the rising shadow of 
Intel, Dell, Nortel, Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, RealNetworks, Akamai, InfoSpace, Critical Path, 
Wind River Systems, Broadvision, and Research in Motion,
72  or the diminishing presence of 
ABC, CBS and NBC. The newcomers naturally seek access to unoccupied radio waves, attempt 
to tap “spectrum reserves,” and challenge inflexible rules protecting the status quo.  
The shifting economics have yet to overturn history, however. The basic structure for 
allocating radio waves is still that crafted in the Radio Act of 1927.
73   FCC airwave regulation 
operates on two broad levels. First, basic resource utilization is determined in the spectrum 
allocation process. This zones bands of frequencies for particular uses––e.g., AM radio, 
broadcast TV, cellular telephone, point-to-point private communications, satellite messaging, etc. 
The FCC, however, has much broader power than determining type-of-service. Within the 
allocation process it sets rules on how many rivals will compete, what services they are permitted 
to offer, what technologies they will use, and a host of fundamental business decisions––e.g., if 
they are to operate as a common or private carrier.   
Once the allocation decision is made, regulators carry out the license assignment 
process.
74   From 1927 until 1981, the sole method used was comparative hearings, political 
                                                         
71  The policy to relax the HDTV requirement in December 1996 was itself largely the result of pressure from 
computer software and hardware interests. Alex Lash, Digital TV Standards Off to Market, CNET N EWS.COM (Dec. 
26, 1996, 1:30 pm PT), http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1003-200-315409.html. 
72  Intel, Dell, Nortel, Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, RealNetworks, and Akamai, are important New Economy firms 
building pieces of communications networks, and each benefits from lower priced network inputs (including 
spectrum). InfoSpace, Critical Path, Wind River Systems, Palm, Broadvision, and Research in Motion depend on 
wireless ‘conduits’ for service delivery.  
73  The Radio Act of 1927 created the Federal Radio Commission. The Radio Act was then inserted, virtually 
verbatim, into the Communications Act of 1934, which replaced the Radio Commission with the Federal 
Communications Commission. The latter assumed responsibility for wireless communications from the FRC, as well 
as authority over long-distance telephony, which it acquired from the Interstate Commerce Commission. This 
regulatory apparatus has remained largely untouched by legislation in the decades since. The 1996 
Telecommunications Act, a major reform effort in wireline communications, did not alter the spectrum allocation 
process in any substantial way.  
74  Some spectrum is allocated on an unlicensed basis. Here the FCC sets rules for spectrum usage, and allows open 
entry under those rules. This requires FCC approval of the equipment used for transmitting in the band. Other bands                 19
 
selection of competing applicants. Then Congress voted to allow the FCC to employ lotteries for 
non-broadcast licenses. In 1993, Congress finally granted the FCC authority to conduct auctions 
for non-broadcast licenses.
75  In 1997, this authority was extended to include broadcast licenses.
76    
Federal regulators allocate airwaves under the statutory standard of “public interest, 
convenience, or necessity.” Firms wishing to utilize airwaves for new, competitive purposes 
must make an affirmative public interest showing before the Federal Communications 
Commission. This burden cannot be met by simply offering to invest private capital in an attempt 
to deliver better and/or lower-priced services to customers, the hurdle for entry into an 
unregulated market. Other public interest considerations can, and will, be raised by interests 
opposed to competition. These objections may be raised without penalty, even if allegations 
made prove false and self-serving. The rule making process is open (with all interested parties 
free to file Comments or Replies) to the various notices issued, and open ended, taking years or 
decades to complete. Of course, incumbents benefit from delay, while potential entrants are 
deterred (leading some potential entrants not to try at all). Given this conservative bias, the basic 
spectrum allocation system is structurally hostile to new competitors. 
IV.  SPECTRUM ECONOMICS: TRAGEDIES COMMON AND UN  
Unregulated access to radio waves may result in a “tragedy of the commons,”* 
destroying a valuable resource due to over-use. The standard tools of property law address such 
issues more directly than does public interest spectrum allocation, however. Private owners 
spontaneously assess consumer benefits in nuanced profit calculations (trading costs against 
revenues), while regulators tend to categorical decisions. The block allocation system is the sine 
qua non of FCC spectrum regulation. It uses an economically crude, and technically obsolete, 
framework to separate various services in frequency space. The system is administratively 
manageable, and it affords great opportunities for incumbent service providers to truncate entry 
(automatically limited by the blocks and channels allocated). But the system is clearly inept at 
maximizing consumer welfare, as vast portions of spectrum space is left vacant and virtually all 
the remaining portions are under-utilized. This is seen in great detail in examples discussed 
throughout this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
are allocated for federal or military use. Wireless users in these blocks are not licensed by the FCC, but are 
coordinated by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA). 
75  Numerous calls for a system of fees or auctions had been made during virtually the entire life of the present 
regulatory system. See Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights, supra note __.  
76  Ibid.                 20
 
The interference rationale for public interest allocation has historically been based on the 
claim that radio spectrum is a “unique” resource that cannot be regulated by standard means such 
as property rights. Not only is this proposition theoretically false, as demonstrated by Coase,
77  it 
is operationally incorrect, as radio spectrum users under public interest regulation rely on de 
facto private property rights to limit interference. Wireless licensees, not the FCC, police “their” 
airspace,
78  reporting interference from unauthorized transmissions (“piracy”) to law enforcement 
authorities.
79  Rarely is trespass reported because incursions are rare and substantial damage rarer 
still. In practice, investors are unwilling to underwrite transmitting facilities without secure 
spectrum access. Market forces constrain private parties to respect lines drawn by regulators. 
Interference is a cost of doing business in wireless. Like some other byproducts (e.g., 
pollution) it is a cost that can spill over to third parties, short-circuiting rational mitigation by 
interference producers if the rules allow it. Of course, avoiding spillovers is itself a delicate 
process. It is not efficient, for example, to minimize interference. All wireless communications 
(indeed, all radiation-emitting activities) imply some positive level of potential deterioration of 
valuable signals. Some interference is valuable input into services providing consumer gains that 
far outweigh the costs (including those emanating from interference damage).  Hence, the quest 
is for an optimal level of interference. 
A simple example illustrates. Consider a given band of frequencies that has been divided 
into twenty channels.
80  These channels may carry audio broadcasts at low cost to consumers with 
receivers. There are six different plans considered for implementation. See Figure 4.  
 
                                                         
77  Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. (1959), 1. 
78  The airspace does not formally belong to the wireless service provider, but is allocated to the license under which 
they operate. This is sometimes argued to be de facto private property, but the limitations on use due to non-
ownership are typically substantial. Hence, an important distinction remains between the de facto and de jure 
notions of spectrum ownership. 
79  When it is asserted that the FCC polices the airwaves, the picture of radio scanning equipment in a high tech 
government facility comes to mind. In fact, the FCC engages in minimal monitoring of frequency use. The practical 
FCC contribution to law and order in frequency space is enforcement of licensing rules in response to complaints. 
Licensees are very efficient monitors of their transmissions and are quick to report interference to the agency. The 
limited arena in which FCC detection of illegal emissions is important is “pirate radio.” Precisely because 
unlicensed low power FM stations typically do not materially interfere with existing broadcasts, their whereabouts 
may be undetected by locally licensed stations. These latter broadcasters are vigilant in communicating suspected 
incidents of unlicensed broadcasting to the Commission, however, as such broadcasts compete for audience share. 
FCC officials then track down and prosecute the illegal broadcasters. See discussion of low power FM, below. 
*see discussion on infra at note __.  
80  Choices over channelization plans are themselves subject to efficiency trade-offs, but we abstract from them in 
this example.                 21
 
Figure 4. Alternative Band Plans 
 
FM Channel: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20   
 
Plan #1                                      Stations: 5 
Quality:  97 
 
Plan #2                                          Stations: 10 
Quality:  89 
 
Plan #3                                        Stations:  6 
Quality: 96 
 
Plan #4                                        Stations:  8 
Quality: 93 
 
Plan #5                                          Stations: 20 
Quality:  75 
 
Plan #6                                          Stations: 20 
Quality:  95 
 
This hypothetical array of alternative band plans––six out of an infinite population––
poses standard trade-offs in spectrum use. In Plan 1, channels are spaced widely and interference 
relatively low. This yields just five listening choices for customers, but an excellent signal 
quality rating of 97.
81  Plan 2 packs in more stations with less separation. This results in a many 
more station choices (11), with reduced signal quality (89). Plans 3 and 4 represent compromises 
in the choice-signal trade-off bounded by 1 and 2. Plan 5 packs in emissions very densely, using 
all twenty channels for communication. The loss in signal quality is pronounced. Plan 6 is 
identical to Plan 5, except a change in a second variable (in addition to spacing) is introduced––
power. At lower power assignments the 20 channels of transmissions create much less 
interference. Of course, this changes other aspects of reception, including a narrowing of their 
geographic reach.   
Countless plans are possible when channel slots, bandwidth, power, technology, and 
transmitter location are varied. Changing the quality of listeners’ receiving equipment also alters 
the value of broadcasting. Which plan yields the greatest value? All plans encompass trade-offs 
between more broadcasting and less static. Rational spectrum use does prevent a “tragedy of the 
commons,” but it must simultaneously guard against the reverse problem––“tragedy of the 
                                                         
81  These numbers and ratings are arbitrarily constructed in the example. They demonstrate the general nature of the 
allocation problem. When allocating spectrum further complexity is introduced by the disagreement over the actual 
magnitudes. The trade-offs shown in the example expand to new dimensions concerning the reliability of differing 
estimates for reception, station viability (determining the final allocation of stations in the marketplace), the value to 
consumers of additional choices, and the value to consumers of improved reception.                 22
 
uncommons.” If the incremental value gained by additional radio emissions exceeds the value of 
communications lost due to increased interference, it would be tragic to “protect” spectrum by 
blocking socially valuable use. 
The Static Case 
82  
Radio transmissions generate benefits but also cause potential interference. In the 
standard situation, pictured generically in Figure 5, gross benefits are depicted as the aggregate 
Sum of Private Gains from wireless communications in the band (Ó Private Gains). These rise 
with the quantity of transmissions, but at a decelerating rate. That is because of two reinforcing 
effects: (a) the most valuable communications are conducted first, and (b) increasing traffic 
compacts the bandwidth available for new service. The costs of radio interference are also 
displayed in Figure 5 (Ó Private Losses). Losses result when transmissions disrupt other wireless 
communications, degrading signals.
83  In the absence of compensation, this results in external 
costs––pollution––imposed on third parties. Initially, the low volume of transmissions causes 
little interference, resulting in little economic damage. As more intensive use is made of the 
band, however, increasingly valuable communications are lost. Indeed, the losses are anticipated 
to rise at an accelerating rate.
84  
                                                         
82  No pun intended. “The Static Case” refers to optimal band allocation at a point in time, freezing technology and 
service innovation. “The Dynamic Case” follows. Static interference is part of the static case analysis by semantic 
coincidence. 
83  Proponents of “spread spectrum” or “ultra-wide band” technologies sometimes claim that these modes of 
transmission do not fit this pattern. In essence, they argue that unlimited communications are possible via computer 
algorithms or low-power devices, yielding additional communications in a band without congestion – forever. This 
is false, as discussed below. In fact, dynamic considerations do change the shape of the Gains and Losses curves and 
are an important consideration in determining the optimal level of communications, but the basic access rule 
framework is impervious to such technical arguments. 
84  While non-linearity in band degradation is the likely functional form, the basic economics are unaffected if a 
linear degradation pattern obtains.                 23
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Net Social Value, the difference between Private Gains and Private Losses, is at a 
maximum where the marginal cost of band use equals marginal benefit. This point will be the 
optimum utilization level (T* in Figure 5). The practical challenge is in deriving the underlying 
cost and benefit functions. Both are defined by consumer valuations, and how customers value 
alternative possibilities is not easily discovered. Indeed, the information is not likely to be known 
ex ante by consumers themselves. Only in actual markets are choices made that reveal such data. 
This reality will properly influence the tools chosen – and their effectiveness – in 
regulating radio spectrum usage. But it does not change the basic implication of Figure 5, which 
is that utilization close to T* is the optimal level of communications. Strictly speaking, public 
policy should not seek to eliminate all sources of interference, only those whose costs exceed 
their value. Figure 5 also suggests that spectrum access rules may avert “tragedy of the 
commons,” a resource allocation problem most famously described by biologist Garrett Hardin: 
 
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all… 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or                 24
 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What is the utility to me of adding 
one more animal to my herd?’ This utility has one negative component and one 
positive component.  
 
1.  The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since 
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, 
the positive utility is nearly +1.  
 
2.  The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by 
one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all 
the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decisionmaking herdsman 
is only a fraction of –1.  
 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes 
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to the 
herd. And another… But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational 
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit––in a world that is 
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in 
a commons brings ruin to all.
85   
 
Overuse similarly dissipates value in the spectrum “pasture.” While individual users reap 
gains from wireless transmissions, potentially destructive interference lands on third parties. 
Service providers are able to realize Gains even when usage exceeds T*––a situation where the 
marginal Losses from congestion are higher than the incremental Gains. The system’s defect 
stems from the fact that Losses (from interference) are incurred generally whereas Gains are 
captured specifically. It is not a technical problem, but an economic coordination problem, as 
shown by both Hardin and the seminal paper by Ronald Coase.
86  The commons leads to market 
failure in that the marginal costs faced by resource users exclude damage absorbed by others.  
                                                         
85  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 SCIENCE (1968), 1243 (emphasis in original).  
86  Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). This article notes that the tragedy of the 
commons can be solved by enforcement of property rights to the resource, leading to optimal dissipation. This was 
later dubbed the “Coase Theorem” by George Stigler, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics. Stigler, Memoirs of 
an Unregulated Economist  (New York: Basic Books, 1988) 73-79. The Theorem was actually discovered as Coase                 25
 
The “tragedy of the commons” has a corollary––the “tragedy of the uncommons.” This 
results from use limitations that prevent over-exploitation by being too restrictive, leaving 
socially valuable uses unrealized. Were band use capped at T 1 (< T*), for example, very little 
damage would result from interference. In fact, too little. Services that could be efficiently 
provided consumers are prevented, lowering social welfare.  
Optimal policy involves a balancing of the respective forms of social loss. Call Type I 
Error over-utilization (or the airwave “chaos” problem, featuring “destructive interference”). 
Call Type II Error under-utilization (where “productive interference” is inefficiently blocked). 
Rules that minimize social losses from the sum of these errors maximize social welfare.  
The Dynamic Case 
T* is a static optimum. In a dynamic world, however, changing customer preferences and 
new opportunities perceived by entrepreneurs affect optimal spectrum use. Net Social Value is 
maximized only if the “best” T* obtains. This means that rules should not simply police 
bandwidth to limit destructive interference, they should encourage innovative services and 
technology to develop and compete in the marketplace. As seen in Figure 6, the optimum at T A
* 
(identical to T A
* in Figure 5) loses its luster when services offering greater benefits (Gains B) and 
superior technology with lower congestion costs (Losses B) are available.                                                                
It is even more difficult to determine values associated with future technologies, 
however, than existing services. While some operating data, including revenues and accounting 
flows, exist for the latter, similar information for new systems or applications can only be 
projected. Even for existing firms with established operating histories, projections by market 
experts can vary widely. For innovations, the projections are extremely volatile. One indicator of 
the uncertainty associated with technology adoption is the high cost of capital facing start-up 
firms. Venture capitalists require returns far higher than those associated with standard equity 
investments to back innovative ideas, for the simple reason that even scientific certification of 
the technical aspects of a new service or product yields only limited clues as to its ultimate 
success with consumers. Picking winners on the frontier of creative enterprise is very risky, even 
given due diligence.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pondered the very issue at hand – regulation of radio spectrum. Hence, the analysis of radio waves has achieved “a 
special, almost holy, place in the economic analysis of law and the economics of property rights.” Dean Lueck, The 
Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J. L. & ECON. 393, 419 (Oct. 1995).                  26
 
















             
There are many more ways to miss a optimum than in the static case. For instance, 
assume that policy makers succeed in establishing rules leading to optimal spectrum use at T A
* in 
Period A. Economic conditions change in Period B. A new set of innovative wireless services 
becomes available, offering a new (static) optimum at T B
*. Because T B
* > T A
*, it is clear that 
consumer welfare would improve (more wireless service, lower prices) were the radio spectrum 
reallocated to the new service in Period B.
87  Public policy that performs flawlessly under one set 
of conditions can, in failing to accurately forecast coming marketplace opportunities, become 
instantly obsolete. 
The Conservative Bias of Spectrum Regulation 
Identifying T* is a complex practical matter. It requires an intensity of wireless traffic, 
and efficient systems, taking the market right up to the “edge of chaos.”
88  Band managers must 
                                                         
87  This also assumes that the costs of transition are less than the gains realized by the new technology. 
88  S. Kaufman, At Home in the Universe  (New York: Wiley, 1995). Sophisticated technologies aim to produce just 
such a result, using every possible bandwidth available before significantly diminishing communications quality. 
Joseph Mitola III, Software Radio Architecture: A Mathematical Perspective, IEEE J. OF SELECTED AREAS IN 
COMMUNICATIONS (May 1999).                 27
 
account for consumer demands over a wide array of competing services, including demands by 
business users (input markets). These include services not yet provided or even invented. 
Optimal deployment entails comparing countless alternative delivery platforms (including non-
wireless services that substitute for or complement wireless). As the standard discovery of such 
platforms is via the “gale of creative destruction,”
89  projections are fraught with difficulty. 
Investments in technology and telecommunications infrastructure are long-lived, meaning that 
spectrum allocation plans necessarily impact––and are impacted by––future innovation. No 
central authority enjoys knowledge of the information relevant to such complex economic issues.  
Regulators do not attempt to blindly assert control over radio spectrum. While the public 
interest allocation process is formally top-down, with rule makings initiated and then imposed by 
Commission fiat, essential information inputs are gathered from decentralized sources. The FCC 
methodically invites public comment at every stage of its deliberations, drawing extensive 
information from interested parties.
90    
Each FCC spectrum allocation requires a rule making, usually triggered by a petition 
filed by a private party. (The agency may initiate a proceeding on its own, and it need not initiate 
a rule making just because one is requested.) Petitions received are published and public 
comment is invited. If the Commission decides to act, it issues one of three general documents: a 
Notice of Inquiry (NOI), a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), or a Memorandum Report 
and Order (R&O). Unless the Commission chooses to deny a petition without further evaluation, 
the standard sequence is to issue (if the agency wishes to proceed) an NOI, followed (if it wishes 
to proceed further) by an NPRM, followed (if proceeding still further) by a R&O. Multiple 
notices can be issued at every level, as the FCC considers, reconsiders, and amends its rules.
91  
The process elicits information for policy makers. The NOI says, in effect: This is what 
we’re thinking about doing. Tell us what you think. There is a Comment period and then a Reply 
Comment period. The NPRM is the FCC’s tentative proposal––again, comments are invited. 
Licensees, wireless equipment manufacturers, potential entrants, industry trade associations, and 
government agencies with a material interest in the matter dutifully respond with documents 
                                                         
89  Joseph Schumpeter’s memorable phrase describing the dynamic process of capitalism, much used in today’s 
communications markets. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy  (New York: Harper & Sons, 1942),  
90  The rule making process is formally governed by the Administrative Practices Act, U.S.C. § 706. For an 
informative overview of its actual operation, see Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An 
Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169 (1978). 
91  Robert L. Hilliard, The Federal Communications Commission: A Primer  (Stoneham, MA: Focal Press, 1991), 72-
3.                 28
 
offering legal arguments and empirical evidence supporting their preferred policy.
92  Law firms 
specializing in communications are retained to draft these statements, and expert statements by 
industry experts, economists, engineers, or scientists are often attached as exhibits. That the 
filings from vested interests are self-serving does not destroy their credibility. Indeed, because 
comments and supporting data submitted to the Commission are crafted on behalf of 
shareholders, the Commission views such information as reliable representations of economic 
interest. In the adversarial process contrasting positions are presented and argued, allowing 
regulators to glean useful knowledge about the marketplace.
93  
The rule making process is iterative, open-ended and highly discretionary, limited only 
by “public interest, convenience, or necessity.” The Commission may elect to pause, to stop, or 
to move forward at essentially any point. There is no time limit, and costs or benefits accruing to 
consumers are external to policy makers, who are directly influenced by political costs and 
benefits specific to Commission members.
94  Congress and the Executive Branch also provide 
essential information conduits to FCC policy makers, communicating the positions of important 
constituencies through legislators.
95  This is often a preferred medium for influential interest 
groups, who can gain input into rule makings without public disclosure, thereby improving their 
advantage over rival interests; for legislators, who may extract compensation (of various forms) 
for the access provided interested parties; and commissioners, who have more regulatory latitude 
the slimmer the formal record, and who use such channels to nurture ongoing relationships with 
                                                         
92  Other parties, including individual consumers, activist lobbying organizations, academics, or independent industry 
experts, also participate. As a practical matter, these filings typically produce limited market data for Commission 
decision makers. They may offer valuable political information to the agency, however. 
93  The analogy to the adversarial process in jurisprudence is clear. Yet, the structure of justice in equitable courts is 
distinct from what develops under the public interest standard. See below. 
94  Members of the Federal Communications Commission are appointed to five-year terms by the President, subject 
to confirmation by the Senate. Three members are of the president’s political party. Congressional leaders (usually 
ranking members of the Senate Commerce Committee, overseeing FCC operations) and the White House use FCC 
appointments to reward important campaign contributors or outstanding staff members for services rendered. 
Members are predictably loyal to their political champions. Chairman Reed Hundt (1993-1997), for example, claims 
to have regularly consulted Vice President Al Gore, known to be the source of Hundt’s selection, in making 
Commission decisions. Hundt, You Say You Want a Revolution  (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2000).  
95  “[T]he most powerful and persistent ‘political’ influence over the Commission clearly originates with the 
congressional appropriations and oversight committees and with other important members of the legislature.” 
Richard E. Wiley, “Political” Influence at the FCC, 1988 DUKE L. J. 280. 282 (1988). Wiley chaired the FCC under 
Pres. Nixon. He went on to quote a predecessor’s experience: Newton Minow’s “courtesy visit” to House Speaker 
Sam Rayburn after his nomination: “’Mr. Sam’ put his arm around the new FCC Chairman and said, ‘Just remember 
one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of the Congress; you belong to us. Remember that and you’ll be all right.’” In 
Erwin Krasnow, Lawrence Longley & Herbert Terry, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation  (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1982), 89.                  29
 
political patrons. With the formal and informal information collected on industry economics, 
alternative technologies, and interest group pressures, regulators then supply spectrum rules.
96   
Three sources of non-market failure are evident in FCC spectrum allocation.
97  The first is 
the FCC’s lack of information relative to competitive markets. Despite the elaborate and partially 
successful attempt to draw information from private sector sources, the resulting allocations must 
rely on relatively crude estimates. For instance, a recent Department of Commerce report 
reviewed wireless services being provided in the 24 GHz, 28-31 GHz, 39 GHz, and 59–64 GHz 
bands. The study was specifically designed to determine “spectrum requirements for the fixed 
[i.e., non-mobile or satellite] services.” Despite abundant input from non-government sources, 
the study’s author is unable to even hazard a guess as to future market developments: 
 
It is difficult to know whether all (or any) of these applications will be 
commercially successful… Not only are these totally new applications, but they 
are still changing. MMDS [multi-channel, multipoint distribution service, or 
“wireless cable”] and LMDS [local, multipoint distribution service], for example, 
started out as alternative ways to distribute analog TV. They are now becoming 
super-CLECs [competitive local exchange carriers], offering telephone, high-
speed Internet access, and video entertainment. Who knows what they will be ten 
years from now? Industry is making its predictions backed with billions of dollars 
of capital investment. The author hesitates to even venture a guess, but it will be 
very interesting to see how things work out.
98  
 
The second source of non-market failure is that the information gleaned from interested 
parties will systematically exclude the interests of the general public. Individual consumers have 
small interests at stake, and the investment required to become both knowledgeable and 
influential are insufficiently compensated. While consumers would generally benefit from 
policies allowing optimal spectrum use, each consumer rationally attempts to free ride on 
                                                         
96  Some economists model regulation as a supply and demand problem, with (monopoly) policy makers maximizing 
political support (ultimately, votes) by supplying rules sought by political constituencies. See Sam Peltzman, 
Toward A General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (Aug. 1976); Gary Becker, A Theory of 
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (Aug. 1983). 
97  Charles Wolf, Jr., Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives  (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1989). 
98  Robert J. Matheson, Spectrum Usage for the Fixed Services, NTIA Report 00-378 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. 
of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Admin., March 2000), 92-3. The NTIA regulates 
federal spectrum use.                  30
 
investments of others. That strategy is rational even when little investment in pro-consumer 
lobbying results. Public policy is a non-excludable public good.
99  
The third non-market failure stems from the incentives of incumbent licensees and 
regulators. Material self-interest of these primary participants in the regulatory process strongly 
favor under-utilization of radio spectrum. Incumbent licensees benefit from policies that keep 
interfering transmissions (costly to their emissions) at a minimum, and also from rules that 
exclude competitive entry into their markets. The block allocation system has historically served 
spectrum-based industries (AM radio, TV broadcasting, cellular radio, e.g.) as a cartel 
enforcement device, limiting service competition by denying licenses to newcomers and policing 
technical operations so as to lower industry output.
100  In addition to this anti-competitive motive, 
however, incumbent licensees will predictably serve as aggressive monitoring agents of radio 
spectrum, such that any interference (actual or potential) will be reported to the FCC with 
elaborate documentation. Wireless firms will not sit idly by while new entrants invade their 
operating space, degrading quality of service. Indeed, the problems of radio interference are 
unlikely to be over-estimated, as incumbents use the system to strategically deter entry.
101  
On the contrary, losses from deterring entry will be under-reported. First, the major 
beneficiaries of entry, consumers, will not invest in rent seeking to unleash new competition due 
to the public good problem.
102  Consumer interests will not generally be represented at all except 
insofar as equipment manufacturers, large users, or technology suppliers––better organized 
constituencies with interests parallel to consumers––enter the policy fray. Second, potential 
                                                         
99  This problem is not easily remedied by organizations purporting to represent consumer interests. Such groups do 
not prosper by how well they advance policies lowering prices, but by how well they appeal to targeted audiences 
such as the press, ideologically driven contributors, and ideologically driven executives (who enjoy “consumer 
activism”). Such organizations are highly motivated to appeal to such constituencies, as can be seen from the sharp 
philosophical divergence of such groups. Naderite groups such as the Consumer Federation of America or 
Consumers’ Union rarely agree or collaborate with market-oriented groups such as Citizens for a Sound Economy or 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, despite rival declarations promoting consumer interests. Each group prospers 
by appealing to a core constituency defined by philosophical motivations rather than consumer interests. An 
example illustrating the difference is the endorsement of trade barriers (or opposition to trade liberalization) by some 
“consumer” groups. 
100  Existing communications firms will be vigilant – and relatively effective -- in bringing the alleged problems of 
entry to the attention of regulators, Congress, the Administration and the press. They will motivate regulators’ 
sympathy by offering compensation in multiple dimensions, offering to subsidize popular programs (universal 
service, educational programming for children, etc.), hiring ex-FCC officials at attractive pay levels, contributing 
generously to political benefactors, or making other commitments to the public weal. This inducement to regulate is 
summarized by Richard A. Posner,  Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGT. SCI. 22 (1971). 
101  Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam,  The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process  
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1978). 
102  This reflects the bias inherent in economic regulation. Concentrated gains for special interests are pursued more 
diligently than equal dollar values diffused among the general public. Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965).                 31
 
competitors have less incentive to lobby for pro-entry policies than incumbents have to lobby 
against them. Incumbent rents predictably exceed those available to entrants in what would be a 
more competitive marketplace.
103    
Potential entrants may not even be identified prior to opening a market. Entry is 
discouraged by the requirement to invest in a rule making to open spectrum access; it is a tax 
(paid in lawyers’ fees, consulting contracts, and the capital-draining byproducts of delay and 
uncertainty) lowering expected returns. Incumbents are more motivated players in the lobbying 
process, as they seek to protect profits in a less competitive field. Incumbents also enjoy 
advantages in challenging arguments concerning social gains from new entry. Such gains are 
always speculative. In an open-ended public interest determination, intense debate can focus on 
the benefits asserted to materialize in the future. Innovative technology, inherently risky, is 
relatively uncompetitive in the administrative process, where the status quo creates a comfort 
level for agency bureaucrats armed with ample documentation from vested interests.  
Since the losses associated with over-utilization of spectrum will be closely monitored 
and carefully reported, while losses from under-utilization will generally not be, the allocation 
system will be especially prone to Type II error.
104  Equivalently, it will be overly sensitive to 
Type I error, the “cacophony of competing voices” forming the fundamental legal rationale for a 
central allocation system.
105  There is relatively little negative feedback to the FCC from the costs 
of restricting spectrum access, compared to the pressure resulting from potential losses from 
output expansion (including both pro-competitive effects and radio interference). This parallels 
the skewed incentives of Food and Drug Administration regulators, who tend to weigh the 
potential costs of new drug approvals (per injury or death) more heavily than costs resulting from 
the suppression of live-saving medicines.
106  Potential victims of deterred entry are not well 
identified, and are under-valued. Competition is inefficiently truncated, and consumers lose.  
Not all arguments by incumbents opposing entry are anti-competitive. Existing operators 
offer informed and useful testimony as to the probability that new spectrum users will create 
interference, imposing real costs. Such information is valuable for optimal band utilization. What 
is problematic in spectrum allocation policy, however, is that the incumbent has incentives to 
                                                         
103  The exception to this rule would be where a new entrant anticipates overwhelming advantages due to the use of 
innovative technology. In such instances, regulatory resistance may, in fact, be overcome. 
104  Political pressure will accompany reporting, assuring regulatory responsiveness, particularly when interests 
notify congressional and executive branch policy makers about FCC policy concerns. 
105  Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).                  32
 
combine the interference problem with the (incumbent’s) market structure problem. Indeed, the 
opportunity to deter competition by leveraging interference concerns is the primary manner in 
which technical spectrum issues will enter the incumbent’s calculus.   
For instance, suppose that an incumbent wireless operator discovers, through internal 
research and testing, that adjacent bandwidth could accommodate a competitive entrant were a 
slight, inexpensive modification made by the incumbent (perhaps aiming antennae and 
transceivers at different angles). This private information is not likely to be proffered in a rule 
making considering allocation of the adjacent band for competitive services. Instead, wishing to 
avoid a loss of profits due to entry, the incumbent will argue that interference will degrade 
existing transmissions, and elaborately document the costs. The arguments will be true, but not 
economically accurate. More efficient rules would reward incumbents that volunteer their best 
information, including proprietary knowledge about economical ways to intensify utilization of 
the spectrum resource.
107  Instead, incumbents maximize profit by withholding information, 
advancing narrow arguments against entry. The limits imposed by inefficient spectrum use can 
serve to protect incumbents’ market share,
108  and spectrum regulation––largely dependent on 
regulatees for information about alternative system designs––often lock-in obsolete standards. A 
rather striking example of technology fossilization is provided by analog television broadcasting. 
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Lucent Technologies, has over 30,000 full-time researchers who file four patents per day. Six Nobel Prizes, awarded 
to 11 different scientists, have been won for work performed at Bell Labs. http://www.bell-labs.com/employment/; 
http://www.bell-labs.com/blpeople.html. At the other end of the spectrum is CableLabs, founded by cable TV 
operators to pursue joint research projects and coordinate industry standards in 1988. It has over 80 full-time 
employees and hosts over 30 engineers and scientists from other organizations. 
http://www.cablelabs.org/about_cl/factSheet.html. Literally scores of research centers and thousands of private 
telecommunications firms invest to explore new technologies, standards, and applications. One such firm, 
Qualcomm, spent over $381 million in 1999 on research and development. Qualcomm Inc. 10-K Annual Report 
(filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission Nov. 17, 1999), 34. By contrast the  entire budget of the FCC in 
fiscal 1997 totaled about $190 million. Robert Corn-Revere, Mass Media …  
108  A great example of incumbent interests pushing technical standards designed to impose inefficiency is seen in the 
HDTV proceeding. As one advocate of HDTV told an industry group concerned about possible FCC auctions to 
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The current NTSC standard for off-air TV was adopted in 1941.
109  Meanwhile, the unregulated 
computer industry has been upgrading. While personal computer monitors in the early 1980s had 
decidedly lower resolution than TV screens, the cheapest PC monitors sold today feature pictures 
far sharper than analog television.
110  
Optimal spectrum management moves the radio resource into promising new 
applications, closing down low-valued operations. Technology adoption is simply another 
transition: using spectrum inputs more effectively, satisfying more intensely-valued consumer 
demands. The key to efficiency lies in (a) identifying the gains from new deployment, (b) 
identifying the losses from discontinuing, or uprooting, existing services, and (c) the ability to 
execute winning trades in a timely fashion. At all three levels, regulatory bias appears: (a) new 
opportunities are speculative and under-weighted, without existing constituencies; (b) costs to 
existing users are more immediate, easier to document, and over-weighted, with relatively 
powerful allies vested in the status quo; (c) the adjudication process is itself a public good, and 
regulators do not suffer material loss when consumer benefits are delayed or destroyed.   
The structural nature of rule making favors inaction. Entrants petitioning for the use of 
under-utilized frequencies must shoulder a burden of proof, showing that new competition is in 
the public interest. This vague standard gives wide latitude to regulators to block entry, even in 
instances in which consumers would clearly benefit. As is typically the case in bureaucratic or 
even legislative processes, it is much easier to stop an initiative than to enact one, ceteris paribus. 
Of course, incumbents may be coaxed into accepting new spectrum allotments, but the price is 
typically high. Incumbents will not settle for mere compensation, but will seek to extract up to 
the entire social gain that their cooperation (moving, and thereby allowing spectrum to be 
reallocated) enables. These negotiations––arduous given the level of uncertainty prior to 
technology adoption, and further complicated by lack of clear ownership rights––are costly and 
time-consuming. 
111  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rate of the 6 MHz allocated to each license].” As explained by Joel Brinkley, “If TV stations broadcast high-
definition programs… there would be no space left to auction off.” Brinkley, Defining Vision , supra note __, 324.  
109  Brinkley, Defining Vision , supra note __, 12.  
110  David W. Sosa, Market Failure in Standard Setting: The Case of AM Stereo, University of California, Davis, 
Dept. of Ag. & Resource Econ. Ph.D. thesis (1999), 49.   
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This is precisely the argument for market allocation of radio spectrum. Coase advanced it 
in 1959, noting the basic nature of the issue: 
 
This “novel theory” (novel with Adam Smith) is, of course, that the allocation of 
resources should be determined by the forces of the market rather than a s a result 
of government decisions. Quite apart from the misallocations which are the result 
of political pressures, an administrative agency which attempts to perform the 
function normally carried out by the pricing mechanism operates under two 
handicaps. First of all, it lacks the precise monetary measure of benefit and cost 
provided by the market. Second, it cannot, by the nature of things, be in 
possession of all the relevant information possessed by the managers of every 
business which uses or might use radio frequencies, to say nothing of the 
preferences of consumers for the various goods and services in the production of 
which radio frequencies could be used. In fact, lengthy investigations are required 
to uncover part of this information, and decisions of the Federal Communications 
Commission emerge only after long delays, often extending to years. To simplify 
the task, the Federal Communications Commission adopts arbitrary rules. For 




 The case for property rights is simply the case for markets, the argument against central 
planning. Private band owners compete to discover the information that eludes policy makers 
allocating spectrum owned by others. True owners have incentives to maximize value, and 
escape the distractions of rent seeking. Of course, this assumes the absence of regulatory 
institutions offering to supply favored market positions for the market-clearing political price––
the “attractive nuisance” of public policy.
113  When limited to a general regime of property rights, 
spectrum users would ironically have less ability to control spectrum. Consumer demand, and 
competitive rivalry, would constrain firms to act in socially useful ways in the pursuit of profit. 
Spectrum owners race to develop new applications, compete to increase traffic, and rationally 
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trade off the gains from serving consumers in one wireless market versus the costs of lost 
opportunities elsewhere.   
In sum, the private owner–more specifically, rivalry among competing owners––will 
most reliably find the delicate balance defined by T*. Airwaves may fall victim to a tragedy of 
the commons (Type I error) or over-regulation (Type II error). The tragedy of the commons can 
be solved by ownership of frequency space. Markets can efficiently allocate spectrum given 
property rights to spectrum. Over-regulation, on the other hand, is endemic to the public interest 
allocation system.
114  
V. SCARCE, ELASTIC SPECTRUM  
Intensive and Extensive Margins
115  
On April 13, the FCC handed out the last remaining substantial portion of prime 
radio waves, setting aside six megahertz of spectrum for companies that want to 
sell U.S. air-to-ground telephone service to airplane passengers… With the 
radio-wave spectrum booked solid, innovating telecommunications firms are 




Now, with virtually all usable frequencies actually being used….
117  
                                                         
114  Curiously, the traditional view of FCC spectrum allocation as deux ex machina survives. Economist Gerald W. 
Brock’s Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), while 
devoted to exploring the regulation of wireline telephone service, ventures into spectrum policy when describing the 
FCC’s 1959 decision to allow limited long-distance service over (non-AT&T) microwave links. Prof. Brock writes: 
“Any reasonable proposed use of the radio spectrum that did not interfere with other existing or proposed uses was 
generally approved.” Ibid., 107. Not only is this at odds with FCC history, as shown below, it contradicts the facts 
relayed on the previous page of Brock’s text. There it is explained that, while experimental licenses to operate 
microwave facilities were granted liberally after World War II, “the FCC’s permanent licensing policy was more 
restrictive and favored AT&T provision of microwave service for both voice and video signals.” Ibid., 106. Private 
licenses were granted only when AT&T declined to provide similar service. Not until microwave manufacturers 
(desiring more competition to sell more equipment) presented a comprehensive study (6,000 person-hours) showing 
that a twenty -fold increase in microwave use would not result in material interference even in the most crowded 
areas, did the FCC permit non-AT&T entry. Of course, this took many years, as the 1959 decision unlocked the use 
of World War II technology. The delay favored the incumbent telecommunications monopolist, AT&T, and was not 
necessary to police airwave interference. 
115  Harvey J. Levin uses this delineation in defining the supply curve for wireless bandwidth. Levin, The Radio 
Spectrum Resource, 11 J. L. & Econ. 433 (Oct. 1968). See also Arthur S. DeVany, Ross D. Eckert, Charles J. 
Meyers, Donald J. O’Hara and Richard C. Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. (June 1969), 1499; Douglas W. Webbink, Radio 
Licenses and Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights, 9 COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW (June 1987), 3.  
116  Margaret Kriz, Supervising Scarcity, NAT’L J. (July 7, 1990), 1660. 
117  Keith Bradsher, The Elbowing is Becoming Fierce for Space on the Radio Spectrum, N. Y. TIMES (June 24, 
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The airwaves always look crowded. In fact, looks are deceiving. While press reports in 
1990 lamented “the last remaining substantial portion of prime radio waves,” a 6 MHz band 
allocated by to telephone access for airline passengers (see above quotation), vast tracts of “new” 
spectrum were apparently discovered over that last decade when the FCC allocated and licensed:  
  
• 14 MHz for Specialized Mobile Radio 
• 120 MHz for personal communications services 
• 25 MHz for General Wireless Services 
• 30 MHz for Wireless Communications Services 
• 25 MHz for Digital Audio Radio Services 
• 400 MHz for Digital Electronic Messaging Services 
• 1.3 GHz for Local Multi-point Distribution Services 
• 1.4 GHz for 39 GHz Services 
 
Hundreds of companies now provide service in these bands, while hundreds of millions of 
customers use them.
118  Some of these allocations have produced gales of economic activity; the 
infusion of competition into the cellular telephone sector by the advent of PCS rivalry has 
slashed prices for consumers and brought new efficiencies throughout the business sector.
119  
Today it is clear that bandwidth was available for new services in 1990. 
Yet, reliable sources backed up what the NATIONAL JOURNAL and NEW YORK TIMES 
reported in 1990. Underutilized or even unused radio spectrum is formally “allocated” within the 
regulatory system. What is impossible to infer from FCC designations is the productivity of 
wireless services versus alternative opportunities. A band providing miniscule public benefit 
while blocking potential ‘killer apps’ is fully occupied only in the jargon of bureaucratese. 
Frequencies composing the electromagnetic radio spectrum are defined by science. The 
communications capacity of given frequencies, however, is defined by economics. This capacity 
changes with cost, demand, technology and market structure. The relevant question for band 
managers is: At what cost is communications capacity available? Each band carries a range of 
possibilities. More communications can be squeezed out of a given frequency with more 
sophisticated transmitters and receivers. Investment in technology permits increased traffic and 
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television stations in April 1997. Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Advanced Television 
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higher quality over time; at each moment there are countless combinations trading volume for 
quality (e.g., reliability) to consider as well.   
A century of progress exhibits profound improvements in the economical use of airwaves. 
When Guglielmo Marconi began developing wireless communications in the last years of the 
19
th  Century, he believed that only one radio transmitter could operate in any geographical 
area.
120  He soon discovered that multiple signals could peacefully co-exist – and promptly 
applied for Patent No. 7777, awarded in 1900. Marconi’s “tuned circuit” was instrumental in 
creating both Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) and Frequency Division Multiple 
Access.
121  This began a rolling history of leap-frogging advances to make productive use of 
higher and higher frequencies. This is seen vividly in spectrum taxonomy: 
 
• Medium Frequency (300 KHz – 3 MHz) 
• High Frequency (3 MHz – 30 MHz)  
• Very High Frequency (30 MHz – 300 MHz) 
• Ultra High Frequency (300 MHz – 3 GHz) 
• Super High Frequency (3 GHz – 30 GHz) 
• Extremely High Frequency (30 GHz – 300 GHz)
122  
 
In the 1920s, engineers dubbed the frequencies used by radio broadcasters "medium 
waves," defined as 3W KHz to 3,000 KHz.
123 By the 1930s, short waves (high frequencies) were 
utilized in long-distance communications. They had different properties than long waves, 
clinging to the curvature of the earth. Short waves tended to shoot straight out, and were first 
thought only useful for short point-to-point communications. They could cover long distances, 
but only by use of relay stations. It was then discovered that short waves were reflected off the 
ionosphere and back to earth, eliminating relay expense. The supply of wireless communications 
capacity shifted out. 
Also in the 1930s radio engineers found they could economically utilize the spectrum 
above 3 MHz. In fact, they learned it was possible to send FM signals long distances at 30 to 300 
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MHz (Very High Frequency). FCC engineers had flatly rejected such transmissions as useful. A 
January 1936 report by Chief Engineer Charles B. Jolliffe stated that very high frequencies were 
of little value, being limited to “only a few miles, probably on the order of two to ten miles.”
124  
In fact, FM radio signals had already traveled 80 miles in the band. Both FM radio and television 
were to live in the very high frequency band, transmitting far beyond ten miles. Research during 
World War II led to the use of Ultra High Frequencies, 300 MHz to 3 GHz. Microwave 
transmissions in this band are now widely utilized for point-to-point communications, relay 
services, mobile telephony, paging, dispatch, and “wireless cable.” By 1990, transmissions were 
routine up to about 16 GHz.
125  In 1998, LMDS licenses to offer point-to-multipoint data, voice 
and video services over 1.15 GHz between 27 and 29 GHz were auctioned by the FCC. Winning 
bids totaled $597 million.
126  As one prominent analyst wrote, “The conventional wisdom was 
that these microwaves (above about 12 gigahertz) are useless for anything but point-to-point 
transmissions and are doubtful even for these.”
127  Today, several publicly listed firms compete 
directly with local telephone companies using LMDS licenses or those allocated similar 
frequencies. Nextlink, the largest LMDS licensee, has a market capitalization of $10.8 billion. 
Teligent, valued at $1.6 billion, offers wireless service at 24 GHz. Winstar, with a market cap of 
$2.97 billion, and Advanced Radio Telecom, at $432 million, operate on licenses allocated 38 
and 39 GHz frequencies.
128    
John O. Robinson, in an interesting history of federal spectrum regulation, notes that the 
regulated band keeps growing. The government was aware of only 1500 KHz of utilizable 
"ether" at the time of the first federal Radio Act (1912). By 1930 the Federal Radio Commission 
defined its jurisdiction (in sync with international organizations) to cover 60 MHz. This grew to 
300 MHz in 1936, and to 30 GHz in 1944.
129  Today, the regulated band stretches to 300 GHz.
130  
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The milliwave frequencies, 18 GHz to 100 GHz, are today’s hot battleground in technology labs 
and, increasingly, the marketplace. The Federal Communications Commission is currently in the 
process of allocating 59-64 GHz for unlicensed use, and is in the preliminary stages of a rule 
making to allocate 95 GHz spectrum, due to intense private sector interest in the airwaves for 
wireless broadband applications.
131    
Innovation enabling communications in progressively higher bands expands the extensive 
margin. Methods to intensify traffic within a given band push the intensive margin. Gains have 
perhaps been even more impressive in the latter. For instance, the original mobile telephone
132  
transmissions consumed 120 KHz of bandwidth per phone "line", but by 1950 were using only 
60 KHz per line, 50 KHz in the mid-1950s, and 25 KHz by the mid-1960s. This was achieved by 
improvements in transmitting and receiving equipment.
133  Each decrease in channel size makes 
room for more channels, increasing service capacity. Variations on this theme provided huge 
increases in mobile telephone system capacities via cellular architecture, which lowers the power 
of emissions and splits bandwidth into re-usable cells. Adding cells creates capacity, at a cost.
134  
All interesting capacity questions are economic.
135  At a higher price, more wireless 
communications will be supplied to customers. In the jargon of economists, the supply curve of 
effective bandwidth capacity is upward sloping.
136  The location and slope of this functional 
relationship between cost and capacity will change with technology, but the quantity of 
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communications delivered to the market will always tend to increase with the price paid. With 
greater compensation, more service is possible. See Figure 7. While the relationship holds at a 
moment in time, it looks similar to the increase in communications capacity of a band (at a 
constant price) over time. That is because knowledge of radio frequency engineering increases 
with the progress of science, acting as a multiplier in wireless technologies.   
Figure 7. Supply of Effective Bandwidth Capacity
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Bringing “New” Spectrum to Market 
The process of spectrum regulation is conducted under the public interest standard in two 
connected, but conceptually discrete, phases. First, the agency conducts a rule making to 
consider the allocation of frequencies, a zoning function. The rule making will determine more 
than simply the category of band use, however. It defines the service allowed, what business 
model that business will be conducted under (common carrier, private carrier, broadcaster, etc.), 
technical standards, the number of competitors in the marketplace, geographic size of licenses, 
terms of license renewal and license transfer, and myriad business details.                 41
 
Once a band is allocated the Commission issues licenses to users. (Where unlicensed use 
is mandated, rules are adopted mandating that prospective users receive FCC certification of 
transmitting equipment.) Until 1981, the assignment of licenses was exclusively by comparative 
hearing, an administratively-judged ‘beauty contest.’
137  In 1981, the U.S. Congress authorized 
the use of lotteries, and the FCC assigned over 1,400 cellular telephone licenses using this 
method between 1986 and 1989. Hundreds of thousands of license applications poured into the 
Commission, and billions of dollars in cell-phone permits were awarded to speculators who 
quickly flipped the licenses to actual operators. Because the Commission maintained the fiction 
that lottery applicants certify themselves as capable of constructing and running mobile phone 
systems, “application mills” sprang up that generated huge fees––and up to $1 billion is social 
losses––helping prepare complex paperwork for each applicant.
138  Despite the embarrassment of 
lotteries, including an FCC facility that partly collapsed under the weight of the voluminous if 
meaningless applicant documentations,
139  the system successfully shortened the regulatory delay 
of comparative hearings.
140  
In 1993 Congress finally allowed the FCC to issue licenses via competitive bidding.
141  
Auctions began the following year and proved so popular that auction authority was extended by 
Congress in 1997 to include virtually all licenses issued by the FCC, even previously excluded 
broadcast licenses.
142  License auctions raised over $20 billion by May 1996, although some 
winning bids have proven uncollectable.
143    
The central feature of the spectrum allocation system is that the underlying resource 
cannot be owned by any party (including the government), but is held in common by the people 
of United States. The federal government regulates access to the airwaves on behalf of the 
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public. (See discussion below for more detail on the nature of the rights issued.) The predictable 
result of such radically diffused ownership is tragedy of the spectrum commons. Members of the 
general public are the nominal spectrum owners, but they are individually uninterested in 
management of “their” property. Much of the value of the resource is squandered, one graphic 
example being the 67 year period during which Congress refused to authorize competitive 
bidding for wireless licenses. Taxpayers literally squandered billions of dollars. Losses from 
inefficient spectrum use are much larger––and ongoing. Effective control over spectrum 
allocation belongs to the political coalition victorious in a rent-seeking competition. This tilts 
decision making away from consumer welfare maximization and towards influential pressure 
groups.  
The key operational result is inversion of pro-consumer spectrum management: instead of 
rules being crafted to encourage innovation and competitive entry, rules are designed to subject 
new wireless competition to administrative scrutiny. The burden of proof is on the potential 
entrant. No incumbent must show that less competition serves the public in order to preserve the 
status quo, it must only rebut proponents of competition. The default position is that entry does 
not occur, as new service may be offered only after the Commission affirmatively determines the 
service to be in the public interest, an Order is adopted and released, equipment is certified, and 
licenses are issued.   
Regulators can block allocations for a variety of reasons, or simply by administrative 
delay. Requests to use radio waves may be opposed by claims that new services will interfere 
with existing services. Evidence demonstrating interference-free operations must outweigh pro-
interference documentation for the entrant to meet its burden. Given the ability and incentives of 
incumbents to pile on the paperwork, this is a daunting task. No clear standards resolve such 
conflicts; the Commission reviews technical disputes, under the public interest, on a case-by-case 
basis. More significantly, allocations may be challenged for reasons unrelated to interference. If 
new services lessen the profitability of incumbents, these firms can assert that obligations 
imposed on them in the public interest will be terminated, thus threatening the public interest 
itself. This opens up an unlimited number of cross-subsidy plans for consideration, and gives 
regulators a range of public interest rationales for promoting incumbents’ interests over 
consumers.’ 
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At a minimum, substantial delays are imposed on innovative applications and competitive 
services. Once the Commission considers an application to allocate spectrum for a particular 
service, questions can be raised by private parties or public agencies, including incumbent 
licensees whose conflict of interest in deterring new entry is palpable. Objections to new entry 
may be made without cost. Countering questions and dispensing with controversies raised in a 
spectrum allocation rule making is costly, taxing new competitors. This lowers the gains from 
pursuing new services and may deter entry altogether.   
VI. CONSUMER WELFARE V. PUBLIC INTEREST  
“Public interest, convenience or necessity” is a legal standard for regulatory action. Yet, 
not even the government’s own experts can define what it means, or what action it rules out. 
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt (1993-97) dubbed it, “a vague, general, amorphous standard 
that can be all things to all people."
144  Dean Burch, FCC Chairman under President Richard 
Nixon, once commented: "If I were to pose the question, what are the FCC's [public interest] 
renewal policies and what are the controlling guidelines, everyone in this room would be on 
equal footing. You couldn't tell me, I couldn't tell you––and no one else at the Commission could 
do any better (least of all the long-suffering renewals staff).”
145  Henry Geller, a noted 
telecommunications policy expert who served as General Counsel of the FCC during the 
Kennedy-Johnson Administration observed, "[A]ll the 'public interest' means is, 'We give up. 
Congress doesn't know.'"
146  Others have noted that, "[The 'public interest'] is ill-defined to the 
point of being meaningless,"
147  and "The phrase... lacks any definitive meaning."
148  Alas, the 
author of the public interest, Sen. C.C. Dill, conceded, "It covers just about everything."
149  
Which, as the last source might suggest, was largely by design. The phrase provided the 
least constraining constitutional standard for regulation. (Only when charged to act on mandated 
criteria could a regulatory authority outside Congress be created). Putting spectrum regulation 
under “a vague and meaningless standard” allowed a creature of Congress to exercise influence 
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over an industry with intense political significance. The standard’s malleability offered policy 
makers maximum degrees of freedom while shielding Congress from the First Amendment, a 
potential constraint to intervening in the editorial content of the broadcast press.
150  
What does not satisfy the public interest? William Mayton observed that whatever 
government rules is, by definition, in the public interest.
151  Only procedural violations are barred 
by the public interest standard. In substance, virtually any well-documented policy flies. 
This pliability yields political advantage to policy makers and influential interest groups. 
Because a public interest explanation can easily be manufactured,
152  regulators are legally free to 
promote economic transfers to members of a prevailing coalition. Regulation justified as 
safeguarding resources yields to pork barrel politics. The process naturally leads agency officials 
to maximize support. Indeed, if FCC leaders do not, competition in the market for political 
influence will replace them with those who do.
153      
The Case for Property Rights  
The public interest standard gives rise to a regulatory architecture that is genetically 
hostile to efficiency.
154  Consumer interests are dependably eclipsed by special interests. Public 
interest rule makings are open-ended. The merits of entry are considered in the broadest possible 
context, forcing regulators to gauge the social benefits of competition ex ante. That requirement 
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front-loads the regulatory process, substantially raising the cost of entry. Allocations are then 
made on a case-by-case basis, and rules adopted in one proceeding may be rejected in another. 
This further swells the pre-entry certification process, again deterring market competition. The 
sum procedural total is that the public interest allocation system is booby-trapped against new 
rivals, an irresistible “attractive nuisance” to anti-competitive constituencies.
155  
Consider the logic of replacing the public interest standard with a policy to maximize 
consumer welfare. Profiting from the lesson that antitrust law runs amuck when it serves many 
masters,
156  the uniform promotion of consumer welfare would eliminate the distractions leading 
to perverse outcomes. The resulting economic efficiency would create greater resources for 
society. Richard Posner argues that this is a powerful motive force driving law: “The efficiency 
theory of the common law is not that every common law doctrine is efficient… The theory is that 
the common law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of 
society.”
157  
A consumer welfare goal in spectrum allocation would logically establish a framework to 
promote competitive wireless markets.
158  Potential wireless competitors would be afforded ready 
access to unoccupied radio spectrum. Rather than delay entry until essentially unanswerable 
questions are resolved to the satisfaction of regulators, rules would encourage private parties to 
discover how to best satisfy consumer demands through trial and error in the marketplace. Risks 
would shift from public administrators asserting knowledge of the public interest, to private 
investors. Financial markets would regulate which products or innovations were worth offering 
customers, as capitalists would assume liability for unprofitable ventures.
159  Profit calculations 
would include the opportunity cost of spectrum. Investors would likewise assume liability for 
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airwave interference.
160  Third party certification services would allow entrants to contract for 
interference protection. Agents, including insurance companies, would test systems for harmful 
emissions, indemnifying users and operators against damage. Efficient mitigation by wireless 
technologists and entrepreneurs would lower the cost of such coverage. 
Spectrum would be competitively allocated, the bandwidth market Ronald Coase long 
ago advocated and which FCC regulators now profess to champion. The enabling policy is 
simply private property in radio spectrum. Such a regime would allow for the efficient definition 
of rights, adjudication of disputes (including interference), and easy entry into unoccupied 
property. Monopoly problems would continue to be the domain of antitrust law. Dispute 
resolution would be the province of courts, including, perhaps, an expert court to expedite the 
resolution of technical issues specific to spectrum use.
161  Remedial market failures are not 
available to justify creation of a specialized regulatory agency.   
VII.  SILENCE OF THE ENTRANTS  
 In fact, spectrum regulation is not mandated to advance consumer welfare, and the 
structure yielded by the public interest standard protects incumbent licensees. To gain the right to 
compete, entrants must affirmatively establish a public interest rationale supporting additional 
allocation of bandwidth, scaling a procedural gauntlet to produce an actual rule making. Given 
the relatively weak constituency for consumer interests, the open-ended and long-winded nature 
of rule makings, and the relatively modest gains available to entrants versus those realized by 
incumbents opposing new licenses,
162  wireless competitors have strong incentives to respect the 
regulatory wall. This system has the attributes, in fact, of a cartel-enforcement device, an 
appearance that the historical creation of the Federal Radio Commission does nothing to 
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diminish (see discussion below). A recent FCC Chairman conceded that his agency had long 
been known as, “Forever Captured by Corporations.”
163  This section summarizes illustrative 
episodes in FCC spectrum allocation history, including some ongoing, to demonstrate how this 
reputation has been earned. 
AM Radio Chases the Non-profits  
When the Radio Act was signed into law on February 23, 1927, about 750 radio stations 
dotted the AM dial. This included about 200 new stations that began broadcasting during the 
“break-down of the law,” initiated July 9, 1926. On that day Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. 
Hoover announced that his Department would no longer enforce the priority-in-use rights 
regulating airwave traffic since the advent of broadcasting in 1920. During this anarchistic period 
there was some confusion as to how property rights were being determined and enforced. 
“Pirates,” “trespassers,” and “interlopers” were decried by radio listeners and the press for 
interfering with established broadcasts. 
There were several ways to remedy the situation, the most straightforward being to 
increase the number of available frequencies. Indeed, European regulators had already expanded 
the AM band in international agreements, and two proposals to increase broadcast slots were 
quickly brought to the new Federal Radio Commission. One would have extended the top of the 
AM band from 1500 kc to 2000 kc, upping available broadcast frequencies by 50%. (The band 
stretched from 500 to 1500 kc). The other proposal would have increased the number of 
frequencies by dropping channel separation from 10 kc to 7 kc. This would have increased the 
number of stations permitted to broadcast by nearly 50%. But accommodating the demand for 
stations was not considered to be in the “public interest.” Both proposals were firmly rejected by 
the FRC to the applause of major commercial broadcasters.
164  
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Rejecting the opportunity to expand radio station slots, the Commission winnowed the 
market. It instituted a number of technically arcane requirements that had the effect of 
eliminating small stations, particularly non-profits. As many as 200 stations were then owned by 
universities, schools, churches, labor unions, municipalities, and various amateur associations. 
The seven years of the FRC (it was folded into the Federal Communications Commission in the 
Communications Act of 1934) were not kind to this sector. Non-profit stations were driven off 
the air by the cost of complying with FRC rules. Much more often than commercial broadcasters, 
non-profits forfeited their licenses.
165    
Two hundred stations fell silent even as the strongest stations, particularly those with 
network affiliations, prospered. The loss in competition, and particularly in community-oriented 
niche programming, did not conflict with the Commission’s public interest mandate. It actually 
characterized many of the non-profit stations as “propaganda” outlets devoted to serving narrow 
audiences, unworthy of receiving a license to broadcast in the “public interest.” While important 
and controversial stations like WCFL, the voice of the Chicago Federation of Labor, floundered 
and failed, major commercial interests surfed Depression-era economic conditions to new 
prosperity.
166  NBC and CBS, the dominant networks, saw their affiliates rise from 6.4 percent of 
stations in 1927 to 30 percent by 1931.
167  By then, the two networks accounted for 70 percent of 
U.S. broadcasting factoring in hours on-air and power levels. By the mid-1930s, they would be 
responsible for an astounding 97 percent of night-time broadcasting.
168  To this day, non-profit 
broadcasting has not recovered. 
AM Blocks FM  
One of the most heroic stories in the annals of American communications is the tale of 
Major Edwin Howard Armstrong.
169  Armstrong, a professor of electrical engineering at 
Columbia University, was an inventor whose contributions to radio broadcasting technology 
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were seminal.
170  His greatest achievement, however, was inventing frequency modulation, FM, a 
transmitting technique using wider bands than amplitude modulation (AM).  
The key FM innovations were patented by Armstrong in 1933. He then asked regulators 
to allocate radio spectrum for FM broadcasting. After some difficulty, Armstrong was issued 
experimental licenses. But the FCC did not believe FM radio would work. In January 1936, for 
instance, a Commission engineering report stated that the VHF band (where Armstrong had 
devised his FM equipment to operate) was virtually worthless for communications stretching 
beyond 10 miles. This was despite the fact that Armstrong had reported, in a November 1935 
paper, test results indicating that FM signals were clearly received over 80 miles away.
171  He set 
about building more formidable testing facilities, aiming to amass evidence rebutting the FCC’s 
technical arguments. 
In 1937 Armstrong paid General Electric to construct twenty-five proto-type FM 
receivers. These were used to gauge reception from a 50,000 watt FM station Armstrong built 
with a personal investment of $60,000 in Alpine, New Jersey. Further experiments were 
conducted by John Shepard III of the Yankee Network, a New England chain. Shepard 
constructed a 50,000-watt FM transmitter on a mountain near Worcester, Massachusetts. Test 
results stirred great excitement in Armstrong and his collaborators. The signals traveled much 
further, and with much greater clarity and far less sensitivity to sources of interference than 
existing methods. Stations operating on almost identical bands still did not drown one another 
out; receivers picked up whichever signal was clearest. 
Armed with impressive field data, Armstrong returned to the Commission. He was 
surprised to find great hostility to his request for an allocation to use unoccupied VHF 
frequencies for FM radio broadcasting. Specifically, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 
the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) all 
advanced arguments that would hinder or thwart FM. RCA, owner of the National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC), was the largest AM broadcaster. CBS was a close second. These established 
incumbents did not see a public interest in increased competition. AT&T was concerned about 
the new technology because the Yankee Network had shown that FM was ideally suited to 
provide wireless relay service, successfully linking several New England stations with point-to-
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point transmissions. FM networking bypassed long distance lines, where AT&T enjoyed a good 
business transporting network programs via coaxial cable connections.
 172    
In 1940 these interests and their allies attempted to dissuade the Federal Communications 
Commission from moving forward with an FM spectrum allocation. They were right––or, at 
least, rational––to be worried. FM posed a grave threat to AM: 
 
Armstrong saw in the development of FM the opportunity to free the U.S. 
radio system of oppressive restriction and regulation. An almost unlimited 
number of FM stations was [sic] possible in the shortwaves, thus ending the 
unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded longwaves. If FM were 
freely developed, the number of stations would be limited only by economics and 
competition rather than by technological restrictions. Small stations and new 
networks would have a chance to grow, reducing the need for FCC regulation and 
lessening the domination of the industry by a few corporations. Armstrong 
likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of 
the printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to control this 
new instrument of mass communications to imposing restrictive licenses on it. 
This tyranny was broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire 
printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention 
as the printing press, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
173  
 
Armstrong was naïve. The possibility of new competition did not prompt FCC regulation 
to wither away, but instigated regulatory action to resist entry.
174  This anti-competitive response 
delayed FM’s introduction in the years following its invention in 1933. But, interestingly, 
Armstrong won a major victor 1940. Despite contentious hearings and proposals by CBS to 
derail FM, the Commission chose to re-allocate 6 MHz of radio spectrum, previously one 
channel of the thirteen assigned to VHF television, for the use of FM radio broadcasters. This 
would allow 40 channels, on which as many as 2,000 FM stations could be located 
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nationwide.
175  The ruling paved the way for development of FM. By late 1941, 40 stations were 
on the air or under construction, and some 500,000 households had purchased receivers.   
U.S. entry into World War II froze technology adoption. Station construction halted, and 
set manufacturers switched from civilian to military production. Armstrong was himself diverted 
to lead ‘round-the-clock Army Signal Corps research on mobile communications via FM. The 
technology again proved robust, and FM relay units developed by Armstrong were soon in use 
by U.S. forces (including Gen. George S. Patton’s Third Army on its furious march through 
France in 1944––too speedy for wired communications).
176  As the war came to a close, 
Armstrong assumed that peacetime would usher FM radio into a golden age. The public had 
gotten a taste of FM––the few stations on air had continued to broadcast to the few receivers 
spread around the country––and listeners liked what they heard. “Yankee’s FM broadcasting 
system had blanketed the New England area with a service that AM stations and big AM 
network affiliates could not match in quality or coverage.”
177  But this very success, coupled with 
the pause in industry development caused by wartime mobilization, pushed competitors of FM 
broadcasting to regroup. 
NBC and CBS petitioned the FCC in 1944 with a bold proposal: toss every FM station 
off its assigned frequency. The plan was to relocate the industry to a band higher up the dial, but 
all existing equipment––transmitters owned by stations, receivers by ordinary listeners––would 
be rendered obsolete. The claim was that the move would help FM stations by allowing them to 
avoid “ionospheric interference,” a threat alleged to emanate from sunspots. This technical 
problem was said to uniquely degrade transmissions in the frequencies of the current FM band. 
FM broadcasters and equipment makers were united their opposition to this view. Armstrong, 
who again conducted extensive tests on the matter, submitted voluminous data to the FCC 
dismissing the interference threat. 
Such testimony is persuasive and should be dispositive. Atmospheric damage to FM 
broadcasts would inflict economic damage on FM licensees and their suppliers. By forcing the 
alleged victims to move, the FCC substitutes its administrative powers for the expert opinion of 
self-interested parties. This is not the ostensible aim of regulation, which is to limit spillover 
damage suffered by third parties. Here the only third party effects concern listeners who 
purchased radio sets, assets complementary to the broadcasts provided by licensed FM stations––
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and the Commission decided to appropriate these investments.
178  The federal government 
enthusiastically joined forces with the incumbent broadcasters hostile to FM, going so far as to 
produce testimony from a Army Signal Corps engineer, formerly with the FCC, that “secret 
military data” showed FM should move.
179  Other public testimony, and technical experts who 
met with the Commission privately, revealed the conclusion to be in error. The FCC ordered 
staff to omit corrections to the record, later congressional hearings found. 
In 1945 the Commission uprooted FM. A higher band (88 to 108 MHz) was mandated for 
relocation. The migration rendered existing transmitters inoperative and receiver sets worthless. 
Armstrong spent the next two years frantically developing new FM technology for use in the 
higher band. The blow was devastating to consumers and radio entrepreneurs who had been early 
adopters of FM technology, creating negative momentum for efforts to establish FM on the new 
band. A study later found the public extremely reluctant to buy redesigned FM sets. The industry 
now had a reputation as a speculative technology.
180  
Gratuitously, the FCC also decided to reduce FM station power. Armstrong’s Alpine, 
New Jersey station (operated commercial-free, subsidized by Armstrong to promote FM) was cut 
back from 50,000 watts, for instance, to just 1,200. The stated rationale was to promote local 
broadcasting, a recurring theme in FCC public interest regulation. To squeeze in more local 
assignments, each station’s coverage area had to be reduced (else interference between stations 
in adjacent communities would threaten local broadcasting). The practical effect of the so-called 
Single Market Plan was to lower the economic viability of the new FM stations. With smaller 
audiences, it would be more difficult to compete with established AM stations for advertising 
revenues.   
These policies stopped FM dead in its tracks in 1945.
181  In 1948 Senate hearings, 
Armstrong would testify: “[T]he effort has been to mold the allocation of FM into a form where 
it will become a network subsidiary, unable to take the leading role which its technical merits 
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would give it if left unhampered by regulation.”
182  Soon listeners were lost and stations went 
silent, relinquishing broadcasting licenses. The threat to AM radio was over. It was a financially 
painful loss for Armstrong, as his key patents expired in 1950. Due to the delays of the FCC and 
the diversions of war, his impressive scientific breakthroughs went largely uncompensated. 
Not until the FCC approved stereo broadcasting for FM in 1960––some 26 years after 
Armstrong had initially developed multiplexing––did FM rise from the dead. Audiophiles 
flocked to FM “high fidelity” in the years that followed, and the mass market soon thereafter. 
FM stations multiplied in number and audience share. By 1979, FM surpassed AM in 
listeners.
183  By 1985 there were as many FM stations broadcasting as AM, and by 1995 there 
were substantially more (nearly 7,000 FM to under 5,000 AM).
184  Armstrong’s boasts about the 
superiority of FM were not idle. 
Armstrong was not alive to see vindication. On January 31, 1954, broken by the 
successful campaign to deter his invention and locked in an acrimonious lawsuit over royalty 
payments owed him for FM manufacturing,
185  he penned a letter to his wife, dressed neatly, and 
walked straight out the window of his 13
th  floor New York City apartment. “[I]t seemed 
incredible to [Armstrong] that in this country, by means of restrictive regulations and slippery 
measures, a superior scientific advancement could be overwhelmed by the shoddy and the 
expedient.”
186  
The Death of Du Mont 
The average American household can receive 13 signals of off-air TV programming. Yet, 
the official FCC Allocation Table blocks off spectrum space for 67 channels. Why are so many 
channels “allocated,” yet so little product delivered? The technical limits of (analog or digital) 
television receivers do not restrict viewers to just a few channels of off-the-air television. Rather, 
deliberate policies of the FCC do. Indeed, the dominance of just three national TV networks was 
an entirely predictable consequence of the FCC’s regulatory plan: 
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Perhaps the most significant event in the history of television regulation 
was the creation of an artificial scarcity of VHF-TV licenses. The effect of 
this policy has been to create a system of powerful vested interests, which 
continue to stand in the path of reform and change…
187  
 
The Federal Communications Commission began allocating VHF radio spectrum for 
television in 1940, and in 1945 an allocation plan for channels in the top 140 markets was 
established.
188  In 1948, however, a rush of post-war applications prompted the FCC to freeze 
assignments after 108 TV licenses had been issued. The thaw came when the Sixth Report and 
Order was released in 1952.
189  The TV Allocation Table issued in the Order determined how 
both VHF and UHF TV channels were to be distributed, although a fierce debate over the rule 
making continued for many years. 
Two basic positions evolved. The first proposed to emphasize viewer choice. Du Mont, 
the weakest of the four TV networks, aggressively pushed this position. Its fortunes depended on 
the FCC issuing licenses such that large numbers of Americans could tune into four (or more) 
stations. Without a number of competing broadcast outlets, Du Mont would not be able to 
establish nationwide coverage. With its potential audience dwarfed by rivals, the network would 
then be handicapped in the race to produce quality programs, having a smaller base over which 
to amortize fixed costs of production. Quality erosion would reduce audience share, further 
diminishing the network’s viewer base. A downward spiral into financial futility would result. 
The alternative position emphasized localism, seeking to “provide each community with 
at least one television broadcast service.”
190  Enhancing the number of TV markets would 
produce many cities with one or two viewing choices, but relatively few with four or more. 
Spectrum would be “consumed” by small markets crowding in to get their “own” TV stations, 
blocking (through airwave interference) the use of channels in adjacent markets. 
If it were not for the FCC’s TV allocation plan, which created low-power, local stations, 
we could all have access to a great many more channels. The same spectrum could be used for 
powerful regional stations, no one of which could serve a small community. This is called the 
“Du Mont Plan”…. The essence of the Du Mont Plan was to have fewer cities with TV stations, 
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but to have each station cover a large geographical area, spanning a number of cities. Such a plan 
would permit the creation of new networks and increase the number of choices available to each 
viewer… [S]uch an increase in the number of channels may increase diversity of programming, 
and certainly increases competition… [C]onsideration of the Du Mont plan does point up the 
choice that was before the FCC in the early years of television—a greater range of diversity of 
programming and competition versus localism in decision-making.
191  
The FCC adjudged localism to be in the public interest in 1952. By September 1955, Du 
Mont went dark. U.S. television viewers were limited to just three commercial networks until 
1986 (when Fox finally recreated a fourth off-air network). The regulatory rationale was clear: 
 The FCC could have allocated the total volume of spectrum to [television] broadcasting in 
such way as to produce fewer, higher-powered outlets. This would have resulted in six or seven 
national television networks. Such a system, however, would have contained many fewer “local” 
broadcasting outlets than we have today. Instead, he FCC chose to allocate the spectrum so as to 
create a larger number of much lower-powered stations. In fact, the FCC’s primary goal appears 
to have been to place at least one over-the-air service in every large community. This 
corresponds neatly to placing broadcasting station in as many congressional districts as 
possible.
192  
VHF-TV Blocks CATV 
The network triopoly that formed under the FCC’s restrictive VHF-TV licensing plan 
could have been ameliorated had the FCC permitted a competitive UHF-TV sector to emerge. 
Instead, the Commission took actions to guarantee that VHF-TV incumbents would be virtually 
unchallenged for years to come. While allocating a huge swath of bandwidth to UHF, ostensibly 
to provide increased choice for American viewers, the spectrum was regulated in such a way as 
to make competition with VHF untenable. UHF assignments were inferior in their reach and 
signal quality, and were unable to gain audience shares sufficient to compete with VHF stations. 
This problem could have mitigated by a proposal for “de-intermixture,” moving markets into all-
VHF or all-UHF status. The FCC extensively considered the plan, but it was resisted by the 
networks and was never implemented. For decades, UHF TV spectrum went largely unused.
193  
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Which gave an opening to cable television operators. If airwaves were set off limits by 
airwave regulation, then wires––“spectrum in a tube”––would provide the competition to satisfy 
customer demand. Yet regulators did not sit idly by. The Commission launched a dramatic and 
now notorious campaign to suppress this potential competitor to broadcast TV. This effort offers 
a fascinating illustration of the dynamics of spectrum regulation.   
The episode eerily coincided with the most famous attack on television programming 
ever launched: the "vast wasteland" speech delivered by FCC Chairman Newton Minow to the 
National Association of Broadcasters, May 9, 1961.
194  Minow surprised industry officials by 
blasting broadcasting’s product quality, a rude gesture for FCC policy makers: 
 
[W]hen television is bad, nothing is worse. I invite you to sit down in front 
of your television set… I can assure you that you will observe a vast wasteland. 
You will see a procession of game shows, violence, audience participation 
shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, 
mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, Western badmen, Western good men, private 
eyes, gangsters, more violence and cartoons. And, endlessly, commercials––many 
screaming, cajoling and offending. And most of all, boredom. True, you will see a 




Excluded from this analysis was the most salient policy fact: Spectrum allocation rules 
produced the "vast wasteland." As then noted by Peter Steiner,
196  Ronald Coase,
197  and Allen Du 
Mont, FCC regulation pre-empted product diversity. Given the importance of scale in TV 
programming (where fixed costs are substantial but marginal costs are zero), issuing sufficient 
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TV licenses for just three networks to amass national scope ordained that each network would 
target mass audiences with least-common-denominator programming.  
 The very same producers and networks would exhibit more sophisticated tastes were the 
opportunity costs of airtime not so high. Once cable TV was permitted to develop, it 
demonstrated the economics perfectly. Cable networks provide an array of specialized 
programming, serving a diversity of tastes high, medium and low.
198  While attracting many 
fewer viewers than major broadcast networks, they are nonetheless profitable––precisely because 
they are abundant and the opportunity cost of bandwidth is low.   
Given that TV regulation produced a “vast wasteland,” Newton Minow might have 
greeted emerging cable competition warmly. Tellingly, just the reverse: Minow’s FCC moved 
decisively to quash cable.
  199  The policy offensive began with a 1962 ruling, Carter Mountain v. 
FCC.
200  Cable TV had been unregulated by the Commission; two staff requests to apply 
common carrier rules were rejected by the FCC in the 1950s.
201  But this was in cable’s earliest 
days, when broadcasters did not object to “community antenna television” (CATV) extending 
broadcasts to more eyeballs. Once cable began to “import” competitive signals into local 
markets, however, the mood changed. Broadcasters protested cable TV expansion at the FCC. 
But the FCC lacked jurisdiction. Cable systems were local, not interstate, and did not 
utilize radio spectrum. The FCC had not been awarded authority in this market by the FCC’s 
authorizing statute, the 1934 Communications Act. There was a backdoor into cable, however. 
The Commission had jurisdiction over microwave operators in the transport business. The 
operators were used by CATV systems to import TV signals to a local head-end, where they 
were then distributed via coaxial cable to subscribers. CATV systems were customers of these 
common carriers, who served customers without discrimination. Turning common carriage on its 
head, the FCC stepped forward to mandate discrimination against one type of customer––CATV 
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companies.
202  The Commission’s rationale was the "ancillarity doctrine.” In order to successfully 
regulate broadcasters, the Commission argued that it needed to also control those forces that 
threatened the public interest obligations of licensees. Loss of consumer choice was simply 
collateral damage in a larger war.   
The FCC formally established its anti-cable policy on February 14, 1962––the 
Valentine's Day CATV massacre. A broadcaster, KWRB-TV, filed a petition to deny a common 
carrier, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., a permit to construct microwave transmission 
facilities for the purpose of sending TV programming to existing cable TV systems in Riverton, 
Lander and Thermopolis, Wyoming. KWRB-TV broadcast on channel 10 in Riverton, and 
considered itself a competitor of CATV systems in all three towns. The rationale for its FCC 
petition, according to the FCC, was that "the microwave facilities would enhance their [the cable 
systems'] competitive standing to the economic detriment of KWRB-TV."
203    
The FCC found that "economic harm" to the broadcaster was proper grounds upon which 
to act, and proceeded to examine the record of "competitive standing." The Commission wrote 
that if allowing competition via the microwave relay, “enables this customer potential to destroy 
a basic Commission policy, then… the ability to create such a situation in this particular instance 
is sufficient to warrant an examination into the entire problem. We will not shut our eyes to the 
impact upon the public service which is our ultimate concern..."
204  The rationale for licensing, 
that it was necessary to maintain order over the airwaves by restricting access to some, was 
precisely reversed. Now the FCC was stating that the government’s licensing structure was 
sacrosanct, and that competitive access should be blocked to protect it. 
The FCC denied Carter Mountain’s microwave application. "Reason and logic cause us 
to agree with the conclusion that should the CATV system be permitted to expand its services 
and furnish better technical facilities, KWRB-TV will be placed in the economically 
disadvantageous position of finding it more difficult to sell its advertising..." This, the 
Commission augured, might lead to the destruction of the station altogether, and the loss of TV 
service to those who couldn't afford, or weren't passed by, cable TV. "True, a grant of the instant 
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application would permit the rendition of better service by the CATV, but at the expense of 
destroying the local station and its rural coverage."   
Carter Mountain laid the foundation for a series of Commission rule makings checking 
cable television growth to protect broadcasters from audience “siphoning.” The financial health 
of struggling UHF TV stations played a central role in the rule makings, as the limits place on 
cable were crafted to counter the “grave danger to UHF broadcasting.”
205  Events were soon to 
lead to a natural experiment testing this proposition.   
 The deregulation wave of the mid- to late-1970s led the FCC to relax anti-cable rules.
206  
Permitted to compete for audience share, cable systems grew rapidly in a “gold rush” that saw 
U.S. cable subscribership rocket from 11.8 million households in 1976 to 45.7 million in 1988––
the year in which national penetration surpassed 50%. Interestingly, UHF TV did not collapse. 
UHF’s signal transmission inferiority relative to VHF faded due to a rising tide of cable 
subscribership––the “community antenna” improved reception for all stations, and the fuzziest 
signals benefited most. Audiences grew and UHF stations prospered. One indicator of this robust 
new health was that the number of UHF outlets
207  rose pari passu with the climb in cable 
penetration, 1970 to 1991. See Figure 8. Indeed, by the time that half of U.S. homes subscribed 
to cable, the U.S. finally saw the creation of its fourth broadcast network.  
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The factual basis for the FCC's Carter Mountain decision proved false.
208  The episode 
now serves as a textbook example of anti-competitive regulation:   
 
Cable television made possible an unlimited transmission of stations to any given 
point, unlike broadcasting through the air. The whole structure of the industry––
networks, affiliates, advertising patterns––could have been undermined or 
destroyed by the new technological possibilities. So too would have been the 
existing regulatory apparatus… so in communications the response to the 
elimination of the initial rationale for regulation was to extend the regulation to 
encumber and contain the new threatening technology.
209  
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This has not stopped regulators from audaciously stealing credit for the eventual progress the 
FCC’s broadcast protectionism so long delayed. In his 1995 book, Newton Minow boasts that his 
"Commission worked to promote cable and other technologies."
210  A more accurate assessment 
of the Commission's cable policies is available. Former FCC member (now University of 
Virginia law professor) Glen Robinson described them this way, some 16 years after Carter 
Mountain: 
 
When cable television emerged as a marketable service in the early 1960s, 
the FCC faced a unique opportunity to overcome the mistakes it had made in the 
regulation of broadcast television. Cable television, with its multiple channel 
capability, solved the problem of spectrum scarcity––the rationale and 
rationalization for nearly all the FCC's basic regulatory policies and indeed for the 
Communications Act [of 1934] itself...  
Since the advent of cable, the Commission's first concern has been the 
impact of cable, not on the public, but on the broadcast industry. To be sure, the 
Commission has always couched its concern in terms of the public interest: the 
possible adverse impact on the growth of UHF, the threat to local television 
service, and the possible loss of service to rural areas and to the poor. However, 
the Commission simply presumes there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the interests of the broadcast industry and those of the public... 
Proceeding from that premise, the Commission's regulation of cable has 
been concerned only with estimating the degree of harm and selecting the 
measures necessary to prevent it from becoming too serious. Even in assessing the 
degree of harm, however, the Commission has proceeded more from assumptions 
of faith than from findings of fact. In 1959, it could find no significant threat. In 
1962 and again in 1965, a changed membership saw things differently... 
Ostensibly, the Commission's premier concern always has been UHF 
stations, those sickly siblings of the broadcast industry over which the FCC has 
fussed and fretted for twenty years, trying to shelter them as much as possible 
from the cold competitive environment. What was the evidence of the impact of 
cable on UHF? An early econometric study predicted that duplicative                 62
 
programming over cable would cause substantial harm particularly to UHF 
stations... Later studies, however, suggest that cable has been more beneficial than 
harmful to UHF insofar as it has brought UHF signals into par with VHF. What is 
particularly notable is that every time the occasion arises for contracting some 
rule designed to protect broadcasters, the cry of dire harm is heard. But when as a 
Commissioner I asked for credible evidence to substantiate the claim, all I ever 
heard from the industry and the probroadcast faction at the FCC was: "We are not 
going to wait for the corpses of dead broadcast stations."
211  
AM & FM Block DARS 
In 1990, a firm called CD Radio petitioned the Federal Communications Commission to 
allocate spectrum to provide CD-quality satellite audio service to the U.S. market. The service 
was dubbed Digital Audio Radio Satellite service, or DARS, and the FCC soon opened a formal 
rulemaking to decide the issue of spectrum allocation.
212  Three additional firms soon joined CD 
Radio in applying for DARS licenses. 
The four applicants outlined their business plans. They were to use satellite distribution 
for national dissemination of packages of commercial radio broadcasts. Each planned to deliver 
approximately 30 channels of CD-quality programming. Two firms anticipated advertiser 
support, with zero charge to listeners, while the other two planned subscription fees.   
The FCC proceeding moved forward slowly. NASA and other U.S. organizations argued 
that DARS would interfere with vital national communications links. These objections were 
finally overcome, and in 1995 the Commission allocated 50 MHz of radio spectrum (2310––
2360) for DARS, four blocks of 12.5 MHz each.
213  Intense opposition came from radio 
broadcasters, who filed documents challenging the introduction of satellite radio. The primary 
justification to deny the spectrum allocation request was “localism.” Under the public interest 
standard, the importance of service to local communities is long established. Broadcasters argued 
that national satellite competitors would siphon audiences and, therefore, advertising revenues 
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from radio broadcasters licensed by the FCC to serve local communities, thus undermining the 
public interest in localism.    
The question appeared weighty in the context of the FCC’s public interest determination. 
The arguments for and against DARS were both substantial, the Commission wrote in its 1995 
proposed rulemaking: 
[S]atellite DARS… could expand and complement the audio programming 
choices now available to listeners. By offering a national based service, satellite 
DARS providers could target niche audiences that have not been served by 
traditional local radio but now could be served as an aggregate national audience. 
Such specialized program offerings could include foreign language programming, 
music formats not usually carried by radio broadcasts, and programming geared to 
children or senior citizens… 
It is also apparent that satellite DARS, to some extent, will compete with 
terrestrial radio. Proposed satellite DARS systems will provide 30 or more 
channels of national digital audio programming to fixed and mobile receivers…. 
throughout the country…. Some of these DARS channels may provide 
programming that is similar to what is available on local stations… We request 
comment on whether consumers would alter their listening patterns by 
abandoning local stations to any significant degree…  
We also seek comment regarding advertising revenues that may be lost 
due to competition from satellite DARS.
214  
The FCC sought to weigh the benefits of new technology against economic losses on 
existing suppliers. The consideration afforded market incumbents is generous when compared to 
the competitive market’s adjudication of such questions. This example demonstrates the ease 
with which public interest (here, localism) melds into incumbent protection. 
Interested parties introduced sharply conflicting evidence as to the public interest 
associated with DARS.
215  Even after the initial spectrum allocation decision, deliberations over 
how to set rules stretched another two years. What is interesting is that the case is easy and 
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overwhelming that DARS will not threaten local radio content but promote it. The strong trend 
within the radio broadcasting market has been for “local” radio stations to distribute (i.e., 
rebroadcast) national programs. Syndicated talk shows, national news services, satellite and 
fiber-optic cable feeds, and turn-key music programs have allowed stations to dramatically 
reduce locally-generated radio productions. Satellite broadcasting direct to consumers would 
both create efficiency in distributing national services (cutting out the middle layer) and free 
radio stations to provide more local programs. Only by nurturing and promoting local talent and 
community-oriented content, in fact, will radio stations be able to offer unique programming 
alternatives to DARS. Hence, the threat to radio station financial viability offers to stimulate 
local program production.
216    
The effect of nationally distributed audio programming on localism has already been 
observed in two historical transitions––the introduction of television and radio-over-the-Internet. 
The first of these explains how national programming competition created radio localism.   
In radio’s early years, local stations relied heavily on nationally delivered 
network programming… Television, however, became the primary purveyor of 
(national) block programming in the 1950s when its executives persuaded many 
then-popular radio personalities such as Jack Benny, Bob Hope, and Abbott and 
Costello to move to TV… 
[R]adio executives turned to specifically targeted or specialized local 
programming… to effectively compete against television for audience share and 
against each other for advertising dollars. Radio networks redefined their role by 
offering mostly news and special event programming. Thus, radio broadcasting 
staked its claim as “the local medium.”
217  
Similarly, the advent of streaming audio over global telecommunications networks 
naturally moves off-air radio stations to focus on content uniquely interesting to community 
audiences. As reported by Inter@ctive  Week: 
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Not too long ago, progressive radio stations were streaming music on the Web. 
Today, thousands of radio stations replay their content on the Web. But already, 
the idea of listening to the same broadcast that’s available on a nearby radio is 
getting stale, particularly because music networks such as Spinner Networks and 
Yahoo! Broadcast offer continuous streams of various genres, according to a new 
report by market research Nielsen/NetRatings. “Every single site that’s offering 
some kind of entertainment stream becomes a local station,” says T.S. Kelly, 
director of Internet media strategies at NetRatings. That means stations that really 
are local “need to expand to offer specialty programming catered to the local 
market, where their strength is,” Kelly says.
218  
Lack of substance did not render the localism argument impotent in the FCC’s public 
interest rule making. Broadcasters delayed and partially deterred DARS. Not until 1997 was the 
rulemaking completed, and by then the spectrum allocation had been cut in half. In April 1997, 
just two DARS licenses were auctioned. One license was won by Sirius Satellite Radio, while 
the other went to XM Satellite Radio. Even as firms ready their systems for roll-out in 2000, and 
before the first subscriber fee is collected, either firm sported a market capitalization in excess of 
$1 billion––strong evidence the service is likely to deliver valued services to customers. See 
Table 5.  Part of the investor appeal may lie in the fact that either firm, through technical 
advances in compression, now plans to deliver 100 channels of programming. One decade after 
they petitioned the FCC for the right to do so, it appears two surviving DARS applicants will. 
 
Table 5.  DARS Service Providers in the United States 
 
Company  Market Capitalization  Sales  Channels 
Sirius Satellite Radio  $1.28 billion  $0.00  100 
XM Satellite Radio  $1.42 billion  $0.00  100 
Source: Yahoo!Finance, January 26, 2000. 
 
SMR’s End Run 
[A] recent deal in New York valued a band of cellular telephone frequencies 25 
megahertz wide at $4 billion, or $160 million a megahertz. But a band of adjacent 
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radio frequencies 1.5 megahertz wide in New York recently sold for about $12 
million, or $8 million a megahertz, because the F.C.C. had allocated those 
frequencies for use by long-range car radios like those used in taxis.
219  
Some people see newspaper reports and yawn. Others arbitrage FCC regulation. The 
extraordinary success of entrepreneur Morgan O’Brien, founder of Fleet Call (now Nextel), 
brilliantly illustrates the dynamics of FCC regulation as the exception proving the rule. O’Brien 
did what should be easy and unremarkable: He moved radio spectrum from a low-valued use to 
where it did far more for customers. Yet his path was strewn with regulatory obstacles. This 
paradoxically raised the gains realized by O’Brien, who emerged a wealthy man. But it 
demonstrates the social costs of a system where visionary and audacious strategies are required 
to achieve simple and obvious efficiencies.  
O’Brien, a nine-year FCC lawyer, left government service to work with a Washington, 
D.C. communications firm. After a some years of representing wireless clients, contrasting 
market phenomena struck him as interesting: While cellular telephone license sales prices were 
soaring in 1987, specialized mobile radio (SMR) licenses were not. SMR licenses authorized 
wireless dispatch for taxis, construction crews, pizza delivery vehicles, and other service 
vehicles. The business was not particularly lucrative and an SMR license was cheap. Far cheaper 
than, for instance, FCC licenses to deliver cellular telephone service. 
Given existing rules, this was perfectly natural: the right to engage in a highly profitable 
business is worth much more than a permit to operate a barely profitable one. But O’Brien 
recognized a deeper incongruence. If the spectrum allocated to the respective licenses were 
equally regulated, values should be similar. Cellular licenses were allocated 25 MHz each; SMR 
licenses up to 14 MHz. The bands were nearly identical in technical characteristics, both in the 
800 MHz band. “[T]he only difference between the two industries was artificial – an FCC decree 
limiting SMR’s use. Yet the same amount of spectrum sold for just $100,000 with a dispatch 
license and $2 million with a cellular license.”
220  
The strategy was simple: O’Brien would buy cheap SMR licenses, and then petition the 
FCC for permission to use the bandwidth for mobile telephony. But that would be a long, drawn-
out, lawyer-intensive process. Moreover, incumbent licensees would fiercely oppose such 
efforts. The increased competition would lower the value of their FCC licenses. That is where 
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O’Brien’s “arcane knowledge of FCC rules––and how to get around the–– was crucial to the 
Nextel effort.”
 221  
O’Brien knew he could not succeed in a straight-up rule making to re-allocate SMR 
bands to cellular. The FCC’s administrative process would block that. So he figured out a below-
the-radar-screen approach to accomplish the same thing. After tying up the rights to scores of 
local SMR licenses, he met with Motorola’s wireless technology experts. They had developed 
devices to make more efficient use of the bandwidth allocated to SMR by digitizing existing 
analog systems. Of course, use of the new technology required an FCC waiver, but when 
O’Brien made the application he petitioned to upgrade dispatch service, not compete with 
cellular. Since digitization would economize on bandwidth, new capacity would be available. 
Fleet Call requested permission to utilize it for increased business-to-business communications. 
While this was similar to dispatch service, the request adroitly positioned the company to extend 
mobile phone service to the general public.
222  “When Nextel lobbied at the FCC in 1990 for 
waivers to rules that limited how rapidly Nextel could assemble its systems, the filing didn’t play 
up the cellular angle, emphasizing instead how to improve dispatch service. By early 1991 
Nextel had won FCC approval.”
223  
The achievement was not insignificant. According to a Nextel vice-president, the 
company spent approximately $2 million on its application (filed in 1989), while opponents 
(including cellular operators) invested $25 million attempting to defeat it.
224  Once having 
survived the regulatory process, however, Nextel became enormously valuable in promoting 
competition with established cellular and (now) PCS carriers, innovating in wireless telephony 
products, and creating shareholder value. As of June 29, 2000, the firm was capitalized at about 
$42 billion. 
Nextel is the exception that proves the rule. Bringing radio spectrum out of an 
unproductive employment should not be such tricky business. Regulators should not have to be 
fooled, competitors blindsided, and businesses pursued as though delivering better service to 
millions of customers were an illegal activity. Entrepreneurs should have to make their mark 
innovating in the marketplace, inventing technologies or marketing “killer apps,” not out-foxing 
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competing sets of lawyers. The countless other businesses that have flunked this test––most of 
them unknown and deterred from the start––constitute economic carnage without offsetting 
social advantage. 
NAB & NPR Block Low-power FM 
 In January 2000 the FCC designated a new class of low-power broadcasting outlets and 
set a timetable for accepting applications for licenses. The stations will radiate extremely limited 
power, with broadcast coverage between one to 3.5 miles in radius. Commission staff estimated 
that “as many as 1,000 stations or perhaps even more” would potentially be licensed under the 
rules.
225  The policy was hailed as a “stunning reversal,”
226  a “clear victory” for low power 
enthusiasts.
227  In fact, the episode reveals the protectionist bias of the regulatory system.  
The FM band is divvied into 100 channels by the FCC, with 200 KHz allocated to 
each.
228  According to the technology available to the market in 1962, regulators channelized this 
band.
229  In general, each FM station was awarded a slot with three vacant channels on either 
side. These buffer zones reduced potential interference at the cost of audience program choice. 
Adopted prior to digitization, the scheme ignores tuners that lock onto FM frequencies. 
Low-power stations were once tolerated in the FM band. But twenty years ago the 
Commission reversed its policy, refusing to issue low-power licenses anywhere in the 
continental United States.
230  Low power is defined as 1,000 watts or less, in contrast to emissions 
of full-power FM stations of 6,000 to 100,000 watts or more.
231  By 1999 the Commission was 
receiving over 13,000 inquiries annually about starting such stations,
232  and hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of stations were operating illegally without licenses.
233  Several well publicized cases, 
and a campaign in the early Clinton Administration to crack down on “pirates,” raised visibility 
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of the issue.
234  The FCC changed course, however, when it issued a Notice of Inquiry in 1998. It 
followed up with a Notice of Proposed Rule Making in January 1999, and a Report & Order in 
January 2000.   
The existing FM allocation inefficiently devours spectrum by keeping multiple channels 
vacant between broadcasting stations in the same market. These guard bands give a station 
assigned 94.5 MHz the implicit right to silence six adjacent channels: 94.7, 94.9 and 95.1 to the 
north, 94.3, 94.1, and 93.9 to the south.
235  FM “pirates” discovered many years ago that they 
could transmit in these stretches of dead air. Such broadcasts did not disrupt existing 
communications; indeed, they long went undetected. Commercial and National Public Radio-
affiliated broadcasters, keenly concerned about loss of audience, informed the FCC about 
unlicensed operators. 
Pirate radio stations attempt to make productive use out of idle airspace. Not only is it 
economically efficient to extract additional value from a given resource, new broadcasting 
activity promotes public goods as defined by the Federal Communications Commission. It 
enriches democratic debate to bring diverse information and entertainment to listeners. Given the 
FCC’s long-standing policy that “localism” is in the public interest, tiny neighborhood 
competitors might have been embraced by regulators. Instead, the FCC reflex was to suppress 
such broadcasting. The crackdown, however, mainly worked to inspire additional illegal entry.   
Finally, the Commission chose to suppress low-power FM in a more effective manner: by 
embracing it. By extending an extremely limited, highly regulated opportunity to a small handful 
of community radio stations, vast opportunities for low-power FM broadcasting will continue to 
be left unexploited. Incumbent broadcasters, both public and private, will be protected from 
effective competition. But the cause of the anti-consumer result will be invisible to the public, as 
the generic policy against LPFM will have ended. The Commission will ironically appear to 
champion the interests of LPFM listeners. 
Indeed, thanks to harsh opposition to the FCC’s LPFM proposal by the National 
Associations of Broadcasters (NAB) and National Public Radio (NPR),
236  this has already 
                                                         
234  Loring Wirbel, Too Much Noisy Static, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES (Feb. 14, 2000), 
http://www.techweb.com/se/directlink.cgi?EET20000214S0056. 
235  Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order , MM Docket No. 99-25, FC 00-19 (Jan. 27, 2000), par. 
2. 
236  “The firestorm of opposition from broadcasters to a U.S. proposal to set aside spectrum for low-power FM radio 
stations resurfaced again last Monday at the National Association of Broadcasters convention.” The NAB appealed 
to Congress and filed suit in federal court to stop the FCC’s low-power FM license assignments. George Leopold, 
Debate Over Low-power FM Flares Again at NAB Confab, EETIMES (April 17, 2000), www.techweb.com/se/ 
directlink.cgi?EET2000041720027. The NAB was joined in its fight by National Public Radio. Stephen Labaton,                 70
 
occurred. The conflict demonstrates the conservative bias of spectrum allocation, including the 
huge over-weighting of Type I error. Three things are notable about industry opposition to low-
power FM. First, the broadcasters boldly assert factual mis-statements, prompting the FCC to 
issue almost humorous rejoinders.
237  In particular, the NAB distributed a compact disk to 
members of Congress in January 2000 that featured sounds of static interference. The screechy 
noises purported to simulate the marketplace effect of allowing new low-power stations to crowd 
in on the FM dial. The special effects, however, had no technical connection to the alleged 
market failure. As the NEW YORK TIMES reported, “Although government engineers say the 
stimulation [sic] is downright fraudulent and cannot be replicated at the F.C.C.’s radio lab, the 
compact disk has had a substantial impact on the debate in Congress and has repeatedly been 
cited by lawmakers as evidence of the need to block the low-power radio program.”
238  
Second, the brash tactics are productive. H.R. 3439, a bill “To prohibit the Federal 
Communications Commission from establishing rules authorizing the operation of new, low 
power FM radio stations,” passed the House of Representatives, 274-110, on April 13, 2000.
239  
The bill guts low power FM by protecting three vacant co-channels around FM assignments, and 
requires the FCC to consider the effect of low-power FM stations “on incumbent FM radio 
broadcasters… including an analysis of the economic impact on such broadcasters” prior to 
issuing any new licenses.
240  Its sponsor, Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA), Chair of the House 
Telecommunications Subcommittee, has openly defended such interests. “Rep. Billy Tauzin of 
Louisiana said the Federal Communications Commission plan for so-called microradio would 
reduce the audience and advertising revenue of current stations and possibly create severe 
interference.”
241  (The admission that economic damage is certain, while signal degradation is 
speculative, is a clue into regulatory dynamics.)    
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Congressional sentiment was clearly an incentive for the FCC to abandon more ambitious 
FM low-power policies, including that originally proposed by the Commission in 1999.
242  (See 
discussion related to Table 7, below.) On Dec. 15, 2000, anti-LPFM legislation did indeed 
become law, meaning “that at most a handful of stations in the least populated parts of the 
country may be started, although even that now is uncertain.”
243    
Finally, broadcasters argue interference in a categorical way. Instead of debating the 
pluses and minuses of low-power FM, or comparing the cost of new signal degradation with the 
benefit provided by new stations, they present an all-or-nothing defense of the status quo. If any 
new transmissions interfere with any stations now on the air to any degree, the conclusion is that 
no new broadcasting should be allowed.
244  An NAB vice president declares: “Interference is 
obnoxious.” No quantification necessary, nor consideration of the rival obnoxiousness––reduced 
listener choice.
245   
An illuminating expert report by Virginia Polytechnic Institute engineering professor 
Theodore Rappaport documents the polar position taken by regulators and broadcasters.
246  It 
notes that the FCC adopts worst-case assumptions in creating station separation rules. These 
rules err hugely on the side of too few stations (rather than too much interference) when adopted, 
and become increasingly obsolete over time (as new technology improves radios). Of course, 
with such rules in place, radio sets need not upgrade performance, as there is no demand for 
equipment to receive additional signals (which fail to be licensed by the FCC). Broadcasters then 
seize on the least discriminating radios to test the effect of new transmissions.
247  Interference 
becomes a self-fulfilling regulatory reality. 
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 Ignoring dynamic improvements, information revealing whether new broadcasts improve 
or lessen listener enjoyment would be interesting. These experiments are not performed. Instead, 
broadcast industry engineers show that low-power broadcasts could exceed FCC interference 
parameters. To achieve even this modest result, broadcasters use receivers of such poor quality 
that existing full-power FM transmissions can also be shown to violate FCC interference rules. 
“The NAB invents a ‘worst radio,’” writes Rappaport, “in order to show much greater potential 
LPFM interference than would be experienced by any real receiver.”
248  
The categorical plea for interference-free operations, while theoretically rendering all FM 
broadcasting in violation of the public interest, is applied asymmetrically. Old FM stations 
already have licenses; only new stations must apply. The administrative process invites interests 
to oppose “reduc[ing] the audience and advertising revenue of current stations,” by raising the 
possibility that entry will “create severe interference.” 
If existing broadcasters were given the right to sub-divide assigned frequencies 
(including first, second and third adjacent channels), they would race to establish thousands of 
new stations in a quest for new revenues. Broadcasters oppose privatization, however, because 
radio license values would decline as competition for listeners intensified. Incumbents would be 
forced to provide additional programming were the 100 FM channels owned fully by private 
parties.   
Instead, license restrictions police a cartel and block new entry. As of September 30, 
1999, the FCC listed 7,832 full power FM stations (of which 2,066 were non-commercial), and 
4,783 AM outlets.
249  Since November 1964 some 400 full power FM stations have been “short 
spaced,” operating with just one or two channels of separation. According to the Commission, 
“These full-power stations… have consistently met the Commission’s criteria for distortion-free 
signals.”
250  Radio stations operating at a small fraction of the power could transmit “distortion-
free signals” with similar buffers.  
The FCC’s January 2000 LPFM allocation provided for about 1,000 stations emitting 10 
or 100 watts––less than four new stations per each of the 269 U.S. radio markets.
251  (Under the 
truncated allocation consistent with the Dec. 2000 legislation, less than one new low-power 
station will be permitted per market.) How many stations could be inserted into the FM dial 
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subject to the constraint that interference does not exceed current levels?
252  If full-power stations 
peacefully co-exist with one or two channel separation, it is reasonable to assume that they will 
offer acceptable signal clarity when 100-watt stations are in similar proximity. Let us calculate 
the capacity of the FM band to support new 100-watt stations by supposing that each existing 
full-power station occupies a 20 kHz channel and is protected by two adjacent channels (one on 
either side) kept vacant. Because other full-power stations also enjoy such protections, and buffer 
channels are not shared in this model, each existing licensee is given two adjacent channels of 
protection (i.e., more than that afforded some full-power stations operating for decades) against 
other full-power stations. The spacing would result, however, in some full-power stations sharing 
just one buffer channel with low-power stations.  
On each channel unused by high-power FM (including buffers), drop in 100-watt 
stations. Because a 100-watt station has a broadcast contour radius of 3.5 miles, assume that each 
station “consumes” 64 square miles. (This is an 8X8 square, slightly larger than the coverage 
area.)
253  This implies that 100 – 3X channels are available for LPFM stations in each market, 
where X = no. of local full-power FM stations. As each station is allocated 64 square miles, 
potential LPFM drop-ins = [100 – 3X] [SQM/64], where SQM = square miles in the radio 
market.  
Some of these potential low-power stations could be damaged by “blanketing 
interference” from full-power stations. This is the effect that an FM transmitter has in blocking 
all other FM stations’ reception in the immediate area. With the most powerful FM stations the 
area “blanketed” is up to 2.5 miles in radius.
254  If we assume that one entire 64 square mile 
LPFM slot will be unavailable on any local frequency in the area used by every local full-power 
FM station, we account for this interference posed by subtracting X(100 – 3X) slots from possible 
LPFM insert capacity.  
Finally, to avoid having small markets with small potential audiences skew results, an 
optional constraint limits the available slots in a market to just one station per 1,000 of 
population (12 years and older). This is not recommended as a normative policy, as demand for 
licenses should be satisfied without regard for economic viability.  
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By this estimation, there exists sufficient space in allocated FM frequencies for about 
5,500 new 100-watt station––in the top ten U.S. radio markets alone. Medium markets like 
Peoria, Illinois and small markets such as Casper, Wyoming have ample room to accommodate 
new stations up to the artificially imposed 1/1000 person cap. See Table 6.
255  In total, the 269 
U.S. Radio Markets.
256  (Under the truncated allocation consistent with the Dec. 2000 legislation, 
less than one new low-power station will be permitted per market.) How many stations could be 
inserted into the FM dial subject to the constraint that interference does not exceed current 
levels?
257  If full-power stations peacefully co-exist with one or two channel separation, it is 
reasonable to assume that they will offer acceptable signal clarity when 100-watt stations are in 
similar proximity. Let us calculate the capacity of the FM band to support new 100-watt stations 
by supposing that each existing full-power station occupies a 20 kHz channel and is protected by 
two adjacent channels (one on either side) kept vacant. Because other full-power stations also 
enjoy such protections, and buffer channels are not shared in this model, each existing licensee is 
given two adjacent channels of protection (i.e., more than that afforded some full-power stations 
operating for decades) against other full-power stations. The spacing would result, however, in 
some full-power stations sharing just one buffer channel with low-power stations.  
On each channel unused by high-power FM (including buffers), drop in 100-watt 
stations. Because a 100-watt station has a broadcast contour radius of 3.5 miles, assume that each 
station “consumes” 64 square miles. (This is an 8X8 square, slightly larger than the coverage 
area.)
258  This implies that 100 – 3X channels are available for LPFM stations in each market, 
where X = no. of local full-power FM stations. As each station is allocated 64 square miles, 
potential LPFM drop-ins = [100 – 3X] [SQM/64], where SQM = square miles in the radio 
market.  
Some of these potential low-power stations could be damaged by “blanketing 
interference” from full-power stations. This is the effect that an FM transmitter has in blocking 
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all other FM stations’ reception in the immediate area. With the most powerful FM stations the 
area “blanketed” is up to 2.5 miles in radius.
259  If we assume that one entire 64 square mile 
LPFM slot will be unavailable on any local frequency in the area used by every local full-power 
FM station, we account for this interference posed by subtracting X(100 – 3X) slots from possible 
LPFM insert capacity.   
Finally, to avoid having small markets with small potential audiences skew results, an 
optional constraint limits the available slots in a market to just one station per 1,000 of 
population (12 years and older). This is not recommended as a normative policy, as demand for 
licenses should be satisfied without regard for economic viability.   
By this estimation, there exists sufficient space in allocated FM frequencies for about 
5,500 new 100-watt stations––in the top ten U.S. radio markets alone. Medium markets like 
Peoria, Illinois and small markets such as Casper, Wyoming have ample room to accommodate 
new stations up to the artificially imposed 1/1000 person cap. See Table 6.
260  In total, the 269 
U.S. radio markets defined by Arbitron yield 97,701 opportunities for 100-watt stations. Without 
imposing the population-based cap, slots for over 306,000 LPFM stations are estimated to be 
available.
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Table 6. Capacity of U.S. Radio Markets to Absorb LPFM Stations 
 
Rank  Radio Market 
a  Pop (12+) 



















Final result: No. 
of LPFM 
stations 
1  New York, NY  14,449,700  7,796  69  0  0  0  14,450  0 
2  Los Angeles, CA  10,347,700  4,850  38  0  0  0  10,348  0 
3  Chicago, IL  7,147,300  5,619  46  0  0  0  7,147  0 
4  San Francisco, CA  5,812,200  7,369  62  0  0  0  5,812  0 
5  Philadelphia, PA  4,063,000  3,518  19  2,364  817  1,547  4,063  1,547 
6  Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX  3,928,600  6,968  32  435  128  307  3,929  307 
7  Detroit, MI  3,826,600  4,466  23  2,163  713  1,450  3,827  1,450 
8  Boston, MA  3,724,100  3,105  24  1,359  672  687  3,724  687 
9  Washington, DC  3,664,600  3,967  29  806  377  429  3,665  429 
10  Houston-Galveston, TX  3,613,700  7,107  29  1,444  377  1,067  3,614  1,067 
1-10  Large Market Totals        8,571  3181  5,487  60,579  5,487 
134  Appleton-Oshkosh, WI  289,700  1,399  13  1,333  793  540  290  290 
135  Peoria, IL  289,200  1,797  13  1,712  793  919  289  289 
136 Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS  286,700  1,785  13  1,701  793  908  287  287 
137  Atlantic City-Cape May, NJ  286,600  816  18  587  828  0  287  0 
138  Trenton, NJ  284,800  226  5  300  425  0  285  0 
139  Stamford-Norwalk, CT  283,300  210  4  289  352  0  283  0 




141  Newburgh-Middletown (Mid-
Hudson Valley), NY 
270,900  816  9  931  657  274  271  271 
142  Montgomery, AL  266,400  2,008  10  2,196  700  1,496  266  266 
143  Eugene-Springfield, OR  265,200  4,554  9  5,195  657  4,538  265  265 
134-143  Mid-size Market Totals        16,050  6823  9,656  2796  1941 
267  Jackson, TN  72,000  557  11  583  737  0  72  0 
268  Bangor, ME  71,400  352  12  352  768  0  71  0 
269  Beckley, WV  67,800  1,271  6  1,628  492  1,136  68  68 
270  Mason City, IA  67,800  1,469  8  1,744  608  1,136  68  68 
271  Jonesboro, AR  66,100  711  8  844  608  236  66  66 
272  Cheyenne, WY  64,300  2,686  9  3,064  657  2,407  64  64 
273  Great Falls, MT  63,300  2,698  5  3,583  425  3,158  63  63 
274  Meridian, MS  61,200  1,380  10  1,509  700  809  61  61 
275  Brunswick, GA  56,500  1,052  7  1,299  553  746  57  57 
276  Casper, WY  50,600  5,340  8  6,341  608  5,733  51  51 
267-277  Smallest Market Totals        20,947  6156  15,361  641  498 
1-276  ALL-MARKET TOTALS  183,127,200  606,292  3,736  488,179   306,805   97,701 
Notes 
New York market includes Markets 47 and 99; San  Francisco metro includes 27 and 113; Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket includes 164; Washington DC includes 200. 
a. Based on Arbitron radio markets, Fall 1999. 
b. Based on Arbitron definition of market areas (follows US Census Bureau Metropolitan Statistical Areas).  
c. CMSA=Consolidated Metro Statistical Area. MSA=Metro Statistical Area. PMSA=Primary Metro Statistical Area 
d. Data from BIA Research Inc, Radio Yearbook 2000. 
e. Gross LPFM slots = [100 – 3X] [SQM/64], where X = no. of full-power FM stations.  
Assumes LPFM 100-watt station coverage area 8 miles square. 
f.  Slots lost to blanketing = X(100 – 3X), where X = no. of full-power FM stations. Assumes a blanketing area of 64 square miles. 
Sources: 
Arbitron radio market rankings, www.arbitron.com/radiosurvey/mm001025.htm 
US Census Bureau, www.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den_ma.txt  
FCC, Mass Media Bureau, Audio Service Division, www.fcc.gov/mmb/asd/fmq.htm#sprung3 




This approximation is rough but exceedingly conservative. Blocking off three channels 
for each full power FM assignment wastes usable bandwidth, as does the use of separate buffer 
channels between stations. These rules are so stringent they soak up all low-power insert 
capacity in the top four markets, despite the fact that airspace for low-power broadcasting has 
been found there by both radio pirates and FCC regulators.  Indeed, that the four largest radio 
markets each feature in excess of 34 FM stations under existing rules demonstrates that full-
power stations do not effectively block three channels throughout each local market.  
Small cities, towns, and even sparsely populated rural areas support both licensed and 
unlicensed stations,
261  but are entirely excluded from our estimation. About one-half the total 
number of FM radio stations in the United States are located outside defined radio markets. Were 
low-power assignments extended to these areas, available insert slots would swell. Of course, 
such areas are served by far fewer full-power stations, so spectrum space is relatively abundant 
for LPFM.  
The estimation also assumes that only 100-watt stations are desired. Including a mix of 
10-watt stations could dramatically increase available slots. The estimate also excludes low-
power opportunities in AM, a band less populated than FM.
262  The assumption that a band used 
once for FM high-power stations (even if only as a buffer) is available nowhere within a given 
radio market is also extremely conservative. 
This lower-bound approximation reveals that the FCC’s controversial plan to create a 
low-power radio service contemplates allocating barely a flash of available airspace to 
community broadcasters. Low-power radio could be a ubiquitous communications medium for 
churches, schools, local businesses, farms, and public safety organizations. Given permissive 
regulation, supply would flood the market, triggering experiments with newly abundant wireless 
communications. In many markets licenses might be available to all who applied, without 
charge.  
                                                         
261  A pirate radio case still in the federal courts, for example, involves a North Dakota farmer providing classical 
music to his and neighboring farms. Roy Neset v. United States of America , Case No. 98-3539, U.S. 8
th  Cir. 
262  Citing the filings of Aaron Reed, Chuckie Broadcasting Co., and Oklahoma Dept. of Transportation, the FCC 
eliminated AM low-power thusly: “Many commenters agreed that existing interference within the AM band and the 
relative complexity of AM facilities should preclude consideration of a low power AM service.” This is hardly 
compelling, least of all because the “relative complexity of AM facilities” would be a problem for the private 
applicants to deal with if given the opportunity to enter the market. Indeed, FM was thought to be relatively complex 
compared to AM for many decades (see AM Blocks FM discussion, above), and remained so until pirates used 




Would interference result? Yes, some would occur. It always does.
263  This is the 
unhelpful question posed by regulators and anti-competitive interests. Would the interference 
annoy listeners so substantially as to cancel the gains from enhanced choice? No––and a much 
more useful question. The FCC has run the one-channel separation experiment with full-power 
stations since 1964. Stations emitting 100-watts do not create more interference than those 
operating at 6,000 to over 100,000, ceteris paribus.
264  
Even prior to its 80% congressional haircut,
265  the plan approved by the FCC was a 
textbook example of how to effectively curtail new entry while nominally supporting it. Over-
regulation of entrants is a victory for incumbents by raising rivals’ costs.
266  The structural biases 
of public interest spectrum allocation facilitate this anti-competitive outcome. As FCC Chair 
William Kennard conceded, “We knew the firestorm of criticism we would get from 
broadcasters trying to protect their markets. That’s why we proceeded so cautiously in the rule-
making process.”
267   
In 1999, the FCC sought to license 100 watt and 1,000 watt stations,
268  but the Order 
limited new licensees to a maximum of 100 watts. This yields a standard coverage area just one-
                                                         
263  Interference among full-power stations can be found where signals using the same frequency are of 
approximately equal strength. Hence, signal degradation can be documented in existing services. The Virginia 
Center for the Public Press (VCPP) has done this, recording actual interference between full-power FM stations in 
Washington, D.C.: http://hometown.aol.com/Wrfr/COM.htm . “Some interference from existing FM stations is 
already acceptable under FCC rules. For example, blanketing interference… The FCC considers blanketing 
interference to be acceptable from existing FM stations.” Rappaport, Technical Analysis, supra note __, 21.  
264  The VCPP notes five pairs of “short spaced” stations in Washington, including WTOP (107.7) and WRQX 
(107.3), separated by just one channel. The stations’ transmitters are 43 miles apart, and broadcast at 29,000 watts 
and 34,000 watts, respectively. “Grandfathered ‘Short Spaced’ stations… are close on the dial and are very near 
each other. Do they interfere significantly with each other? A drive through test has shown that they do not. 
Compare their signal wattage with a 100 watt LPFM station. Would you expect any interference in that case? Under 
these circumstances, it’s obvious you would not.” Testimony of Christopher Maxwell, Secretary/Treasurer, The 
Virginia Center for the Public Press, Before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, Hearings on THE FCC’S RADIO SPECTRUM 
MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING H.R. 3439, March 17
th , 2000, Washington, D.C., 6. 
265  The new law, “Reverses the FCC's decision with respect to interference protection by putting back ‘third adjacent 
protection.’ This means that about 75-80% of the low power stations will no longer be available. The loss of stations 
will be concentrated in the most populated markets.” “Summary of the Anti-LPFM Legislation,” Media Access 
Project web site (visited Jan. 3, 2001), www.mediaaccess.org/programs/lpfm/rpa2000.html. 
266  Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve 
Power over Price, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
267  Alex Markels, Radio Active, supra note __, 372. The article goes on to report: “He [Kennard] says this led to the 
FCC’s decision against earlier plans to allow narrower channel spacing and higher-wattage LPFM signals.” This 
illuminates the conservative bias of spectrum allocation. It is the primarily the structure of the administrative process 
– not the ideology of regulators – responsible for anti-competitive outcomes. 




eighth of that provided by 1,000 watt transmitters, which broadcast a 10 mile radius.
269  The 
severe power limits undermine economies of scale in marketing and promotion, as well as other 
productive dimensions.
270   
For-profit entities were ruled ineligible for low-power radio licenses. This protects 
incumbents from new competition in local advertising markets.
271  It also eliminates 
organizations perfectly suited to provide community radio programming, including some Indian 
tribes.
272  Further, only one license will initially be granted per non-profit licensee. After two 
years, as many as five stations may be owned in different areas, and after three years the national 
limit is relaxed to ten stations––where it stays. Additionally, LPFM licensees may not have any 
ownership interest in other media properties (including a newspaper).
273  These rules, designed to 
favor amateur operators, virtually guarantee inexperience, and block efficient combinations of 
operations. They are far stricter than rules applied to full-power stations, an asymmetry 
impossible to justify on consumer protection grounds. Such constraints will severely hamper 
entrants in producing popular programming and, therefore, attracting capital from either 
investors or donors.  
 Third, low-power licensee are assigned by comparative hearings, the traditional FCC 
method wherein the Commission determines who deserves to broadcast according to public 
interest criteria. The three key items evaluated in the process are (a) local community presence of 
group applying for a permit; (b) commitment to on-air operation; (c) commitment to original 
program content. The last two criteria are specified: applicants pledging to provide at least 12 
hours of daily programming, and eight hours of original daily programming, receive bonus 
points.
274  Stations making such pledges will be first to receive licenses, but the obligations 
                                                         
269  Aaron Pressman, Now You Can Create A Radio Station, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2000, 10:37 am PT), 
http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2424651-2,00.html. The average 100 watt station will reach 
only about 12% the area covered by the average 1000 watt station. 
270  The FCC was strongly urged to allow 1,000 watt emissions, because “restricting LPFM stations to lower power 
operation will adversely affect their economic viability.” Even where 1,000 watt stations could broadcast without 
serious interference problems, the Commission rejected the plea. Federal Communications Commission, In the 
Matter of Creation of Low Power Radio Service: Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, MM 
Docket No. 99-25 (Sept. 28, 2000), par. 70. 
271  The FCC received public comment that “restricting the service to noncommercial service reduces LPFM stations’ 
economic viability and eliminates a potential advertising medium for small business.” Order on Reconsideration, 
supra note __, par. 72. 
272  Tribes are allowed to apply for LPFM permits, but must meet noncommercial enterprise criteria. Those that 
operate profitably are presumably ineligible. Order on Reconsideration, supra note __, par. 75. 
273  Order on Reconsideration, supra note __, pars. 76, 78. 




incurred will prove crushing. They will also deprive low-power listeners of desirable 
programming produced elsewhere––say, home country news and entertainment in an immigrant 
enclave. This content is heavily discriminated against by FCC rules.  
As bold and innovative as local content sounds in theory, it is extremely difficult to 
achieve and typically counter-productive to mandate. The failure of public access cable 
television channels to attract even trivial audiences, despite receiving literally hundreds of 
millions of dollars in cross-subsidies courtesy of local franchise regulators, is testimony to the 
consumer hostility embedded within the scheme.
275  That low-power FM advocates strongly 




Table 7. Limitations of FCC’s Jan. 2000 Low Power FM Broadcasting Policy 
 
Policy  What Obtained  What was Possible  Reason/Comment 
Power  10 watt and 100 watts  1000 watts  
(in NPRM) 
Reduced service areas from 10 mi. 
radius to between 1 and 3.5 mi. 




Using second adjacent channels 
for local stations yields abundant 
insert opportunities 
Which Band  Only FM  AM, FM, UHF, 
others 
 
Programming  Stations promising 12 hours 
per day total, 8 hours 
original programming, first 
to receive licenses 
Market determination  Heavy financial burden is 
imposed, one that eliminates 
popular programming, hinders 
network formation for content 
Eligibility  Only non-commercial 
educational, “pirates” 
ineligible 
Open entry  Limits lessen the ability of LP 
stations to operate efficiently, 
attract audiences or capital 
Cross-
ownership 
One station per applicant, 
no cross-ownership of any 
media property (including 
newspapers) 
Open entry  Raises costs, guarantees entrants 
are relatively inexperienced 
Speed of 
enactment 
LPFM licenses in 2001 
barring further delays 
Same policy decades 
previous 
 
                                                         
275  Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television 
Franchise, 134 U. PENN. L.R. (July 1986), 1335, 1400-01; Mark Zupan, The Efficacy of Bidding Schemes in the 
Case of Cable Television: Some Systematic Evidence, 32 J. LAW & ECON. 401 (OCT. 1989). 
276  The Media Access Project actively promotes LPFM, but sabotages its success by arguing, for instance, “The 
Commission May Place Stricter Ownership Limits on Low Power FM Stations than on Full Power Stations.” Reply 
Comments of United Church of Christ, et al., Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Creation of a 




Fourth, in what has to be considered almost gratuitous violence, the FCC barred operators 
of pirate radio stations from being granted new low-power station licenses. Because the FCC 
long determined that low-power radio would be illegal, the only experienced community radio 
operators are those who engaged in underground broadcasting. Prohibiting these lawbreakers 
from operating lawfully eliminates even the modest supply of human capital available to 
fledgling radio entrants.
277  Curiously, past non-compliance with various rules and regulations 
does not bar a corporation from being licensed to operate a full-power radio station.  
Finally, licensing is likely to stretch several years. The experience with pirate FM 
broadcasting, the low-power rule making, the legislative fight, and the current assignment of 
licenses by the FCC has already stretched beyond a decade. It may go much longer. Even if 
licensed immediately, however, the spectrum allocation process would have prevented useful 
exploitation of FM frequencies for a generation. As the president of the NAB says with perhaps 
unintended candor: “If this could be done, it would have been done 20 years ago.”
278   
UWB and SDR: The Queue Starts Here 
Among the most promising wireless technologies are those known as software-defined 
radio (SDR). These systems intelligently sort communications across many bands, reading coded 
information detailing traffic conditions over alternative frequencies. These codes allow for 
protocols that prioritize messages. Emergency fire or police communications might take 
precedence over cell-phone calls, e.g., and interactive cell-phone calls over one-way data 
downloads (where a 0.5-second delay is not disruptive).
279  SDR intelligence can be embedded in 
decentralized devices to avoid interference by frequency-hopping. Congestion is managed by 
protocols directing traffic in order of the most time-sensitive communications. Improved traffic 
management increases communications capacity.
 280   
A related family of communications systems is based on ultra-wideband (UWB) 
transmissions.
281   By utilizing very low power, UWB systems can operate underneath existing 
                                                         
277  Alex Markels, Radio Active, supra note __, 324.  
278  Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Heads for Showdown with Congress Over Radio Plan, N.Y. TIMES (March 27, 2000). 
279  The SDR Forum provides useful information at, www.sdrforum.org . The FCC’s Technical Advisory Council 
posts discussion papers at, www.fcc.gov/oet/tac/focusgroups.html. 
280  Joseph Mitola III, Cognitive Radio for Flexible Mobile Multimedia Communications, 6
th  International Workshop 
on Mobile Multimedia Communications (Nov. 1999), and Appendix D in Joseph Mitola III, Software Radio: 
Wireless Architecture for the 21
st  Century, Ph.D. dissertation (1999). 




radio emissions without causing noticeable degradation of signals. Yet, by utilizing frequencies 
spanning a wide range of the radio spectrum, greater communications capacity is achievable. 
Much like SDR, this capacity is unleashed through intense, simultaneous use of radio bands. 
Receivers decipher coded information, constructing messages from what would appear a 
“cacophony of competing voices” to less sophisticated systems. The ability to detect low power 
transmissions, combined with intelligence to separate data sent over a given frequency, again 
increases communications capacity.  
Despite years long development,
282  neither technology has gained FCC authorization. A 
Notice of Inquiry was issued for SDR in March, 2000, and the Commission is now determining 
what policy is warranted.
283  A rule making for UWB was initiated in September, 1998,
284  and in 
May, 2000 the Commission tentatively proposed to allow UWB on an unlicensed basis.
285   
The wait is on. Every week of delay in the deployment of these promising 
communications systems represents a loss of utility to customers and an unrecoverable reduction 
in wealth. While there are legitimate issues regarding the effect of new SDR and UWB devices 
the transmissions of existing wireless infrastructure, the process by which the FCC will resolve 
those issues fails to properly account for the costs of delay.   
This is vividly seen here, because both SDR and UWB economize on spectrum use by 
reducing the problems of interference. Rather than pose a threat to existing communications, the 
technologies represent an opportunity to squeeze far more out of given bandwidth. This means 
that a technology-neutral regulatory structure designed to maximize the value of the public’s 
airwaves would embrace and expedite adoption. Instead, the new applications are confronted by 
                                                         
282  Both trace their origins to military research. SDR was first demonstrated in 1995. Federal Communications 
Commission, In the Matter of Inquiry Regarding Software Defined Radios, ET Docket No. 00-47, FCC 00-103 
(March 21, 2000), par. 4. UWB, an offshoot of a larger family of wireless applications called “spread spectrum,” 
traces its roots back at least four decades. “During the period 1960-1999, over 200 papers were published in 
accredited IEEE journals and more than 100 patents were issued on topics related to ultra wideband technology.” 
Gerald F. Ross, Early Motivations and History of Ultra Wideband Technology (Lexington, MA: Anro Engineering, 
Inc.), www.jacksons.net/tac/A_Brief_History_of_UWB_Communications.pdf. A leading UWB technology supplier, 
Time Domain, notes that it “has been meeting with members of the FCC’s staff since 1991 to describe its novel 
time-modulated ultra-wideband (TM-UWB) RF technology.” Part 15 Emissions Measurement Technique for TM -
UWB Signals, Prepared by Members of the Technical Staff of Time Domain, attachment to Comments filed with 
FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 (May 22, 1997). 
283  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Inquiry Regarding Software Defined Radios, ET Docket 
No. 00-47, FCC 00-103 (March 21, 2000). 
284  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding 
Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, FCC 98-208 (Sept. 1, 1998). 
285  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding 




tall administrative barriers, and must shoulder heavy burdens in demonstrating the public interest 
in new technology adoption.  
SDR. Software-defined radio poses a fundamental challenge to the block allocation 
system. Instead of reserving entire frequencies for particular, pre-defined transmissions, SDR 
allows more sophisticated use of spectrum. “The technology enables devices to seek out pockets 
of the airwaves that are not being used locally and adapt to those frequencies.”
286  Under block 
allocation––and the spectrum-hogging technologies mandated by block allocation––these voids 
are substantial. SDR introduces a more efficient traffic cop. Smart systems are programmed to 
automatically sidestep interfering signals, freeing unused guard bands to be used productively. 
SDR poses a direct threat to traditional spectrum management by frequency hopping.
287  
This jeopardizes existing interference control mechanisms, centrally planned allocations that 
limit traffic to neatly separated, pre-designated slots. The decentralized, agile, real-time 
bandwidth optimization of SDR is the antithesis of this regime, distributing “pooled spectrum” 
efficiently among competing licensees and services. FCC equipment approval rules effectively 
bar software-defined radio, as devices are restricted to assigned frequencies. Changing 
frequencies or communications protocols is forbidden without an FCC rule making.
288  As Joe 
Mitola writes: “Software radios provide a vast untapped potential to personalize services. But the 
contemporary process of spectrum allocations takes years to decades and lacks flexibility.”
289  
Ultra-wideband.  This family of technologies has excited interest in the press and before 
the FCC.
290  They “‘could be the silver bullet’ that resolves spectrum congestion.”
291  Yet, rule 
                                                         
286  Associated Press, Cell Phones May Upgrade Automatically, CNET N EWS.COM (March 17, 2000, 11:00 am PT), 
http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1004-200-1575643.html. 
287  “Regulators in the United States and worldwide have scarcely begun to grasp what software-defined radio could 
mean… In fact, Dale Hatfield, chief of the FCC’s office of engineering and technology, warned that it may be next 
to impossible to employ frequency planning in an environment where handsets could be programmed for different 
frequency bands and different digital air interfaces at the push of a button.” Loring Wirbel, Software Radio’s Move 
to Handset Jolts Regulators, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES (Aug. 16, 1999), 67. 
288  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Inquiry Regarding Software Defined Radios, ET Docket 
No. 00-47, FCC 00-103 (March 21, 2000), par. 19. 
289  Mitola, supra note __, 293. Mitola also notes that the Type I/Type II error trade-off extends to SDR protocols: “If 
the etiquette is too strict, very little additional benefit will come from spectrum pooling because the control overhead 
will be too high to be workable. If, on the other hand, the etiquette is too liberal, there will be much interference and 
universally poor quality of service. Such complex adaptive systems operate best at the ‘edge of chaos.’ This is not a 
particularly comfortable place for regulators to be.” Ibid. (The quoted material is credited to Nicolas Negroponte.) 
Again, the conservative bias of spectrum allocation is material. 
290  See: Kevin Maney, Pulsing With Promise: New Digital Technology Likely to Revolutionize How We Live, USA 
TODAY (April 9, 1999); Speech by Commissioner Susan Ness, “Meeting the Challenge of Innovation at Internet 




changes are needed to allow UWB transmissions.  Principally, UWB needs permission to access 
a wide range of frequencies (several GHz) at very low power levels. The FCC must decide if the 
devices generally emit an acceptable level of interference to other communications, and whether 
the incursion of such (low level) interference in restricted bands, including broadcast television, 
is in the public interest.   
Both questions stir controversy. The first invites questions from wireless operators, most 
particularly amateur operators and users of unlicensed spectrum.
292  These firms would directly 
compete with the new users, and be most vulnerable to possible interference. The Federal 
Aviation Administration and Global Positioning System (GPS) users also fear interference, and 
cite dangerous consequences if UWB operations are permitted.
293  Opposition in the restricted 
bands is stiff.  TV set makers and the National Association of Broadcasters voice concerns about 
UWB.
294  The FCC rule making again focuses on concern over Type I errors despite presumably 
much larger social costs associated with Type II errors. 
The basic UWB story is even, perhaps, more compelling than that of SDR. By using low-
power transmissions spread very widely, additional communications can be achieved even where 
spectrum looks extremely crowded. As THE ECONOMIST writes, UWB creates “bandwidth from 
thin air.”
295  It also has extraordinary ability to go through physical structures, alleviating 
problems plaguing other wireless systems depending on line of sight connections.
296  Existing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Radio: A Regulator’s Perspective,” SDR Forum 19
th  General Meeting, Seattle, Washington (June 20, 2000), 
www.fcc.gov/oet/speeches/ sdrforumsph.html . 
291  Quick Rulemaking Predicted on Ultra Wideband Communications, COMM. DAILY (Sept. 30, 1999). The passage 
quotes from Ralph Petroff, CEO of Time Domain. 
292  See Comments of the Wireless Information Networks Forum, FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 (Dec. 7, 1998), and 
Comments of the American Radio Relay League, Inc., FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 (Dec. 7, 1998). 
293  See Comments of the Federal Aviation Administration, FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 (Oct. 20, 1998); Comments 
filed by GPS Industry Council, Federal Communications Commission, ET Docket No. 98-153 (Dec. 7, 1998), and 
Reply Comments of the U.S. GPS Industry Council, American Airlines, the General Aviation Manufacturer’s 
Association, Stanford University (the GPS Research Program) and United Airlines, FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 
(Feb. 3, 1999). 
294  See Comments of the Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association and the National Association of 
Broadcasters, FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 (Dec. 7, 1998). “Clearly, it would be inconsistent with the fundamental 
tenets of the Commission’s… policies… if the Commission were to amend its rules to accommodate the provision 
of unlicensed UWB radio systems, knowing that such systems can cause harmful interference within restricted 
bands and the TV broadcast bands.” Id., 2. 
295  Bandwidth from Thin Air, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 1999), online edition. See also, How to Look Through Walls, 
THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 1999), online edition 
296  This aspect of UWB actually has quite dynamic possibilities apart from mass communications. Time Domain, for 
instance, received an FCC waiver in June 1999 allowing it to sell up to 2500 devices capable of “seeing” through 




transmissions are undisturbed due to the ability of UWB to use extremely low-power 
transmissions that do not rise above the “noise floor.”
297  
The primary request by the UWB users is for FCC approval of devices that emit no more 
radiation than existing non-communications devices such as microprocessors used in personal 
computers. As the UWB Working Group filing submitted to the FCC argues: “The principal 
regulatory issue confronting UWB technologies under Part 15 involves the fact that the rules 
distinguish between intentional and unintentional radiators.”
298  The UWB users request parity 
with digital devices that accidentally pollute the airwave. The request does not appear ambitious, 
given that the spillover emission standard adopted for microprocessors in 1979 has not proven 
dangerous despite vast expansion in the use of desktop and laptop computers,
299  and that the 
FCC agrees that “only spurious emissions” are allowed in restricted bands.
300   
Nonetheless, the UWB proposal is highly controversial. First, it is opposed by interests 
alleging UWB would, in fact, cause deleterious interference.
301   Any new application faces such 
concerns, particularly one using novel technical standards, aiming for broad deployment, and 
utilizing many bands. Interference is a possibility, as proponents admit, and it would be 
extraordinary if existing spectrum users did not call for a thorough pre-entry investigation.  
Second, such interests have strong incentives to oppose entry. Objections to the 
applicants’ ambitious new plans can be filed free of charge (by the FCC), and there is no reward 
offered incumbents to resist temptation. At worst, potential interference may be mitigated. At 
best, potential competition will be delayed. Given the spectrum allocation framework 
incumbents oppose entry unless they have material stakes in the innovations of the entrants. 
Third, the adjudication process at the Commission allows opposition considerable 
leverage not afforded applicants.  Opposing interests need only raise questions about possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, ET 
Docket 98-153 (May 11, 2000), footnote 16.  
297  The “noise floor” is background static present in all bands. Wireless communications are typically designed to 
ignore such signals, focusing higher power emissions. UWB uses directional microphones, metaphorically speaking, 
to decipher conversations in this buzz.  
298  Comments of the Ultra-Wideband Working Group to the Federal Communications Commission, ET Docket No. 
98-153 (Dec. 8, 1998), footnote 6 (emphasis in original). 
299  Ibid. 
300  The FCC specifically asked for comment “on whether the Commission should eliminate the requirement that 
only spurious emissions be permitted to fall within the restricted bands…” FCC, Notice of Inquiry In the Matter of 
Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-wideband Transmission Systems, ET Docket No. 




interference. That is because the entrant has an affirmative obligation to make a public interest 
showing, and because there is no cost (beyond lawyers’ and experts’ fees) to raising questions 
that extend rule makings. Entrants bear considerable costs, denied the ability to compete in the 
marketplace, often for years.
302   But these are external to incumbents. 
Scientist David Hughes filed Comments and Reply Comments in the UWB proceeding, 
arguing “that the fears of interference by UWB devices on existing services is simply 
overrated.”
303  Hughes appeared frustrated by the low price of admission charged opponents: 
 
The objections by the FAA, WinForum…, Broadcasters, and the AARL… 
simply provided no technical analyses––only assertions––that UWB will interfere 
to unacceptable degrees with their current spectrum-using devices. It appears to us 
that they should be called upon… to offer objective proof of the interference they 
fear. But simply objecting on the grounds their exclusive use of the bands 
assigned is the way it’s always been, not be allowed to stop this important and 
progressive step to much more beneficial use of the spectrum.
304  
But the delays imposed on UWB are FCC pro forma. Despite the enormous spectrum 
efficiencies of UWB, the tsunami of demand from business and residential customers for faster, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
301  See, for instance, the Comments filed by GPS Industry Council, Federal Communications Commission, ET 
Docket No. 98-153 (Dec. 7, 1998). The Council includes Boeing, Honeywell, and Rockwell International. 
302  Krohne Technology offers one excellent example. It developed an UWB method for measuring petroleum and 
chemicals in large tanks and requested permission to market their “novel technology” in 1992. The FCC was 
unwilling to classify the system as a low-power device able to access unlicensed bands, but did allow it Krohne to 
apply for a private radio license on every site at which the measurement device was operated. This cumbersome 
method allowed Krohne’s Tank Level Radar Gauge BM70 to be used at “hundreds of sites” since 1992, and “there 
has not been a single reported case of interference in or out of the restricted bands.” Yet, Krohne’s efforts at 
commercial roll-out have been severely hampered “by licensing cost and inconvenience to Krohne and its 
customers.” Krohne supports approval of UWB equipment as it is “now ripe for the Commission to discard the 
cumbersome and costly regulatory ‘red tape’ that accompanies its BM70 sales.” Reply Comments of Krohne, Inc., 
FCC, ET Docket No. 98-153 (Feb. 4, 1999), 2-3 (emphasis in original). 
303  Reply Comments by David Hughes, FCC, ET 98-153 (Feb. 3, 1999). Hughes is Principal Investigator of the 
National Science Foundation’s Wireless Project. He has championed the use of spread spectrum for high-speed 
Internet access. See David R. Hughes and DeWayne Hendricks, Spread-Spectrum Radio, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 
(April 1998) 94. 
304  Reply Comments by David Hughes, FCC, ET 98-153 (Feb. 3, 1999), 2. The FCC appeared unmoved, examining 
the record to express “a number of concerns about generally permitting the operation of UWB devices in the region 
of the spectrum below approximately 2 GHz.” This is where the largest number of restricted bands exist, and where 
television is located. To solve Commission concerns, the Notice of Proposed Rule Making suggested consideration 
of even stricter power limits in the region below 2 GHz, conceding that notch filters (restricting such frequency use 
altogether) are exorbitantly costly (as argued by many UWB proponents commenting in the proceeding). The FCC 




more economically broadband access, and recent FCC policy directives pledging streamlined 
regulation to usher new services to market, UWB is going nowhere fast.
305   A news account of 
the September 1999 meeting of the UWB Coalition gave a glowing assessment of the 
technology: “UWB is to today’s cell phone and radar what the microprocessor was to yesterday’s 
mainframes. It could launch another revolution.”
 306  But legal problems dominated:  
 
[T]he UWB market is stalled… the regulations and the process for 
changing them has grown so many layers and so much bureaucracy, it’s 
stultifying. So the panelists fretted over potential problems with UWB interfering 
with other radio signals––problems that don’t seem to exist. They laid out 
timetables that would unfold slower than a soap opera plot. Julius Knapp of the 
FCC said the next steps are to analyze information, do more testing and then 
make a proposed rulemaking, which is not to be confused with an actual 
rulemaking. It’s about like saying to your wife, “I’m going to make a proposed 
lawnmowing”––then going in the garage and gazing at the lawnmower before 
going inside and turning on the football game…. 
To her credit, FCC Commissioner Susan Ness got up and criticized 
government sluggishness saying it has to learn to move at “Internet speed.” But 
then, when she specifically addressed UWB, she said she’d push for “an initiative 
within the next few months with the hope of completing a study next year.” Next 
year? For just a study? That’s Internet speed? By next year, any Silicon Valley 
venture capitalist worth his salt will have found, funded and taken public four 
companies. 
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Fact is, we don’t really know what UWB can do or whether it could mess 
up existing wireless communications because regulations have prevented much 
testing and development.
 307  
Summary 
 This litany of spectrum regulation horror stories is not a scientific sample. Yet it 
illuminates the manner in which new entry is deterred despite the absence of compelling––or 
even plausible––evidence that consumer welfare will be harmed.  Combined with studies 
revealing that FCC spectrum regulation has not advanced public interests specifically identified 
as justification for FCC rulings, the pattern is clear.
308  Indeed, the pattern is admittedly evident to 
federal policy makers themselves, as seen in detailed critiques of spectrum allocation 
procedures
309  as well as in the call by the current FCC Chairman for market reforms to remedy 
the “spectrum drought”
310  The regulatory system is seen to systematically suppress competitive 
entry, block efficient spectrum use, and protect obsolete technologies from innovate challenge. 
These outcomes prevail due to structural attributes of the spectrum allocation system: 
 
• The FCC determines bandwidth use top-down. 
• Entrants wishing to compete or innovators attempting to develop new wireless 
technologies must apply for permission, and assume the burden of making a public 
interest showing. 
• The public interest standard relegates consumer welfare to one interest competing 
among many. 
• Incumbent licensees and their allies, including interest groups benefiting from cross 
subsidies, have incentive and opportunity to obstruct competitive forces through FCC 
rule makings. 
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• Protected interests enjoy substantial advantages in influencing Commissioners and 
their over-seers in Congress and the Executive Branch. 
• The costs of excessive entry are very well represented in FCC decision making. 
• The costs of insufficient entry––including the costs of delaying entry eventually 
deemed to be in the public interest––are dramatically under-represented in FCC 
decision making. 
 
Many analyses of spectrum regulation note similar results, but attribute such outcomes to 
the innocent, confused origins of broadcast regulation. Despite their sharply divergent normative 
prescriptions, Ronald Coase and Newton Minow both believe that errors by policy makers in the 
earliest days of radio law led to unanticipated anti-social consequences. I believe this to be an 
incorrect reading of history, one that leads to a basic misunderstanding of the structure of 
regulation. The overly conservative legal framework in spectrum has achieved precisely what 
was sought by the political coalition instrumental in enacting the 1927 Radio Act. Understanding 
the linkage between system design and system performance leads to clearer diagnosis of 
spectrum policy ills, and to more effective reform. 
VIII.  THE GENESIS OF RADIO REGULATION
311  
  Conventional wisdom regarding the origins of spectrum allocation has two essential 
elements. The first is that prior to the public interest standard instituted by the 1927 Radio Act 
the radio market was victimized by a tragedy of the commons. Dramatic measures were needed 
to rescue the public from a "cacophony of competing voices.” The second part is that Congress’ 
decision to regulate reflected a passive interest in legislation, motivated by radio’s market 
failure. This led to vague rules that, out of neglect, resulted in perverse outcomes. As described 
by former FCC Chair Newton Minow:  
 
The law governing radio and television broadcasting, the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934, gives broadcasters free and exclusive use of 
broadcast channels on condition that they serve the "public interest, convenience 
and necessity." When I arrived at the FCC, I sought out the man who had drafted 
the law twenty-seven years earlier, Washington's former senator Clarence C. Dill, 




Senator Dill told me that he and his colleagues had been of two minds: on the one 
hand, it was the middle of the Great Depression and they wanted to encourage 
people to risk their money in the new medium; on the other hand, they knew they 
had to have some legal standard with which to award licenses to some people 
while rejecting others, because there were not enough channels to go around. "A 
young man on the committee staff had worked at the Interstate Commerce 
Commission for several years," Dill recalled, "and he said, 'Well, how about 
"public interest, convenience and necessity"? That's what we used there.' That 
sounded pretty good so we decided we would use it, too."
  312    
       
Minow criticizes the casually crafted standard as ill-defined, resulting in a pro-industry 
tilt to policy. In this commonly held view, lackadaisical legislators unintentionally enacted a 
regulatory standard too weak to effectively constrain FCC licensees:  
 
The plan backfired. No one in Congress defined what the public-interest clause was 
supposed to mean in broadcasting. It had been developed to regulate the railroads 
and later the telegraph and telephone services, industries that the law deemed public 
utilities subject to detailed rate and public-service regulation. But the Federal 
Communications Act specifically exempted broadcasters from obligations as public 
utilities, which meant that they had the best of both world–all the benefits of a 
utility monopoly but none of the rate and public-service obligations.
313   
 
 Minow is correct in positing Senator Dill, author of the 1927 Radio Act and the 1934 
Communications Act, as an authority on the origins of regulation.
314  However, the history 
actually written by Dill is sharply at odds with what Minow claims to have been told a quarter 
century later.
315  According to Clarence C. Dill’s 1938 volume, Radio Law ,
316  the public interest 
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standard was not concocted by the Senate Commerce Committee.  The book details what any 
serious student of the 1920s broadcasting marketplace would have independently discovered. 
Namely, that the public interest standard was anything but an ad hoc policy gambit:  
 
How Broadcasters Suggested "Public Interest" Test 
 An interesting fact in this connection is that the broadcasters themselves 
suggested the inclusion of the words "public interest" in the law as a basis for 
granting licenses. They did this by a resolution which the National Association of 
Broadcasters passed in 1925. 
A resolution submitted to the Fourth National Radio Conference declared: 
"That in any Congressional legislation *** the test of the broadcasting privilege 
be based upon the needs of the public served by the proposed station. The basis 
should be convenience and necessity, combined with fitness and ability to serve." 
One of the provisions which the Fourth National Radio Conference 
adopted, read: "That public interest as represented by service to the listener shall 
be the basis for the broadcasting privilege."
317  
According to its legislative author, the broadcasting industry originated and promoted the 
public interest standard––not an innocent young congressional staffer. It is apparent that the 
industry acted rationally. Major commercial broadcasters were ‘grandfathered’ on existing 
frequencies, yet were not subject to fees, common carrier obligations, rate regulation, or universal 
service mandates. Instead, broadcasters were given licenses as de facto private property.
318  These 
licenses were enhanced in value by a regulatory structure designed to slow competitive entry. 
This was an innovative regulatory device, and was not borrowed from existing law as stated in 
Minow’s version of his 1961 conversation with Dill. As Dill had written years earlier: 
Newness of the "Public Interest" Requirement 
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 The requirement that before granting a license to operate a radio transmitting 
apparatus, the federal regulatory body must find that "the public convenience, interest 
and necessity will be served thereby", was entirely new in radio law. In fact, it had no 
direct precedent in any federal regulatory law. 
Previous Uses of "Convenience and Necessity" 
 In the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress provided the Interstate Commerce 
Commission must find that "the present or future public convenience or necessity require 
or will require" the construction or abandonment of a railroad line before granting a 
certificate to a railroad; but it made no mention of "public interest." Anyhow, a railroad is 
a public utility, but a broadcasting station is not...
319  
 
 The regulatory standard was not casually chosen, but carefully crafted to facilitate 
cartelization of the broadcasting market.
320  Legislators implemented the regime pushed by major 
commercial radio interests, thereby gaining entrée to regulate an emerging medium of great 
social influence. As Dill noted: 
 
Congress has good reason for this jealousy as to the control of radio. Nobody can 
even imagine what the use of radio may some day mean to the human family. 
When Marconi first sent radio signals across the English channel and even after 
he sent them across the Atlantic, the most fantastic imagination could not foresee 
the marvelous programs of music encircling the earth or literally all of the peoples 
of the world being able to listen to the speech of a king or president. Nor can any 
one even now dream of the possibilities of television or what the results of the 
transmission of electricity by radio may some day be.
321  
   
 The story would later develop that policy makers were dragged into regulation by 
airwave chaos, a tale that has helped facilitate government regulation of the broadcast press. The 
Supreme Court reasoned that since the state essentially created the opportunity for wireless 
“speech,” it could regulate what it had enabled: 
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Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, 
and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies 
constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only 
by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little 
use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be 
clearly and predictably heard. Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was 
established to allocate frequencies in a manner responsive to the public 
"convenience, interest, or necessity."
322  
 
 This rationale has been widely used to defend spectrum policies. For instance, when 
former FCC Chairmen Charles Ferris (1977-81) and Newton Minow (1961-63) testified in 
support of the Fairness Doctrine to Congress in 1987,
323  “chaos” formed the core of their 
analysis. Despite the evidence that maintenance of order can be achieved without program 
regulation (simply observe TV station sales or FCC license auctions), Charles Ferris tied content 
and chaos: 
 
The public interest standard and the concept of broadcasters as public trustees 
date back to the origins of broadcasting. Back then, anyone who could put up a 
transmitter could broadcast, and the result was chaos. Broadcasters universally 
demanded federal government licensing of broadcasting. Congress provided for 




Newton Minow joined Ferris in stressing the critical nature of airwave chaos: 
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Charlie Ferris said something very important and I want to amplify it. We all 
forget history. Why is broadcasting regulated in the first place? It started out 
unregulated, and then when broadcasters realized that they had to have the exclusive 
right to a channel because all the public was getting was static, then broadcasters 
came to Washington, and they went to the then secretary of Commerce, Herbert 
Hoover, and they said: Mr. Hoover, you have got to do something to regulate us, you 
have got to do something so the public can hear the radio. 
That is what led to the licensing system. As Charlie said, an equation was 
struck. On the one hand they said to a broadcaster, here, you have the exclusive 
use to the microphone, just as I have it right now. In exchange for that, you will 
assume the responsibilities of a public trustee. You will serve the public, and as a 
part of that obligation it became amplified as the Fairness Doctrine.
325  
 Minow ironically demonstrates his own admonition, “we all forget history,” offering an 
account that is entirely fanciful. Policy makers in the 1920s were not driven to public interest 
allocation of radio spectrum by airwave chaos. Just the opposite: chaos was strategically used to 
procure public interest allocation.  
 Radio broadcasting began in the United States in November 1920,
326  and quickly became 
popular. By the end of 1922, over 500 radio stations were on the air. Stations held licenses from 
the Department of Commerce determining where and when they could broadcast; unlicensed 
transmissions were illegal. The Department was mandated to award licenses under the 1912 
Radio Act so as to "minimize interference."
  327  This it did by following two procedures. The first 
was to allocate bands for radio broadcasting. Initially (1920-23), broadcasters were limited to but 
two frequencies, with time-sharing and power limits controlling interference. In 1923, the 
Commerce Department expanded the number of frequencies to 70; in 1924, it further expanded 
the band to 89 channels (between 500 Kc and 1500 Kc, very close to the AM band used today).  
Radio stations adhered to the rules, and interference did not deter industry development. 
Millions of Americans purchased radio receiver sets, and retailers promoted a “Radio Christmas” 
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in 1924. One colorful episode illustrates the existence of airwave policing during the period of 
alleged chaos. It involved the Rev. Aimee Semple McPherson, "a flamboyant female evangelist 
who preached what she called the Four Square Gospel Church" in Los Angeles. Her church 
owned and operated KFSG ("Kall Four Square Gospel"), but the station strayed from its assigned 
frequency. "After many warnings, Hoover ordered it off the air and promptly received" the 
following telegram: 
 
TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE HERBERT HOOVER: 
 
PLEASE ORDER YOUR MINIONS OF SATAN TO LEAVE MY STATION ALONE. STOP. YOU 
CANNOT EXPECT THE ALMIGHTY TO ABIDE BY YOUR WAVE LENGTH NONSENSE. 
STOP. WHEN I OFFER MY PRAYERS TO HIM I MUST FIT INTO HIS RECEPTION. STOP. 
OPEN THE STATION AT ONCE. STOP. 
      AIMEE SEMPLE McPHERSON 
 
The station was eventually allowed to resume broadcasting on its assigned frequency.
  328  
 The second important Department policy was utilization of priority-in-use rules for 
license assignments. Because no discretion was granted the Commerce Department under the 
1912 Act beyond "minimizing interference," it could only discriminate against stations only on 
the basis of priority-in-time. This reflected an old principle of common law, that when a resource 
is effectively utilized in a socially useful way, a right is acquired against late-comers who might 
attempt to appropriate the resource.
329  This system worked well to control interference in the 
1920-26 period. Its weakness was not in effective traffic control, but in failing to distribute 
benefits to key rent seeking constituencies. Hence, a primary goal of the 1927 Radio Act was to 
overturn the emerging property rights regime. In the words of Senator Dill: 
It is interesting to note that some of the long established principles of law 
were not applied to radio. In fact, the ratio statute specifically denies the application 
of a number of such principles. The most important of these which the radio statute 
sets aside is the principle of acquiring a certain property right by user. 
It is a long and established principle of law that if a citizen openly and 
adversely possesses and uses property for a long period of time without 
opposition, or without contest, he adcquires title by adverse possession. This is 
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known as property by right of user. Congress wrote into the radio law the 
provision that user should no effect upon the right of the Commission to provide 
for the use of any wave length by a new and different person if the public interest 
would thereby be served.
330  
 
 Priority-in-use rules policed the early radio market. Yet, major commercial broadcasting 
interests and key policy makers, including Senator C.C. Dill and Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover, were critical.  Commercial broadcasters, seeing the market as overly competitive, 
formed the National Association of Broadcasters to lobby for public interest licensing. The 
motive was to secure the rights of vested incumbents and to pre-empt the entry of rivals. Under a 
priority-in-use regime, with rights established under common law, only the former could be 
achieved. The door was open for new competition to use unoccupied frequencies (including 
higher bands with improved technology). Policy makers also feared a property regime would 
limit their jurisdiction. The emerging mass medium was inherently attractive as a regulatory 
target. Moreover, alliances between big business and government planners were then popular 
tools for rationalizing economic development. Hoover, as the leading “technocrat” of his day, 
sought administrative federal guidance for this important new industry.
331  
  In short, both Hoover and his opponents in Congress pushed for legislation. The debate 
concerned jurisdiction. Hoover pushed for an agency in Commerce, which he ran. This 
legislation was popular in the House of Representatives, where it was advanced by Rep. William 
White (R-ME), a Hoover ally. The Senate, however, favored an independent regulatory 
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commission yielding perks to Senators who confirm––or reject––presidential nominees. The 
resulting legislative standoff lasted years. 
Then, Hoover acted––or, rather, strategically failed to act. The Secretary of Commerce 
openly invited broadcasters to challenge his power to regulate radio. He lost the resulting case.
332  
The Secretary of Commerce then refused to appeal the decision, on advice of a public opinion 
offered by the Acting Attorney General of the United States, William Donovan, despite its 
conflict with a previous case decided by a higher court.
333  Hoover’s Department of Commerce 
then issued a press release July 9, 1926 announcing that the Commerce Department would no 
longer enforce airwave assignments.
334   
Secretary Hoover coordinated industry standards though consensus, sponsoring annual 
Radio Conferences each year from 1922 through 1925. Curiously, no Radio Conference was 
called in 1926, as the Secretary “refused to regulate radio transmissions by common consent, 
although nearly all the broadcasters urged it. This, as one United States Senator observed, 
‘seemed almost like an invitation to the broadcasters to do their worst.’”
335  In the following 
seven months, some 200 new stations entered the marketplace, and many existing stations 
changed wavelengths. This excited popular discontent over airwave “pirates,” “intruders,” and 
“wave-jumpers.”
336  The period from July 1926 to February 1927 quickly became known as the 
period of the “breakdown of the law."
337   
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Two events help break the legislative impasse over the Radio Act.  The first was 
Hoover’s orchestrated chaos, which raised demand for new law. Importantly, it gave proponents 
of public interest licensing an answer to the question Hoover claimed was plaguing his 
legislative efforts: "if nothing is wrong, why fix it?"
338  The second was the development of 
enforceable property rights during the "breakdown" period. In a widely discussed opinion 
reached by an Illinois state court (which Senator Dill took care to insert into the CONGRESSIONAL 
RECORD
339 ), radio station WGN (owned by the Chicago Tribune) obtained an injunction against 
a station that relocated within 40 Kc of WGN's signal in September 1926. The court found that 
the incumbent broadcaster enjoyed a property right under common law, and issued an injunction 
against the interloper. Within weeks Congress passed a resolution mandating broadcasters 
relinquish all claims to vested rights as a condition for continued operations. Soon after, the radio 
legislation stalemate lifted when Senator Dill’s measure was redrawn as a compromise. The 
resulting Radio Act passed both houses and was signed by President Coolidge Feb. 23, 1927. In 
Dill's view, Congress legislated principally to pre-empt property rights: 
 
Why Congress Became Aroused on Subject [of radio legislation] 
The development of these claims of vested rights in radio frequencies has 
caused many members of Congress to fear that this one and only remaining public 
domain in the form of free radio communication might soon be lost unless 
Congress protected it by legislation. It caused renewed demand for the assertion 
of full sovereignty over radio by Congress... 
[T]he purpose of Congress from the beginning of consideration of 
legislation concerning broadcasting was to prevent private ownership of wave 
lengths or vested rights of any kind in the use of radio transmitting apparatus.
340  
 
  Later analysts would characterize the 1920s radio market as an audio maelstrom rescued 
only via public interest regulation, yet the U.S. government’s official history of the era––
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contained in the first Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission––calibrated the chaos 
more precisely: 
 
We have had about six years of radio broadcasting. It was in 1921 that the 
first station (KDKA) started operating, and soon grew in popularity, sales 
mounted, and a great new industry was in the making. Then something happened. 
In July, 1926, just 10 months ago, the Attorney General of the United 
States rendered his famous opinion that the Secretary of Commerce, under the 
radio law of 1912, was without power to control the broadcasting situation or to 
assign wave lengths. Thus, after five years of orderly development, control was 
off. Beginning with August, 1926, anarchy reigned in the ether.
341  
 
 Radio developed in “orderly” fashion under priority-in-use rules. These rules did not 
depend on public interest regulation; the rules were enforceable via common law principles 
adjudicated by federal regulators lacking public interest discretion (as demonstrated by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce up until July 9, 1926), or by state courts (as Oak Leaves  demonstrated 
in November 1926
342 ). A public interest standard was clearly unnecessary to bring order to 
airwaves, as those dealing with the “break-down of the law” well understood.  
Rather than remedying market failure, the Radio Act transferred wealth to two key 
interests: broadcasters and policy makers.  Major commercial stations received preferential 
frequency assignments from the FRC, while smaller stations were eliminated via costly technical 
requirements.
343  Robert W. McChesney identifies the Radio Commission’s General Order 40, 
issued in August 1928, as particularly brutal.
344  The rule reassigned 94% of U.S. broadcast 
stations in some dimension (frequency, time, power, or location), but carefully exempted the 6% 
                                                         
341  Federal Radio Commission, Annual Report  (1927), 10-11 (emphasis added). While dated “1927,” the report was 
published in April 1928. This passage was from a speech given by Commissioner O.H. Caldwell.  
342  Interestingly, the Cook County court ruling in Chicago Tribune v. Oak Leaves  ordered the defendant not to 
broadcast within 50 kc of WGN within one hundred miles of downtown Chicago. This was the same separation rule 
adopted by the Federal Radio Commission the following year. Hence, by the standards of the federal regulatory 
commission, the state court got the interference question exactly right. 
343  Firms strategically impose costs on rivals, thereby reducing competitive pressures and realizing higher prices. It 
is a particularly profitable strategy when government regulators absorb the expense of the cost-raising activity. 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power 
over Price, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); see also Chapter 18, “Predation via Governmental 
Processes,” in Bork, The Antitrust Paradox , supra note __, 347-64. 
344  Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy  (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 




of stations affiliated with the two national networks (NBC and CBS). While commercial 
broadcasting continued to experience robust growth following 1927, the reign of the Federal 
Radio Commission was devastating for non-commercial broadcasting.   
Policy makers also achieved their goal––jurisdiction over an important new industry. 
Lawmakers were empowered as licensing agents, a position yielding negotiable political 
currency. Lobbying activity became intense, as a 1932 study by the Brookings Institution noted: 
“Probably no quasi-judicial body was ever subject to so much Congressional pressure as the 
Federal Radio Commission.”
345   Applicants seeking licenses or waivers were eager to offer 
political support. So were radio broadcasters, who disseminate information at wholesale prices. 
The news produced by broadcasters constitutes publicity––a key input into the support-
maximizing functions of officeholders. Trading some degree of content control for protection 
from competition is attractive to broadcasters and policy makers alike.  
In sum, public interest regulation was neither necessary nor sufficient to remedy market 
failure in spectrum. The lack of enforcement of frequency rights was understood as the cause of 
the “breakdown of the law,” and priority-in-use rules were already an established and proven 
legal paradigm. On the other hand, public interest regulation actually introduced “non-market 
failure.”
346  That is because the rules have been systematically biased to underutilize radio waves, 
producing Type II misallocation.  
IX.  THE “SPECTRUM AUCTIONS” FAUX PAS  
No station can operate without a license. Every station must operate within the terms 
of a license. A licensee must renew his license at regular intervals. A license may be 
revoked for violation of its terms, or of the regulations or of the law. In short, all the 
machinery of radio regulation operates through the radio station license.
347   
 
                                                         
345  Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Federal Radio Commission  35 (Wash., DC: Brookings, 1932). 
346  Charles Wolf, Jr. has noted the symmetry between market and non-market failure. In this instance, public interest 
spectrum allocation has resulted in decisions that systematically exclude important costs or benefits. Such 
considerations are external to policy makers. This exhibits a “tragedy of the commons.” Wolf, A Theory of Non-
Market Failure  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). 




 There are common references, even in official FCC documents, to "spectrum 
auctions."
348  This is an unfortunate phrase, because the FCC does not issue property rights to 
radio spectrum by auction or other assignment method.
349  What the Commission awards are 
licenses to use FCC-approved devices to emit signals via radio waves. It is the transmitter, and 
the enterprise operating that equipment, which a licensee is authorized to operate (under FCC 
rules). Wave lengths are allocated to licenses, not licensees, meaning that spectrum can only be 
used as authorized by regulation. Hence, FCC licenses are analogous to operating permits, not 
title to real property.   
Indeed, to be issued an FCC license, an applicant must first certify that it will not assert 
any propertied interests in radio spectrum. This is so fundamental to U.S. communications law 
that it predates the 1927 Radio Act, being enacted in Senate Joint Resolution 125, signed into 
law by President Calvin Coolidge on Dec. 8, 1926.
350  This stipulation became part of the Radio 
Act and then, in 1934, the Communications Act, governing spectrum law to the present. The 
congressional motive for this provision was quite clear: “Throughout the consideration of radio 
legislation by both Houses, members of both the Senate and House feared the establishment of 
property rights in frequencies by licensees. They were of the opinion that the assertion of any 
proprietary rights in frequencies would fetter the regulatory authority.”
351  
                                                         
348  See, for instance, Federal Communications Commission, The FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, WT Docket No. 97-150 (Released Oct. 9, 1997). 
349  “Spectrum auctions” may constitute a convenient reference to the sale of licenses allowing use of radio 
frequencies. (In the spirit of full disclosure, the author confesses to having used the term in the title of a working 
paper written in 1993. Thomas W. Hazlett, “The Political Economy of Radio Spectrum Auctions,” Program on 
Telecommunications Policy, University of California, Davis [June 1993]. The author is able to, and does, blame a 
headline-writing editor for the transgression committed in 1994: Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Auctions -- Only a 
First Step, WALL STREET JOURNAL [Dec. 20, 1994].) The term is nonetheless misleading in its implication that 
spectrum is being auctioned or licensed. The regulatory system rests crucially on the distinction between wireless 
licenses, on the one hand, and radio spectrum rights, on the other. In creating reforms to enable market allocation of 
radio spectrum, the chief objective, in fact, is to turn wireless licenses into spectrum ownership rights.  
350  “That until otherwise provided by law, no original license for the operation of any radio broadcasting station and 
no renewal of a license of an existing broadcasting station, shall be granted… unless the applicant therefore shall 
execute in writing a waiver of any right or of any claim to any right, as against the United States, to any wave length 
or to the use of the ether in radio transmission because of previous license to use the same or because of use 
thereof.” S.J. Res. 125 (69
th  Cong. 1
st  Sess.) introduced by Sen. Clarence C. Dill. 
351  Harry P. Warner, Radio and Television Law: 1952 Cumulative Supplement  (New York: Matthew Bender & Co., 
1953), 775. “[T]he proposed radio legislation in the nineteen twenties required a licensee to sign a waiver indicating 
that "there shall be no vested property right in the license issued for such station or in the frequencies or wave 
lengths authorized to be used thereon." ... The Commission, fearful that licensees would assert property interests in 
their coverage to the listening public, has inserted elaborate provisions in application forms precluding the assertion 
of any such right.” Paul M. Segal and Harry P. Warner, Ownership of Broadcasting Frequencies: A Review, 19 




Hence, spectrum ownership rights are expressly denied FCC licensees. A cellular 
telephone operator, for instance, receives a series of "Radio Station Authorizations" granting the 
right to establish base stations. See Figure 9. (Note: an entire license can be hundreds of pages 
long. A ‘cover sheet’ is pictured in Figure 9.) These permit the licensee to utilize FCC-approved 
equipment, at particular geographic locations, to transmit at regulated power levels on given 
frequencies. The license specifies the physical equipment authorized, listing the location of each 
transmitter or base station. Other aspects of the business are regulated by Orders governing (in 
this example) “mobile radio authorizations.” Market structure, technology, geographical service 
areas, rules of operation (including, for instance, the “receiver pays” rule differing from the 
European “calling party pays” rule), license eligibility, carrier status (common carrier vs. private 
carrier v. broadcaster, etc.), are among the dimensions specified in rule makings. Through the 
government’s interest in protecting the public’s airwaves from interference, a host of related, 
tangentially related, and completely unrelated mandates are imposed. FCC auctions do not alter 
this structure, despite the insistence of some commentators:   
  
Since the Radio Act of 1927, the radio spectrum in the United States has been 
allocated to broadcasters on the theory that the only way broadcasting could 
function was through such allocation. At first this allocation was through 
licensing, and recently, after many years of criticism by economists such as 
Ronald Coase, it has been allocated through spectrum auctions.
352
                                                         




Figure 9: An FCC License 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
   
RADIO STATION AUTHORIZATION     
 
 
MOBILE RADIO AUTHORIZATION 
FCC FORM 463 
  LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY 
6045 EAST SLAUSON AVENUE 
COMMERCE, CALIFORNIA 90040 
 
COMMON CARRIER 
DOMESTIC PUBLIC CELLULAR RADIO 
 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 
 
     
   
CALL SIGN: KNKA351 
SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 0027 
FILE NO: 05602-CL-L-90 
MARKET: 0002 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 
 
   
PAGE 01 OF 25  
 
OPERATOR: DC 
   
   
   
ORIGINAL GRANT DATE: 
DATE OF ISSUE: 
EXPIRATION DATE: 
OCTOBER 13, 1989 
JULY 9, 1990 
OCTOBER 1, 1996 
ALL PREVIOUSLY ISSUED AUTHORIZATIONS ARE VOID 
 
   
MOBILE UNITS PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED: 250000  
AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED FOR BLOCK A –  
   
BASE: 869.040 THROUGH 879.990 MHZ AND 890.010 THROUGH 891.480 MHZ 
MOBILE: 824.040 THROUGH 834.990 MHZ AND 845.010 THROUGH 846.480 MHZ 




     





       





       
LONGITUDE: l18 14 58 W  LOCATION NO. 001:  LATITUDE: 34 06 28 N 
3024 GILROY STREET 
CITY: LOS ANGELES 
STATE: CALIFORNIA 
ANTENNA MARKINGS: NONE 
COUNTY: LOS ANGELES 
 
       
L0NGITUDE: 118 11 48 W 
 
LOCATION NO. 002:  LATITUDE: 34 06 24 N 
5320 FIGUEROA STREET 
CITY: HIGHLAND PARK 
STATE: CALIFORNIA 
ANTENNA MARKINGS: NONE 
COUNTY: LOS ANGELES 
 
 










In fact, spectrum is still allocated by the FCC to licenses. The method for assigning 
licenses is what has changed with the advent of auctions. Until 1981, comparative hearings were 
exclusively used to distinguish applicants according to “public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.” In the budget bill passed that year, Congress approved lotteries for non-broadcast 
license assignments. In 1993, Congress again used an amendment to the budget to authorize 
competitive bidding for non-broadcast licenses. In 1997, Congress extended auctions to the few 
remaining broadcast licenses following the (zero-priced) award of digital TV licenses.
353  
A 1992 FCC study by economist Evan Kwerel and engineer John Williams is instructive. 
The paper considered the efficiency of “voluntary reallocation” of UHF radio spectrum from TV 
broadcasting to cellular telephone service in the City of Los Angeles. The gains were found to be 
substantial––around $1 billion given conservative assumptions. Yet, in recommending policies to 
allow spectrum to flow to more valuable uses with “pre-approval,” the paper noted how far even 
a closely monitored deregulation of spectrum would move Commission rules: 
 
By relying on private initiative and market forces to implement a pre-approved 
reallocation objective, the recommended policy would represent a measured departure 
from past Commission practice. In the past, the Commission has generally 
accommodated new services or expansions of existing services by newly allocating or 
reallocating unoccupied spectrum. In rare cases the Commission has reallocated 
occupied spectrum and moved existing users to other bands after a period sufficiently 
long to amortize their investments. But the Commission has never permitted an 
existing licensee to voluntarily discontinue providing the service for which it was 
licensed and provide a completely different service with the spectrum that was 
occupied by the old service.
354  
 
An FCC license does not yield the right to deploy spectrum in alternative uses; market 
demand does not move spectrum into new services, the FCC does (or does not). Licensees 
seeking to use spectrum in new ways apply for a spectrum re-allocation; the default rule is that 
what is not permitted is disallowed. Non-licensees seeking to use unoccupied frequencies are 
                                                         
353  See Hazlett, Assigning Licenses, supra note __, 534. 




subject to the most stringent inflexibility, no access use whatever. Public interest determinations, 
not purchases of spectrum, govern their market access. 
The economic result is that the “price of spectrum” is not evident in the sales price of a 
wireless license. Because the FCC has fixed the use of the spectrum, the opportunity cost of 
spectrum to the licensee is nil. What is valuable in the FCC license is the right to do business 
within the market designated by the FCC. Radio spectrum, as allocated to the license, is used at a 
price of zero.
355  If this opportunity is expected to earn positive profits on a discounted basis, the 
present value of such flows constitutes a pure rent (to the license).
356  
This accounts for the widely varying prices paid for “similar spectrum”––the spectrum is 
not similar if it cannot be used the same way. According to Kwerel & Williams, prices paid for 
UHF TV licenses were a small fraction of those for cellular telephones, adjusting for bandwidth, 
despite being in the same local market and being allocated adjacent frequencies. The vast 
differential in SMR and cellular telephone licenses that inspired the creation of Nextel is another 
illustration. Winning bids at FCC auctions vary considerably when allocated spectrum blocks are 
“priced.”
357  For instance, a 1997 Congressional Budget Office analysis showed that 10 MHz 
PCS licenses (D, E, and F) were auctioned between August 1995 and January 1997 for prices 
averaging 33 cents per MHz per capita (counting every person in the licensed areas). In 1994, 
however, national and regional narrowband PCS licenses brought between $3.12 and $3.46 per 
                                                         
355  To the degree that a licensee is permitted flexible use (over technology or services), the cost of bandwidth 
becomes a factor in optimizing the value of the license. As policy imposes fewer restrictions, licensee rights 
approach ownership rights. Hence, the logic of liberalization to promote efficient spectrum resource use. 
356  Surprisingly, even prominent economists have confused license rents with spectrum rents. For instance, MIT 
professor of economics Jerry Hausman sought to explain cellular telephone license values as explained “totally [by] 
the scarcity of spectrum for cellular telephony… auction values reflect expected future rents to scarce spectrum.” 
Affidavit of Professor Jerry A. Hausman, attached to “Reply Comments of the Bell Atlantic Companies,” Federal 
Communications Commission, Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act: Regulatory 
Treatment of Mobile Services, GN Docket No. 93-252 (Nov. 23, 1993), 7. To see that this analysis is incorrect, note 
that rents are payments in excess of opportunity cost. Opportunity costs are determined by the price commanded by 
the marginal not bid away from alternative uses. Since federal regulation does not permit markets to engage in such 
bidding for spectrum, that price is not observed and the licensee’s opportunity cost of spectrum is zero. The 
spectrum allocated to the license may have a shadow price (social opportunity cost) substantially greater than zero. 
Indeed, the opportunity cost of spectrum may exceed the rents earned by the licensee – demonstrating that they 
accrue to the license, not the spectrum. The author submitted papers in the FCC proceedings in which Prof. 
Hausman wrote his analysis: Hazlett,  Market Power in the Cellular Telephone Duopoly, Report for Time Warner 
Telecommunications (Aug. 1993); Hazlett, Errors in the Haring & Jackson Analysis of Cellular Rents, Report for 
the National Cellular Resellers Association (Jan. 1994). 
357  Market volatility is always a factor in auctions, as two items auctioned at different times will face distinct 
demands due to macro-economic changes external to the demand for wireless services or their inputs (i.e., FCC 
licenses). Yet, it is safe to say that price differences observed between various FCC auctions are not wholly 





358  PCS licenses sold in the A and B blocks (allocated 30 MHz each) between 
December 1994 and March 1995, in contrast, were sold for $0.51 per MHz per capita. This 50% 
premium over D-F may be accounted for by a premium for sooner-to-market, non-linear scale 
advantages (30 MHz v. 10 MHz), and PCS capital market fluctuations.
359   
The law of one price implies that close substitutes sell for similar terms. Directly 
competitive licenses do tend to fetch equivalent prices, a result observed in auctions.
360  But 
spectrum allocated to different licenses are not equally functional or profitable to licensees.
361  As 
summarized by the Congressional Budget Office:  
 
The current U.S. system of spectrum management relies on wise planning 
decisions to promote an economically efficient distribution of the radio spectrum. 
An alternative is to allow spectrum license rights holders more flexibility, 
essentially broader rights of use, in bringing more desirable consumer services to 
the market. Inflexible and strict definitions of allocations may not allow an 
efficient distribution of frequencies among uses even when licenses for new uses 




                                                         
358  Congressional Budget Office, Where Do We Go From Here? The FCC Auctions and the Future of Radio 
Spectrum Management, Congress of the United States (April 1997).  
359  The D, E, and F auctions occurred after severe financial distress followed opportunistic over-bidding in the C 
block auction. This may well have poisoned the financial well for firms seeking financing in PCS. Because the C 
block winning bids – which averaged $1.35 per MHz per capita – were largely uncollected, they are not relevant to 
the analysis. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Babette E.L. Boliek, Use of Designated Entity Preferences in Assigning 
Wireless Licenses, 51 FED. COMM. L. J. 639 (May 1999). 
360  Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter C. Cramton, R. Preston MacAfee, and John R. McMillan, Synergies in Wireless 
Telephony: Evidence from the MTA Auction, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 497 (1997); Patrick S. Moreton and 
Pablo T. Spiller, What’s in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission’s Broadband 
Personal Communications Service Spectrum Auctions, 41 J. L. & ECON. 647 (Oct. 1998). 
361  The difference between license rents and spectrum value can be illustrated thusly. Suppose one was informed by 
the FCC that they had been approved for a license, License 1, allocated 400 MHz of prime spectrum (800 MHz to 
1.2 GHz), perfectly suited for mobile wireless service. They were given a choice, however, of a second license 
instead. License 2 was allocated just 200 MHz in the UHF band, 900 MHz – 1.1 GHz. To maximize the value of 
your assets, which would you choose? The answer is: It depends. Specifically, it depends on the terms of either 
license. Most importantly, what services are licensees permitted to offer, and how? The number of competitors 
licensed now and in the future is also a key consideration. In short, the value question only considers the value of 
spectrum to the extent that the license rules explicitly yield the right to reallocate spectrum use across markets. 
Except in notable exceptions (discussed below), this is not the opportunity afforded by an FCC license.  




That licenses do not reflect the value of radio spectrum creates social losses provoking 
current calls for bandwidth markets. Rational allocation is subverted for precisely the same 
reason socialist economies cannot achieve efficiency in the capital goods sector. Private owners 
are dogged in seeking to discover more valuable applications for resources so as to maximize 
wealth, yet this beneficial activity is blocked by law. Attempts to duplicate competitive profit-
seeking by administrative mechanisms produce inferior information regarding conditions of 
demand and supply, and yield incentives for vested interests to excel by manipulating rules 
rather than by investing to discover and efficiently satisfy consumer demands.
363   
Who Owns the Airwaves? 
 The federal government does not assert ownership of spectrum. Indeed, Senator Dill 
thought the issue quite irrelevant: "[I]t makes no difference who owns the air or who claims to 
own channels in the air. The thing that is really controlling is the right to use apparatus which 
sends the radio impulses into the air."
364  The Federal Radio Commission held that the 
government could not define the spectrum resource, much less assert ownership: "The ether is an 
hypothetical medium. There is no satisfactory definition of it. It is not even known to exist."
365   
  The official government position is that radio waves belong to the people of the United 
States, and the predicate for regulation is the furtherance of interstate commerce. The 
government regulates access to the "public's airwaves" to protect against the destruction which 
would result from interference. Senator C.C. Dill framed the issue thusly: 
 
The Government does not own the frequencies, as we call them, or the use of 
frequencies. It only possesses the right to regulate the apparatus, and that right is 
obtained from the provision of the Constitution which gives Congress the power 
to regulate interstate commerce.
366  
 
                                                         
363  In general see, Thomas Gilligan W., William J. Marshall, and Barry R. Weingast, Regulation and the Theory of 
Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 32 J. LAW & ECON. 35 (April 1989). 
364  68 CONG. REC. (Feb. 3, 1927), 2871.  
365  Federal Radio Commission brief in General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 58 Appeals DC 386 
(1929), 148; cited in General Electric's brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in response to request for writ of certiorari 
filed by the Federal Radio Commission (Dec. 1929), 47. 




Concern over vested rights in radio frequencies was intense. In noting that Congress 
rejected an amendment requiring monetary compensation to radio broadcasters forced to accept 
new frequency assignments by the new Federal Radio Commission, Dill writes that the measure 
(and its rejection) "shows that the purpose of Congress from the beginning of consideration 
concerning broadcasting was to prevent private ownership of wave lengths or vested rights of 
any kind in the use of radio transmitting apparatus."
367  
The law enlisted private capital as an expedient while maintaining federal authority over 
airwaves. Dill's book summarizes, "The Alpha and Omega of Radio Law": 
 
Instead of establishing government owned and government operated radio 
stations as most other great nations have done, Congress has adopted a policy of 
permitting private individuals to own and operate radio stations. But Congress 
provided that these privately owned and privately operated radio stations should 
be subject to a system of government regulation. 
Congress desired to secure the use of private funds and, most of all, the 
benefit of individual initiative for the more rapid development of the radio art, but 
all of this development has to be kept under government control. 
The means and method of administering and enforcing this system of 
government control is the radio license.
368  
 
 The regulatory story comes full circle. Rather than airwave chaos dictating regulation, 
with content controls an incidental byproduct, a desire to control broadcasters was (according to 
Dill) Congress’ primary motivation in establishing regulation. The utilitarian approach adopted 
was to license transmitting equipment. In discussing the "right to use radio apparatus," Dill 
differentiates spectrum ownership (which Congress determined can only belong to the people of 
the United States as a whole) and a license to operate wireless equipment:  
 
The right to use radio apparatus is often popularly termed "the use of the ether." In 
this sense "the ether" has been called the last public domain belonging to the people 
of the United States. Congress has been extremely desirous of retaining control of that 
                                                         
367  Dill, Radio Law , supra note __, 81. 








 Contemporary debate is confused by "spectrum auctions."
370  What prevents the 
emergence of a market in wireless bandwidth is the fact that spectrum is not being auctioned.  
Competitive bidding for operating licenses are not resource sales––oil leases, water and other 
tangible goods "can not be considered as analogous to the use of radio apparatus."
371   When 
frequencies are property, wireless users and operators will naturally buy, sell, and creatively 
reconfigure rights in complex ways. The demand for organized spectrum exchanges will be 
matched by the existence of a tradable commodity. 
X.  RADIO LICENSE AUCTIONS WORK WELL  
In 1993 the U.S. Congress finally allowed the FCC to auction radio licenses. 
372   The 
policy has created important efficiencies in license assignments in several dimensions: 
 
• Reduced rent seeking in FCC assignments. 
• Reduced delays in issuing licenses. 
• Greater efficiency in license distribution. 
• Easier license aggregation, enabling economies of scale. 
• Rents extracted are an efficient means of tax collection. 
• Competitive bidding for licenses helps the intellectual case for allocation liberalization. 
 
 
Reduced rent seeking. In the absence of auctions, competition between potential licensees 
incurs socially wasteful rent-seeking.
373  When prices are excluded as rationing devices, other 
criteria fill the void. “Bidders” expend real resources to gain valuable licenses by influencing 
FCC policymakers. Such expenditures do not create valuable goods or services, but simply 
                                                         
369  Dill, Radio Law , supra note __, 126-7. 
370  A recent book on spectrum policy demonstrates how confused. Thomas Streeter’s, Selling the Air  (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), features a mistaken title; the book presents a Marxian critique of existing commercial 
broadcasting, a system created by public interest spectrum allocation and not by “selling the air.” Moreover, the 
radio and television cartels conceived and nurtured by regulation exist due to the pre-emption of private rights to 
airwaves. An important corollary is that incumbent licensees would generally be economically worse off under 
reforms moving existing law toward a property system, precisely the reverse of what is implied by Streeter. S ee 
Thomas W. Hazlett, Review of Thomas Streeter's Selling the Air , 35 J. ECON. LIT. (Sept. 1997), 1411. 
371  68 CONG. REC. (Feb. 5, 1927), 3027.  
372  Auctions for non-broadcast licenses were authorized in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act enacted in 
August 1993. See Nicholas W. Allard, The New Spectrum Auction Law, 18 SETION HALL LEGISLATIVE J. 13 (1993). 
373  See Evan Kwerel and Alex Felker, Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees, Federal Communications 




influence the division of spoils. This inefficiency plagued even the FCC’s lottery system, 
because expensive applications (with detailed financial and engineering data) had to be 
submitted by prospective winners. This was to maintain the fiction that licenses were being 
awarded to real telecommunications providers. (In the event, lottery winners rapidly sold their 
interests to actual mobile phone companies.) Between 1986 and 1989, some 400,00 applications 
costing between $500 million and $1 billion were entered in the cellular telephone license 
lotteries.
374   
By eliminating excess demand, auctions end rent seeking. Bidders invest in research to 
estimate values, but such investments are productive insofar as they generate useful information 
as to technology, costs, and market demand. Efforts to curry favor with public officials or 
prepare worthless paperwork do not produce information of comparable social value.  
Competitive bidding is also a political cleanser, as arms length transactions reduce 
opportunities for corruption. Whether those opportunities are exploited or not, they diminish 
democratic institutions. FCC license assignments have historically suffered from the taint of 
insider dealing. Even one U.S. president, Lyndon Johnson, was involved in a series of ugly 
episodes involving personal enrichment though favoritism in FCC awards.
375   More recently, 
presidential hopeful John McCain (R-AZ), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee (which 
oversees the FCC), was found to have aided contributors with broadcast license renewals. 
(Broadcast license renewals continue under the old comparative hearing method.) McCain faxed 
the FCC to complain of delays, with the assisted party hosting a McCain for President fundraiser 
days later. The appearance of campaign-cash-for-favors was apparent––as the candidate 
conceded.
376   
Faster licensing. Auctions are relatively expedient, allowing services to be provided 
more quickly. According to a study by the Congressional Budget Office, the FCC significantly 
reduced licensing duration by using auctions to issue PCS licenses compared to that experienced 
in broadcasting (comparative hearings) and cellular (lotteries). See Figure 10.
377  
                                                         
374  Thomas W. Hazlett and Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from the Cellular Telephone 
License Lotteries, 59 SO. ECON. J. (Jan. 1993), 425. 
375  See Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent  (New York: Random House, 1990), 89-
105.  
376  Tim Noah, The McCain Mutiny, SLATE (Jan. 6, 2000). 
377  Data in Figure 10 are from the Federal Communications Commission, The FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum 



















Efficient distribution. License auctions result in superior initial assignments. Parties 
bidding the most to tend to value licenses them most highly. These, in turn, tend to be the most 
efficient providers of service. Given transferability of licenses, such firms would likely be the 
eventual licensees even without FCC auctions. Transition to an efficient equilibrium, however, 
would not be costless. The FCC estimated that secondary market license trades following cell-
phone license lotteries cost about $190 million annually in brokers’ fees, while imposing 
substantial additional costs on businesses and consumers.
378  Secondary market transactions also 
incur costs associated with strategic bargaining.  Some licensees, even if not the most efficient 
long-term operators of a given service, may holdout for higher prices for some period.
379  The 
resulting inefficiency is fairly categorized as rent seeking waste. 
Evidence indicates that license auctions are relatively efficient. Studies find that similar 
licenses tend to sell for similar prices, and are systematically influenced by economic and 
regulatory factors relevant to future profitability. This has led to an “emerging consensus 
regarding the efficacy of the PCS spectrum auctions.”
380  This consensus has survived events in 
the PCS C Block auction, where below-market financing extended “small business” bidders 
                                                         
378  Ibid., 8. 
379  Peter Cramton, Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. (1992), 205. 
380  Lawrence Ausubel, Peter C. Cramton, R. Preston MacAfee, and John R. McMillan, Synergies in Wireless 
Telephony: Evidence from the MTA Auction, 6 J. ECON. & MGT. STRATEGY 497 (1997); Patrick S. Moreton and 
Pablo T. Spiller, What’s in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission Broadband 




encouraged strategic overbidding and ended in a string of defaults and bankruptcies,
 381  as well 
as a string of wireless mergers reshuffling ownership of large numbers of licenses.
382   
Efficient aggregation. Simultaneous auctions allowed markets to determine PCS service 
area size.  License aggregation instantly created regional and national coverage footprints. Sprint 
PCS, for example, entered the market with coast-to-coast operations. This facilitated relatively 
quick roll-out and achieved efficiencies in roaming, an integral aspect of mobility. The 
atomization of cellular service areas––734 U.S. franchise areas, with two licenses issued per 
market––seriously hampered network formation. Only after several years were a series of 
mergers and roaming agreements in place to facilitate low-cost national cell-phone use. The FCC 
is now considering combinatorial bidding to enable more sophisticated packaging of licenses by 
bidders in future FCC auctions.
 383  
Efficient taxation. Lump sum payments to the Treasury resulting from auctions constitute a 
welfare improvement over income taxes because such transfers do not distort economic 
behavior. The evidence is that a dollar of taxes costs about $1.20 to $1.50 in foregone economic 
value, owing to the disincentives associated with taxing productive enterprise.
384  Since auctions 
simply transfer rents from the licensee to the government, no marginal taxes are levied and no 
labor or investment activities are deterred. 
While the $23 billion bid for FCC licenses
385  was likely raised more economically than an 
equivalent sum collected via income or excise taxes, fiscal benefits are sometimes exaggerated. 
Even under alternative assignment methods the government receives a substantial portion of 
                                                         
381  Hazlett & Boliek, Use of Designated Entity, supra note __. 
382  The largest PCS network, owned by Sprint, agreed to WorldCom’s take-over terms, but the merger was blocked 
by antitrust authorities. Corey Grice,  Sprint Struggles With Growth After Merger Collapse, CNET N EWS.COM (Aug. 
22, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-202-2585624.html. Another large PCS network, VoiceStream, has 
agreed to sell to Deutsche Telekom, and the merger is pending. Associated Press, Deutsche Telekom to Buy Voice 
Stream for $50.7 Billion, CNET N EWS.COM (July 24, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-2329078.html. 
383  These would allow bidders to submit offers for particular combinations of assets. Under simultaneous, multi-
round auctions licenses can be aggregated, but bidders may fail to end up with an optimal array of licenses. See 
Federal Communications Commission, Auction of Licenses in the 747-762 and 777-792 MHZ Bands Scheduled for 
September 6, 2000: Comment Sought on Modifying the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design to Allow 
Combinatorial (Package) Biddin g, Public Notice DA00-1075 (May 18, 2000). 
384  Julian A. Alston & Brian H. Hurd, Some Neglected Social Costs of Government Spending in Farm Programs, 72 
AM. J. AG. ECON. 149 (Feb. 1990). The theoretical issues underlying these estimates are still unresolved, however. 
See Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton, Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods, 6 J. ECON. 
PERSPEC. (Summer 1992), 117 (“no general conclusion can be drawn about the marginal costs of taxation...” [129]). 
385  This is the total listed on the FCC web site, July 7, 2000. It includes the high bids for all auctions, even those in 




license rents in taxes.
386  More importantly, if new licenses are reduced or delayed in order to 
drive up auction revenues, consumer welfare losses result. It is true that measures restricting 
competition can increase rents and, therefore, license bids. This is a losing proposition for the 
public as it introduces economic distortions to offset gains from lump sum taxation. Monopoly 
creation intentionally inflicts inefficiency, the reverse of optimal taxation strategy, which is to 
minimize dead weight losses from revenue collection. 
A superficial advantage of auctions is that they raise revenue more quickly than alternative 
fiscal mechanisms. Auction bids include the discounted present value of future period profits, 
speeding up tax collections. Yet, the gain is illusory. The federal government has excellent 
access to capital markets, borrowing at the risk-free rate. Since the discount rate used to estimate 
license values is the risk-adjusted private discount rate,
387  which presumably exceeds the federal 
government’s rate, the temporal compression implicit in lump sum auction bids actually 
increases revenue collection costs. 
Builds momentum for liberalization. Perhaps the most important aspect of auctions is that 
they have given market mechanisms a test drive at the FCC. Despite warnings of public interest 
apocalypse, they have worked. This may be leading policymakers to the next step. “A few years 
ago the idea of selling frequency rights was considered radical; now it is mainstream.”
388   This 
shift in orthodoxy puts additional measures on the table. This momentum can be important. 
Deregulation tends to come in “waves,” with economic forces and elite opinion interacting to 
produce policy breaks.
389   
Auctions also present new challenges for public policy. Downside risks include increased 
risk for investments in wireless, the temptation for policy makers to enhance auction revenues by 
restricting license supply, and the possibility that FCC license auctions lower demand for 
additional spectrum allocations. 
                                                         
386  This does not obviate the non-distorting effect of auction revenues vs. income or excise taxes. It merely notes that 
auction receipts are not pure gains to the Treasury. 
387  A private bidder finances license costs in capital markets, raising either debt or equity at the rate commensurate 
with the firm’s beta. This was conservatively estimated to be 14%, more than double the contemporaneous 30-year 
Treasury interest rate, by financial experts retained by the Department of Justice in 1997 bankruptcy litigation 
involved PCS C Block licenses. See Hazlett & Boliek, Use of Designated Entity, supra note __. 
388  Glen O. Robinson, The “New” Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 289, 294. Robinson 
notes the “seminal argument” for FCC auctions in Coase’s 1959 article. 
389  See Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 




High Prices, Low Prices, and the “Quantity Theory” of Spectrum Management 
 High auction prices are reported to be the sign of a successful auction. While this is 
clearly true for a private asset owner, the sale of government-created licenses is another story.  
Wireless licenses are inputs into businesses providing services to the public. Where economic 
scarcity limits spectrum access, rents result from demand for the resource, and are efficiently 
transferred via competitive bidding. But where spectrum allocation artificially limits access, 
increased auction revenues accrue from the anticipation of monopolistic output restrictions.
390  
This deprives consumers and business users of efficient use of the spectrum resource. 
Nonetheless, it is often asserted that the government should maximize auction 
revenues.
391  While bids should not be suppressed by limiting the size or scope of rights, pro-
consumer allocation rules will reliably fail to maximize auction receipts by authorizing such 
liberal use of frequencies that competition is robust.
392  No license is so valuable when other 
licenses are excellent substitutes. In the recent 3G license auctions in Europe, unexpectedly high 
prices are attributed to the unique opportunity to establish new standards, seizing first mover 
advantages in the coming battle among global wireless networks.
393   The implication could also 
be that the U.K. spectrum regulator has been overly restrictive; hungry wireless markets are 
being fed scraps.
394  As Reed Hundt appropriately noted: 
 
“At least I’m not the only one who really screwed up an auction.” The 
government should make as much spectrum available as possible, at the lowest 
                                                         
390  In short, this is the difference between license rents and spectrum rents. 
391  William Safire, The Greatest Auction Ever, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 1995), 25. 
392  This assumes that spectrum rents -- observed in market prices following extensive liberalization of private rights 
– would fall below the level of license rents observed in today’s market. It is likely, but not certain, that this is the 
case. The enhanced flexibility afforded wireless operators under deregulation increases their options for providing 
valuable services to customers, a gain to incumbents that is offset by the fact that license rents unambiguously 
decline with greater competition. It is possible that some licenses would gain in market value, but it is not plausible 
that this would be the general outcome. If it were, liberalization would have garnered the support of incumbent 
licensees, and become instituted, long before now. 
393  “3G” refers to third generation wireless telephone service (following analog cellular, and digital PCS). An April 
2000 auction of five licenses in the United Kingdom resulted in total winning bids of $34 billion, while a July 2000 
auction of six licenses in Germany generated $46 billion.   
394  High prices for 3G licenses have alarmed equipment manufacturers. “He [Jardine Fleming Research analyst Jake 
Lynch] believes that Ericsson, Nokia and other cellular equipment providers are very concerned about the high bids 
that European cellular operators are submitting for 3G spectrum.” Karen Chan, Merger in Mobile Sector Tipped, 
HONG KONG IMAIL (July 1, 2000). See also: Bill Mann, Threats to Third Generation Wireless, THE MOTLEY FOOL 




possible prices, Mr. Hundt says now. It “should not be like a seller on eBay.com” 
trying to get the highest prices.
395  
 
There are political incentives, however, to promote high prices. First, governments 
receive favorable publicity, claiming taxpayer savings. The press routinely reports that dollars 
measure auction success.
396  Hundt, as FCC Chair, boasted about FCC auction revenues, making 
front-page headlines around the country.
397  The FCC grabbed national attention when President 
Clinton, accompanied by Vice President Gore, publicly accepted a check to the U.S. Treasury for 
$7.7 billion from Chairman Hundt following the PCS A and B block auction. “I’m glad to be 
here,” said the President. “I’d go anywhere for a check this size.”
398  The Vice President claimed 
credit for “reinventing government at work.” Referring to the check, he said: “Ed McMahon, eat 
your heart out.”
399  
Second, old license winners lobby against new license creation, employing arguments 
about equity and competitive dynamics not available prior to auctions.
400  Such interests may 
effectively mask protectionist goals while lobbying to limit spectrum access. The sale was 
mandated by Congress, which had budgeted projected revenues in its deficit reduction effort. 
While the hurried auction schedule was widely blamed for reducing license demand (firms 
having insufficient time to study the situation and prepare business plans), the licenses seriously 
restricted users in terms of power limitations and applications. In particular, most mobile uses 
were forbidden, ruling out the most lucrative applications.  FCC Chair Hundt defended the 
auction, including McLeod USA’s bargain––$4 for four rural Midwest licenses: “McLeod’s 
                                                         
395  TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS (May 15, 2000), 10. 
396  “The FCC’s first-ever auctions of radio spectrum resulted in a bonanza for the U.S. Treasury, raising more than 
$800 million in a week of high-stakes bidding.” Christopher Stern, FCC Spectrum Auctions Hit Pay Dirt, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 1, 1994), 8. 
397  John M. Broder, Clinton Aims to Cut 4,805 Federal Jobs, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 28, 1995), A1. The story 
garnered the front-page headline, and reported that Pres. Clinton was presented “a mock-up of a check for $7.7 
billion.” It also erroneously noted, “The Clinton Administration was the first to propose that airwaves for wireless 
communications be auctioned…” Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Bush had previously made such requests, 
with Carter putting the request in his 1979 State of the Union message. See Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights… , 
supra note __, 534.  
398  “This money goes straight to reducing the deficit,” President Clinton continued. “Chairman Hundt, on behalf of 
the American taxpayer, I thank you.” Clinton Praises FCC Auction Process as ‘Reinventing Govt.’ Model, COMMON 
CARRIER WEEK (April 3, 1995). 
399  Ibid. 
400  “Cellular-phone-service companies that won in prior auctions complain that falling [auction license] prices have 
devalued their licenses. This makes it harder for them to raise capital for their wireless systems, which in turn delays 
competition, they say. They want Congress to have the FCC allot spectrum more slowly.” Bryan Gruley, Sale of 




license is a cheap way to ride the information superhighway… He’ll hire people, he’ll pay taxes, 
he’ll create an entrepreneurial venture. What’s not to like?”  
Plenty, according to incumbent licensees. Broadcasters, still fearing auctions or fees for 
new digital TV licenses, seized on the low bids. The president of the National Association of 
Broadcasters wrote congressional leaders, “Clearly, spectrum auctions have reached the point of 
diminishing returns.
401  Firms in cellular or satellite telephone markets, were more emphatic.  
 
At a recent Washington soiree, Mimi Dawson, a lobbyist for Motorola Inc., the 
big wireless-communications company, flashed her diamond ring and said, “You 
see this? It wouldn’t be worth a dime if DeBeers (the South African cartel) put 
their diamonds on the market that same way we’re putting spectrum on the 




 Two aspects of this analogy are stunning.
403  First, the world’s pre-eminent example of a 
successful private monopoly is invoked as a model for public policy. The stated rationale for 
government intervention is to prevent exactly the sort of monopolistic output restriction allegedly 
engaged in by DeBeers. Yet, the strategic behavior of a price-gouging monopolist is here used as 
a template for FCC policy makers to artificially restrict access to radio spectrum. 
Second, the analogy appears compelling to lawmakers and some independent analysts. 
No less than the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, John McCain, picked up the 
DeBeers analogy.
404  Indeed, McCain’s staff may have first developed this line of argument 
before handing it off to lobbyists for incumbent interests.
405  And George Gilder, a leading writer 
on technology in computers and communications, used the reasoning to attack the FCC as too 
liberal: 
                                                         
401  Bryan Gruley, FCC Auctions of Airwaves Draws Weak Bidding, WALL ST. J. (April 24, 1997), A2. 
402  Ibid., A10 
403  Three, counting the sparkler. 
404  “We’ve got to maximize the value of this public asset,” Sen. McCain says. Ibid. 
405  “In the next two weeks, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain (R-Ariz) plans to introduce 
legislation to ‘establish order, regularity and method’ to the spectrum auction process. Lauren ‘Pete’ Belvin, Senior 
Counsel to the committee likened the current process to ‘DeBeers putting all the diamonds in the world on the 
market at the same time.’” McCain Preparing to Unveil Spectrum Auction Legislation, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REPORTS DAILY (summary prepared by Benton Foundation’s Communications-related Headlines, April 1, 1997). 
Bryan Gruley, Sale of FCC Licenses in Several States Nets Budget Pocket Change, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 1997), 





Congress determined that spectrum auctions should be a panacea for the budget 
crunch. And so it mandated that the FCC dump huge new spans of spectrum on 
the market, through an array of at least eight previously unanticipated new 
auctions… the mere announcement crashed the market… The result was to 
devalue the licenses the PCS entrepreneurs had won only a year earlier, in some 
cases to less than one-third of what they had been worth.
406  
 
 The FCC “dumps” no “spans of spectrum” into the market. Rather, it issues permits to 
provide particular wireless services. While WCS licenses defined those services in broad terms, 
other license terms (including severe power limitations), made them uneconomic for use in 
lucrative applications: “technical limitations on the use of the WCS spectrum sharply curtailed 
interest in this band.”
407  Hence, WCS licenses were evaluated as fixed wireless service permits 
for “last mile” connections (voice and data), not entry rights into the mobile phone market. WCS 
licenses were priced as comparable to MMDS, a service then languishing under restrictions 
preventing two-way data service. Bankruptcies of “wireless cable” firms spooked investors, 
dampened demand for new licenses, and provided a market overhang of cheap new supply (from 
bankruptcy reorganization).
408  
The spectrum glut argument is a myth. Licenses to provide similar services are good 
substitutes and increasing the supply of licenses within bands will lower license values, ceteris 
paribus. But increasing the supply of non-competing licenses will not. Hence, issuing WCS 
licenses does not devalue PCS licenses.
409  During the period following the PCS C Block auction 
(which closed on May 6, 1996) and the WCS license auction (which closed on April 25, 1997), 
there were trends within the financial markets that affected all wireless stocks. In general, the 
sector lost favor among investors. As with all price movements in financial markets, new 
                                                         
406  George Gilder, Don’t Crush Wireless Innovation, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 1997). 
407  FCC Report to Congress, supra note __, 35. Broadcasting was excluded by license terms. 
408  While GWS permitted two-way data, operations were constrained by power limits and bandwidth of 25 MHz 
(MMDS spans 198 MHz). Even an investor bullish on the financial prospects of fixed wireless would naturally 
constrain bids for WCS licenses to reflect the opportunity to buy MMDS license rights as options against FCC 
approval of two-way. 
409  To the extent that WCS services are anticipated to overlap (compete with) the services provided by PCS 
licensees, there will be valuation effects. Those are assumed to be trivial as of April 1997. This is not an ambitious 




information (including changes in opinion or sentiment) accounts for this. But no shift in FCC 
policy is plausibly responsible.  
As seen in Table 8, FCC spectrum allocations continue to take years to complete. In 
particular, the mobile telephone market has been methodically licensed over a period spanning 
decades. The PCS proceeding formally began in 1989, and the number of licenses granted to 
compete with cellular has been known––and has remained fixed––since September 1993.
410   The 
resulting allocation is clearly too parsimonious: the U.S. market is starved for additional 
bandwidth. Not simply in comparison with a theoretically ideal regime of liberal bandwidth 
access, but even with respect to the highly-regulated European Community: “The total amount of 
spectrum available for commercial mobile uses in the U.S. is only 210 MHz compared to an 
average European allocation of 355 MHz.”
411  Regulatory hording of radio spectrum is the policy 
dilemma, as former FCC official Rudy Baca notes:  
 
The lack of a coherent, efficient, forward-looking spectrum management policy 
and process could hinder U.S. wireless operators’ ability to compete in providing 
global interconnected seamless advanced communications… The reality of 
spectrum management in the U.S. in 2000, and for the foreseeable future, is 
chronic spectrum shortages …. Investors need to be aware that U.S. companies are 
relatively disadvantaged in “New Economy” growth in wireless Internet and E-
commerce. Spectrum management reform could ameliorate some of the 
competitive disadvantages caused by spectrum scarcity, legacy policies, and ad 
hoc multi-regulator spectrum management but comprehensive reform is highly 
unlikely in a reasonable timeframe  (two years)…. U.S. leadership in innovation 
and growth of broadband digital voice, data, and video wireless services could be 
threatened by a lack of sufficient spectrum.”
412  
                                                         
410  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Establish New 
Personal Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700 (1993). This ruling established that 
there would be six licenses in each market, three allocated 30 MHz each, three allocated 10 MHz each. 
411  Rudy Baca, U.S. Disadvantaged by Spectrum Scarcity, Precursor Group Independent Research (July 25, 2000). 










Docket #  MHz  Petition or 






Total time to 
license 
(years) 
IVDS  GEN 91-2 0.5  12/2/87  1/10/91 
(NPRM) 
7/29/94  6.7 
Narrowband PCS  GEN 90-314  3  9/22/89  6/14/90 
(NOI) 
7/29/94  4.8 
Broad. PCS A-B  GEN 90-314  60  9/22/89  6/14/90 
(NOI) 
3/13/95  5.5 
Broad. PCS C- F   GEN 90-314  60  9/22/89  6/14/90 
(NOI) 
4/15/99  9.6 
DBS   IB 95 168 
GEN 80-603 
a  
500  12/17/80  6/1/81 
(NPPRM) 
1/26/96  15.1 
DARS   GEN 90-357  25  5/18/90  (8/1/90) 
(NOI) 
4/2/97  6.9 




4/25/97  1.6 
LMDS # 17  CC 92-297  1300  1/91  12/10/92 
(NPRM) 
3/25/98  7.2 
LMDS # 23 (re-
auctions)  
CC 92-297  1300  1/91  12/10/92 
(NPRM) 
5/12/99  8.3 
39 GHz  ET 95-183  1400  9/9/94  12/15/95 
(NPRM) 
5/8/00  5.7 









WT 99-168  24  1986
413   6/17/96
414   Auction 
3/6/01 
‡ 15 
12 GHz terrestrial 
DBS 
ET – 98-206  500   1994  11/19/98  pending  ‡ 6 
 
In this light, the political response to low auction prices appears perverse. Following the 
GWS auction, legislation was enacted to slow spectrum allocations and mandating reservation 
prices: “Congress specifically requires the Commission to establish minimum opening bids and 
reasonable reserve prices in all future auctions… to ensure that the public receive compensation 
while not deterring participation in the auction.”
415  Low bids can be symptomatic of over-
regulation of spectrum, as inefficient restrictions lower profits. Low GWS prices may have 
                                                         
413  “Now, in the mid-1980s, a new group was clamoring for space – the manufacturers and users of two-way radios. 
Police departments, ambulance services, commercial delivery companies. Motorola made most of these radios and 
led this lobby, which was known as Land Mobile… Why not give some of those [UHF] channels to us? Land 
Mobile asked. By 1986, the FCC had pretty much decided to do just that. Several vacant UHF channels in ten big 
cities were to be taken away from broadcasters and given to Land Mobile.” Brinkley, Defining Vision , supra note 
__, 8.  
414  “Initiative briefly mentioned by FCC Chairman Reed Hundt at a Senate Commerce Committee oversight hearing 
last week….” Jeffrey Silva, TV Spectrum Could Convert to Wireless, 15 RCR 1 (June 24, 1996). 




reflected a too-conservative ruling with respect to power limits. But the consumer damage is 
remedied by liberalizing license rights, not by further with-holding them. That exacerbates the 
losses suffered by the public, which fails to “receive compensation” from either auction revenues 
or wireless services offered. Like “spectrum inventories,” reservation prices for licenses 
squander the spectrum resource by blocking productive exploitation of available frequencies. 
An important principle suggests itself for public policy. It can be summarized as the 
Quantity Theory of Spectrum Management.
416  The regulatory approach maximizing consumer 
welfare is to leave pricing issues to the financial markets. Policy makers should focus on creating 
ever-expanding opportunities for use of radio spectrum. Making access to spectrum easier, 
making licenses more abundant and more flexible, achieves this. This pro-consumer policy 
elicits no unambiguous feedback signal in the simple statistic of license price. The value of a 
wireless license increases as its functionality (or flexibility) is enhanced, but decreases as 
competitiveness (in services) grows. Hence, liberalization produces offsetting effects on license 
values. Given these, as well as a vector of exogenous market valuation fluctuations, license 
pricing will not prove a reliable guide for policy makers. The conclusion is that valuation should 
be left to the market, while regulators focus on rules to intensify use of the radio spectrum. 
Without an “abundant spectrum” policy, regulation can become very confused very 
quickly. Following the surprisingly high prices paid for 3G licenses in the UK and Germany, EC 
antitrust chief Mario Monti attacked the monopoly power such bids seemed to reveal––but 
blamed the bidders. “We shall not consider the huge investments made in acquiring the licenses 
as a justification for excessive consumer prices, unacceptable concentration levels or leniency on 
state aid,” Monti warned.
417  That an antitrust regulator would react to high license prices in this 
manner is ironic––if prospective wireless operators constrained their bids, it could prompt an 
investigation for collusion. In fact, Monti’s fire is misdirected. The only value of such licenses is 
to charge future fees, and high prices indicate expectations of high profits.
418  By bidding for the 
privilege to collect them, licensees disgorge themselves of “excessive” profits ex ante. 
                                                         
416  The quantity theory of money has been used by Monetarists such as Milton Friedman to recommend that the 
central bank focus on limiting the growth of the money supply to constrain inflation. The approach distinctly rejects 
the targeting of interest rates, which – under the Quantity Theory – are left to fluctuate according to market forces.  
417  Tracy Ford, Free Markets and the Cost of Business, RCR (Oct. 9, 2000), 12.  
418  That some profits are anticipated to flow from equipment sales, as 3G suppliers race to establish competing 
standards, does not change the analysis. “Excessive consumer prices” may be alleged to prevail there, as well as in 




The discretionary power to create, or collapse, monopoly pricing is held by the regulator. 
If license values indicate “excessive consumer prices” the remedy is a more liberal spectrum 
allocation, provoking competition. More spectrum should be available to 3G suppliers and rivals. 
This would directly attack the problem of “unacceptable concentration levels,” determined by 
spectrum allocation rules. For the antitrust regulator to be confused by such straightforward 
policy realities simply reinforces the importance of promoting an unambiguous policy goal of 
greater spectrum availability. 
The Mirage of DE Credit Stimulus 
 When authorizing auctions Congress included measures to extend some level of political 
control. Specifically, the FCC was ordered to promote bids from “designated entities” (DEs), 
including firms led by women and minorities, small business enterprises, and rural telephone 
companies. The Commission began offering special bidding credits to these entities, but due to a 
1994 Supreme Court ruling
419  the DE categories were scaled back to include just small business 
and rural telcos. 
 There is an inherent contradiction between auctions and bidding preferences. Unless the 
DE preference is extremely targeted, any preference given DE bidders will simply result in 
higher prices being bid. Yet, the finer one targets DE benefits, the more unlikely it is that truly 
disadvantaged parties will be generally included. In the end, DE categories must be fairly broad, 
and auctions take back whatever largesse is extended to the “protected” category.  
In fact, a theory developed that FCC auctions would actually generate higher receipts in 
markets where DE bidders were “subsidized.”
420  This result flowed from the simple analytics of 
competition: Where additional participants are brought into the auction, rivalry intensifies and 
the higher bids (net of the credits) are squeezed out of the players. The perverse upshot is that 
government can increase transfers from telecommunications providers. Rather than aid 
disadvantaged groups, preferences help taxpayers.  
DE preferences also introduced inefficiencies hurting consumers when extended to 
financing terms. In certain auctions, the FCC allowed DE bidders to pay winning bids over 
several years, whereas non-DE bidders were required to pay cash.  This ultimately proved very 
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costly by introducing long delays in service provision, particularly in the PCS C Block. The C 
Block auction ended in May 1996; winning bids were, in aggregate, over $10 billion, exceeding 
all previous auctions including the PCS A and B Block auctions (where twice as many licenses, 
allocated equal bandwidth of 30 MHz per, brought in $7.7 billion). Yet, a series of defaults and 
bankruptcies by DEs delayed licensing, and C Block service has yet to commence is many areas. 
In fact, the generous credit terms extended by the FCC invited opportunistic behavior. 
DEs systematically over-bid for licenses and then strategically lobbied and litigated to shed 
assumed liabilities. The result is that service to the public has been frozen while regulatory 
brinkmanship is resolved. Auction rules were key to this outcome. Winning DE bidders were not 
qualified for credit-worthiness, and were in fact disqualified for excessive asset ownership. They 
were obligated to pay just ten percent of their total bids (five percent within 30 days, and another 
five percent at license award, likely to be months away). They would then pay interest only on 
remaining balances (ninety percent of total bid) for four years. Then, for six years, bidders would 
pay off the balance in equal annual payments. The interest rate would be the 30-year U.S. 
Treasury bond rate. In 1996, this meant that winning bidders would pay about 6.5%, with 
generous credit terms (just 10% down, no principle due for five years), when private financing 
would cost a minimum of 14% (as the U.S. Department of Justice expert later testified).
421  
This payment plan encouraged DEs to bid aggressively. Once a license was won, the 
licensee would attempt to raise necessary capital. If credit sources in the market responded 
positively, that would result in financial success for the bidders. If the market responded 
negatively, seeing the auction price as too high, the bidder could default and challenge the FCC 
to take its license back. The FCC is not anxious to make a clear admission of failure. In the 
event, the FCC did halt license awards to firms defaulting on the first five percent (30-day) 
payments. These were re-auctioned in July 1996. But––with a much larger number of licensees–
–it blinked and relaxed the terms extended to C Block winners in spring 1997.  
Finally, over-bidding licensees could file for bankruptcy protection, asking a federal 
court to limit liability. The two largest C Block license winners, NextWave and General 
Wireless, Inc., did this, and won bankruptcy court claims. GWI saw its liability for 14 licenses 
written down from over $1 billion to just $18 million, while NextWave’s $4.7 billion aggregate 
                                                         




bid was reduced to about $1 billion.
422  GWI’s case was confirmed on appeal, while NextWave’s 
verdict was overturned. Despite continuing litigation, the FCC has scheduled an auction of 
reclaimed licenses to begin Dec. 12, 2000.
423  At minimum, service to the public via C Block 
spectrum will be delayed five years. Given that the implicit subsidy in DE preferences are bid 
away, this delay constitutes a large social cost (reduced competition in wireless telephone 
service) for which there is no arguable compensating offset. 
The Spectrum Allocation Paradox of License Auctions  
Auctions can efficiently transfer license rents to the Treasury. But that very success tends 
to undermine dynamic efficiency in spectrum allocation. Consider the practical structure of FCC 
regulation. Incumbent licensees reliably oppose the allocation of airwaves for new wireless 
service providers. Two identifiable types of firms attempt to counter incumbent licensees. The 
first is a potential competitor who seeks an FCC license. The second is the equipment 
manufacturer (or other supplier) who will benefit from increased sales in a more competitive 
market. 
Incumbents’ incentives are typically sharper.
424  Yet, historically, one important pay-off 
for the service entrant was provided by an implicit licensing queue. If a firm were to lobby the 
FCC for a particular spectrum allocation, then––if the allocation were made––the petitioner 
assumed a place at the head of the licensing line. That was an interpretation of the public interest 
standard, and provided a reward for applicants who created public benefits by enduring the 
allocation process. 
This incentive structure did not fully offset the influence enjoyed by incumbent operators. 
But the reward of a zero-priced license mitigated it. Auctions (and the lotteries before them) 
erase this incentive. Once an allocation is made, licenses are sold to high bidders. (With pure 
lotteries, actual providers also must be high “bidders” to obtain licenses in secondary markets, as 
seen in the accumulation of cellular licenses post-lottery by McCaw and other firms.) This 
diminishes returns to lobbying for access to radio spectrum. It does not eliminate all returns to 
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rent seeking, particularly those of equipment manufacturers or technology suppliers. But given a 
reduction in the incentives of a key constituency, allocations should become even more 
restrictive under auctions in the absence of countervailing effects.
425   
The FCC has expressed concern that firms instrumental in discovering and promoting 
new wireless applications should be rewarded with favorable consideration in the distribution of 
licenses. This led to implementation of the “pioneer’s preference” (PP) program under which 
entrepreneurs creating novel services would apply to the Commission for special consideration in 
the licensing process.
426  The program managed to survive into the auctions era, and pioneer’s 
preferences for contributions to the development of PCS were Cox Enterprises, American 
Personal Communications (partnering with the WASHINGTON POST), and Omnipoint 
Communications for their contributions to the development of PCS service.
427   The process by 
which the Commission selected just three winning PP applicants––56 were pending at the time 
of selection––was controversial, to say the least. Litigation erupted, and fees were imposed on 
winners by the FCC ex post. One losing FCC applicant––Qualcomm––was victorious in two 
federal appeals court decisions declaring that the FCC had erred in refusing to grant a PP license 
to the San Diego-based developer of Code Division Multiple Access technology widely used in 
PCS and 3G wireless systems.
428  The Commission decided it did not have the ability to 
administer such a program, and it was discontinued. The episode demonstrates both the 
importance of incentives in dynamic optimization, and the administrative difficulty in promoting 
proper incentives under the current system.  
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Evidence to support or reject the hypothesis that license auctions tend to slow spectrum 
allocations should be possible to uncover. One intriguing place to look is the belly of the beast: 
How do firms lobby?
429  While it may be difficult to identify the entrepreneur who fails to 
pressure the FCC for access to radio spectrum, incumbent licensees may behave in suggestive 
patterns. Indeed, in the recent distribution of licenses for digital television, cell-phone and PCS 
providers argued strongly that broadcast TV stations (who received the new DTV licenses 
without monetary payment) should pay for licenses through competitive bidding.
430  This is soft 
evidence in favor of the auctions-reduce-spectrum theory. Incumbents’ strategy reveals that 
competitive bidding would reduce entry.
431  
Some measure of effective demand for spectrum access may be deduced by quantifying 
the sluggishness of FCC process. Table 8 begins the task of estimating the duration of recent 
spectrum allocations. Specifically, it charts the time elapsing from an initial request until licenses 
are auctioned. Measured lags understate actual lags by ignoring unofficial delays. Often the FCC, 
international agencies, Congress, or the Department of Commerce (regulating government use of 
spectrum) spend years grappling with an allocation issue before the FCC initiates a rule making. 
In addition, the process of issuing a license once an auction is complete (the end of the period 
Table 8 covers) can take over a year.
432   
While the extraordinarily lengthy cellular telephone rule making is difficult to match,
433  
recent proceedings do not appear to fast track spectrum allocation. Take the case of 39 GHz, a 
proceeding triggered by a petition filed September 9, 1994.
434  License auctions ended May 8, 
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435  nearly six years later. The General Wireless Communications Services (GWCS) 
spectrum allocation process can be traced to August 10, 1993, when the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) became law. This mandated the Commerce Department to 
identify a total of 200 Megahertz for transfer from government to private use. In 1998, the FCC 
allocated 5 MHz bands to each of 5 licenses (25 MHz total) in each of 175 Economic Areas 
covering the United States (875 total licenses). Auctions, initially scheduled to commence in 
early 1999, have not been held as of mid-2000, and no new date has been set. The clock 
continues to tick seven years after Congress ordered spectrum be made available to the public, 
and over six years after the Commerce Department specifically identified suitable frequencies.
436    
While causality is difficult to establish, the era of auctions has coincided with continued–
–perhaps intensifying––regulatory gridlock in spectrum allocation. Given the spiritual 
momentum for reform supplied by the successful initiation of competitive bidding, as well as 
sharply rising demand for wireless applications from industry, the inertia appears anomalous. 
The median duration for the 13 allocations listed in Table 8 is 6.9 years. The observed 
sluggishness suggests that, at a minimum, the FCC’s administrative process is as fierce an 
obstacle to progress as ever. Indeed, it leaves open the possibility that license auctions actually 
diminish the trickle of radio spectrum allocated for productive use. 
XI.  THE SPECTRUM ABUNDANCE FALLACY  
 
Does new technology make spectrum allocation obsolete? George Gilder,
437  Eli Noam,
438  
Yochai Benkler,
439  Tom Bell,
440  and Larry Lessig,
 441  press the theme that technical 
breakthroughs in digitization systematically alter policy options.
442  With more sophisticated 
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packaging of coded information, airwave congestion is defeated and spectrum scarcity moot. The 
peg on which such arguments hang is the development of spread spectrum technology: 
 
Whatever the state of radio technology was in 1927, there’s an emerging view that 
broadcasting today does not require spectrum allocation. There is a second 
architecture for broadcasting (which I will call “Spread Spectrum”––it has a few 
different names) that would not require any spectrum allocation at all. If 
broadcasting were done through this technology, the extensive governmental 
regulation would no longer be justified.
 443   
 
 This thinking has led to an attack on property rights in radio spectrum. “New open access 
and spread spectrum technologies can allow one frequency to simultaneously carry many signals 
without interference, thus largely eliminating the justification for granting titles to entire blocks 
of the spectrum.”
444  The attack extends to FCC license auctions, taken as a proxy for exclusive 
rights to use radio spectrum.
445  In Gilder’s view, the premises of spectrum exclusivity are 
rendered obsolete by recent scientific advances: 
 
Amid the spectrum fever around by the [FCC license auction] bidding, 
however, new radio technologies are emerging that devastate its most basic 
assumptions… 
Even the language used to describe the auction betrays its fallacies. With 
real estate imagery, analysts depict spectrum as “beachfront property” and the 
auction as a “land rush.” They assume that radio frequencies are like analog 
telephone circuit[s]: no two users can occupy the same spot of spectrum at the 
same time. Whether large 50-kilowatt broadcast stations booming Rush 
Limbaugh’s voice across the nation or milliwatt cellular phones beaming love 
murmurs to a nearby base station, radio transmitters are assumed to be infectious, 
high-powered and blind. If one is on the highway, everyone else has to clear out. 
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Both the prevailing wisdom and the entrenched technology dictate that every 
transmitter be quarantined in its own spectrum slot. 
However, innovations from companies such as Steinbrecher and 
Qualcomm Inc. of San Diego overthrow this paradigm. Not only can numerous 
radios operate at non-interfering levels in the same frequency band, they can also 
see other users’ signals and move to avoid them… If appropriately handled, these 
technologies can render spectrum not scarce but abundant.
446  
 
Traditionally, radio regulation has been justified as necessary to prevent tragedy of the 
commons. “Before 1927,” the Supreme Court wrote in Red Lion  (1969), “the allocation of 
frequencies was left entirely to the private sector and the result was chaos. It quickly became 
apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated 
and rationalized only by the Government.”
447  Ronald Coase (and economists to follow) saw the 
economic fallacy in what became known as the “physical scarcity” doctrine, made famous in 
Justice Felix Frankfurter’s Supreme Court opinion in NBC .
448  Coase responded: 
 
[T]hese arguments… are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
problem. Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to think that federal regulation is needed 
because radio frequencies are limited in number and people want to use more of 
them than are available. But it is a commonplace of economics that almost all 
resources in the economic system (and not simply radio and television 
frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce, in that people would like to use 
more than exists… It is true that some mechanism has to be employed to decide 
who, out of many claimants, should be allowed to use the scarce resource. But the 
way this is usually done in the American economic system is to employ the price 
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Figure 11. Technical Doctines of Spectrum Supply
 Whatever the “physical scarcity” doctrine’s weaknesses as a theory, it has been 
successful as a legal justification shielding regulation of the electronic press from First 
Amendment constraints.
450  Now it is a springboard for a new paradigm created by flipping the 
technical argument on its head: Instead of regulation being mandated by a peculiar form of 
scarcity, open access to spectrum is mandated by a peculiar form of abundance. It is inefficient 
and even unconstitutional to promote property rights, including the de facto rights implicit in 
exclusive use FCC licenses. Technology dictates that the spectrum should be kept open to all. As 
jetliner routes in open skies (an example cited by Eli Noam
451 ), airwaves should be freely shared: 
no exclusive rights.
452  
It is undisputed that a true commons would lead to over-exploitation and airwave chaos. 
“With open access,” Noam concedes, “scarcity emerges, the resource needs to be allocated, and a 
price mechanism is required. But this does not require control over a specific slice of the 
rainbow.”
 453  But that is exactly what rationing a scarce resource entails: a controlling authority 
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resolves conflicting demands for specific slices. Indeed, the mechanism recommended by Noam 
is a complex series of auctions to sell airwave access rights––in tiny increments––to high bidders 
purchasing “control over a specific slice of the rainbow.” This inherently conflicts with the 
allegedly similar position taken by Gilder that “[y]ou can no more lease electromagnetic waves 
than you can lease ocean waves… You can use the spectrum as much as you want as long as you 
don’t collide with anyone else or pollute it with high-powered noise or other nuisances.”
454   
While Noam implicitly retreats to an exclusive rights position, Gilder, Benkler and Lessig 
pursue government regulation to police the commons. Power limits and transmission standards 
imposed by law control radio access to avoid congestion.  That users must be made to invest in 
particular types of wireless systems, giving up less costly alternatives, concedes the existence of 
scarcity and exposes the spectrum commons paradigm as simply an alternative regime for 
resolving costly conflicts over resource use. The argument that revolutionary digital technology 
creates abundance and therefore undermines the existing regulatory paradigm features myriad 
lacunae in its depiction of (1) the origins of regulation, (2) spread spectrum technology and (3) 
the economics of spectrum use.  
Block Allocation: Inefficient Even for Analog 
The spectrum abundance argument precisely inverts the relationship between technology 
and regulation. Rather than digital technologies obviating old regulations, block allocation has 
deterred the development of myriad digital services and systems.  
Take cellular. AMPS (advanced mobile phone system) was the analog technology 
imposed by the FCC on cellular. Only in 1988, after licensees had built their big city systems 
(where capacity was stretched) did the FCC allow digital telephones, creating one of the great 
standards blunders in modern telecommunications history.
455   PCS rules, conversely, permitted 
licensees to select their own digital standards. A standards competition broke out, and CDMA––
the break-out spread spectrum technology––was one notable result. Here the block allocation 
system visibly suppressed digital, protecting analog. 
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Take software-defined radio. Eli Noam specifically touts SDR as technology rendering 
exclusive airwave rights moot.
456  Yet, the SDR expert he cites has alertly noted that the block 
allocation system stifles SDR by preventing the fluid use of frequencies: “Software radios 
provide a vast untapped potential to personalize services. But the contemporary process of 
spectrum allocations takes years to decades and lacks flexibility.”
457  Regulation hinders the new 
technology far more than the new technology hinders regulation. 
Spread Spectrum: Not New, Not Unique 
The key scientific break-through claimed to unleash unlimited bandwidth argument is 
frequency re-use. Rather than separate transmissions by frequency buffers, each message using 
its own dedicated channel to flow to a receiver, spread spectrum technologies transmit multiple 
messages down the same frequency path. Data which would otherwise be a jumble––lost in the 
cacophony––are unscrambled by the receiver, thus enabling more intense utilization of the 
wireless “conduit.” Messages also hop from band to band, depending on local traffic conditions, 
and are reassembled by the receiver. This buys even greater communications throughput. 
Depending upon the format used and the processing power of equipment, dramatic increases in 
effective bandwidth over analog systems are possible. And due to the increasing speed and 
declining cost of computer chips, robust improvements are likely to continue.  
Since the dawn of wireless, inventors have struggled to transmit additional information 
within a given band.
458  Multiplexing techniques, sending more than one stream over a frequency, 
constitute many of the early advances in radio frequency (RF) engineering. The wireless pioneer 
Guglielmo Marconi initially believed that no two transmissions could be intelligible within the 
same region. Innovations later separated messages by frequency, permitting multiple local area 
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459   A century of progress has led to various spread spectrum techniques, including 
the important Code Division Multiple Access format for digital wireless communications 
developed by Qualcomm and heralded by abundance advocates as the organizing principle for a 
new age of spectrum use. As explained, however, by Qualcomm’s vice chairman, Dr. Andrew J. 
Viterbi, the company built on a very old technique: 
 
The origins of multiple access date back to Patent No. 7777 awarded in 
1900 to Marconi for the “Tuned Circuit” which as the enabling technology for 
both Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) and Frequency Division Multiple 
Access (FDMA). (FDM refers to transmission of multiple sources from a single 
location by modulating each on a separate carrier sufficiently separated from the 
other, while in FDMA the sources and their respective modulated carriers 
emanate from different transmitters, generally not co-located.) FDM and FDMA 
are the only multiplexing and multiple access techniques which can be used with 
both analog and digital transmission. 
For digital sources, two alternative technologies have evolved for 
multiplexing and multiple access: time division (TDM and TDMA) and code 
division (CDM and CDMA).
460  
  
 It can be argued that progress in spread spectrum systems is non-linear, that the growth 
rate in data compression efficiency is increasing over time. But it is not convincing to 
characterize new advances as technical discontinuity. Spectrum (or effective bandwidth) supply 
continues to slope upward. With more investment and better science more communications are 
produced.  So with analog, so with digital. 
A Cornucopia is Not Enough 
As with other improvements in radio communications, Gain and Loss functions respond 
to spread spectrum’s capacity-increasing innovations. The result is a higher level of optimal 
communications volume (T*). But communications are not unlimited (T* < ￿ ).  For any given 
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investment in transmission and reception, increased traffic degrades communications; after some 
volume of traffic, marginal degradation fully offsets the marginal value of additional signals. 
Spread spectrum does not eliminate interference; it simply increases the range over which it is 
relatively less important than signal degradation. As the Chief Engineer of the FCC, Dale 
Hatfield, writes: 
 
In spread spectrum systems, multiple conversations (up to some maximum) 
simultaneously share the available spectrum in both the time and frequency 
dimensions. Hence, in a CDMA system, the available spectrum is not channelized 
in frequency or time as in FDMA and TDMA systems, respectively. Instead, the 
individual conversations are distinguished through coding; that is, at the 
transmitter, each conversation is processed with a unique spreading code that is 
used to distribute the signal over the available bandwidth. The receiver uses the 
unique code to accept the energy associated with a particular code. The other 
signals present are each identified by a different code and simply produce 
background noise. In this way, many conversations can be carried simultaneously 
within the same block of spectrum.
461  
 
 Even when deploying spread spectrum systems there remains “a maximum” beyond 
which signal degradation is sufficient to lower the aggregate value of communications. That is 
why PCS licenses allocated 30 MHz (A, B, and C blocks) were sold at auction for more than four 
times the price of PCS licenses allocated just 10 MHz (D, E, and F blocks).
462  If band use is 
unlimited, why pay more to access additional spectrum? Despite the availability of digital 
formats intensely packing data within, and across, frequencies, the extra bandwidth was worth 
billions of dollars to users. The standard economic trade-offs apply: more inputs are needed to 
create more output. Bandwidth remains a scarce, valuable input. 
In fact, while abundance advocates criticize FCC auctions, they ignore the powerful 
evidence competitive bidding reveals. Investors are willing to pay substantial amounts to avoid 
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the spectrum commons. That is the choice made in buying an FCC license, as it offers 
exclusivity in spectrum use. Given the availability of both spread spectrum technology and 
unlicensed bands (see discussion below), it is curious that firms bid so aggressively to escape the 
commons. Over $20 billion has been bid in U.S. license auctions, and recent auctions in the U.K. 
and Germany saw 3G wireless licenses fetch more than the entire U.S. total in each country. 
Financial markets see huge advantages to being able to optimize the use of bandwidth by 
excluding non-payers.  
“Physical abundance” trips over Say’s Law, updated to the Information Age: Spectrum 
creates its own demand.
463  This is evidenced in the premium financial markets place on 
developers of enhanced bandwidth. As described in a recent Fortune  magazine article: 
 
These days, speed is everything. That is why not just Qwest but also AT&T, MCI 
WorldCom, and Williams are turning to these newcomers for the latest optical 
equipment. In the past, network carriers were conservative buyers that made 
purchases from a short list of large equipment suppliers––Lucent, Alcatel, 
Siemens, NEC, Nortel. But now demand for the high speed of optical networks is 
so great that carriers can’t wait. Their impatience fueled an extraordinary run-up 
in the value of optical-equipment suppliers. One example: Tiny Sycamore 
Networks, a Chelmsford, Mass., optical-switch company with just $31 million in 
revenues during its lifetime, boasts a market value of $25 billion… Another 
example: In August, Cisco paid $7.4 billion for two tiny optical startups, 
Monterey Networks and Cerent. That’s an astounding figure, fully one-third of 
the total amount Cisco has paid for the 48 companies it has purchased over the 
past seven years.
464  
The well-publicized “race for bandwidth” is furious. Yet, one can casually stroll when 
claiming an abundant resource. There will be plenty for everyone without charge.  Capacity-
increasing technology suppliers prosper as they develop the means for increasing effective 
bandwidth.  The race extends to software design, data storage and caching––any method for 
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more intense bandwidth utilization. The shares in such firms are valuable only to the degree that 
customers are willing to pay for increased bandwidth.
465  
Broadband connections––two-way network access at 200 kbps or faster
466 ––do not satiate 
users. After upgrading from 56K dial-up to connections between five and one hundred times as 
fast, users still desire faster speeds both locally and in the Internet backbone. The additional 
communications capacity improves network functionality, and unlocks pipe-clogging 
information packages like video conferencing and video on demand. As more customers gain 
broadband access and transmit or receive larger files, the capacity limitations will become even 
more binding––spurring further demands for bandwidth.
467    
The Internet Analogy 
This is the architecture of the Internet. Machines have addresses: they collect from the 
Net packets addressed to that machine. No one allocates a particular channel to your machine; 
your machine shares the Net with every other machine on the Net. But the Net has a protocol 
about sharing the commons. Once this protocol is agreed on, no further regulation is required.
468  
The spectrum commons idea is motivated by analogy to the Internet. Yet, the architecture 
of the Internet––a network of networks––seriously misallocates scarce bandwidth. Because data 
cannot easily be prioritized, or billed, within the existing Internet protocols, tragedy of the 
commons appears frequently. High value communications are jammed in congested arteries with 
massive volumes of data of only marginal significance. Classically, the brain surgeon cannot 
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Bandwidth Ever Be Too Cheap to Meter? BUS. COMM. REV. (Jan. 1998), 53; Michael Weingarten and Bart Stuck, 




read the life-or-death CT-scan because the Internet backbone is clogged with junk e-mail. The 
problems have been described by financial analysts thusly: 
 
It’s the economics (of the Internet) not the technology. Nearly two years ago we 
wrote that the Internet was not fulfilling its potential as a mission critical business 
platform because the economics behind its “one size fits all” price-quantity-
performance offerings were screwed up… Flat-rate pricing and no financial 
settlement led to inefficient usage and reduced incentive to eliminate bottlenecks. 
Bandwidth quantity was limited at the last mile and in core interconnection points 
(NAPs). Many customers who were willing to pay for performance couldn’t get it 
where/when they wanted it, whether it was voice IP (latency), e-commerce 
(reliability) or entertainment (burstable bandwidth).
469  
 
 Noam concedes that a spectrum commons is analogous to the “presently ‘free’ Internet 
system [that] is experiencing congestion problems,”
470  but footnotes a paper by Jeffrey K. 
Mackie-Mason and Hal Varian
471  presenting an Internet traffic pricing proposal as a solution. It 
is yet to be adopted,
472  but if it were it would solve the commons problem by instituting tolls for 
admission––hardly “open access.” The authors, authorities on the economics of the Internet, note 
that open access invites inefficiency: 
 
We expect that if access to Internet bandwidth continues to be provided at zero 
cost there will inevitably be congestion. Essentially, this is the classic problem of 
the commons: unless the congestion is priced, there will inevitably be inefficient 
use of the common resource. As long as users face a zero price for access, they 
will continue to “overgraze.”
473  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
468  Larry Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace  (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 184 (footnote omitted). 
469  Bill Whyman, PRECURSOR GROUP INDEPENDENT RESEARCH (Oct. 2, 2000). 
470  Noam, Spectrum Auctions…, supra note __, 769.  
471  Economic FAQs about the Internet, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (1994). 
472  The inability of Internet policy makers to institute rules promoting efficient use of bandwidth is not surprising, as 
such policies are public goods and are also stymied by tragedy of the commons. In this sense, the Internet is an 
appropriate analogy for spectrum access. 
473  Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Hal Varian, “Some Economics of the Internet,” manuscript, Univ. of Michigan (Feb. 




 Substantial progress has been made in improving bandwidth allocation (and, hence, 
network speed) by privatizing network functionality. By removing key transport and information 
processing functions from the common areas of the Internet users can bid for services, not simply 
queue. With both hardware and software innovations, network service providers are building 
faster Internet ramps, gateways, long distance networks, and content distribution facilities. This 
infrastructure provides bypass around the commons. As the Precursor Group analyst concludes: 
“The one-size fits all… Internet is giving way to a more economic (and heterogeneous) Internet. 
And more importantly, an Internet where providers can price for service!”
474  
The Trade-offs of Unlicensed Spectrum 
There are two types of unlicensed spectrum use.
475  The first involves low power 
transmissions regulated under Part 15 of the FCC’s rules. Certain taboo frequencies are 
protected, but otherwise Part 15 devices are permitted to roam across designated bands. 
Interference is limited by virtue of strict power limits (effectively granting users de facto private 
rights over adjacent airspace) and equipment approval by the Commission. In essence, the FCC 
regulates the wireless equipment manufacturer but leaves users free to police their own localized 
radio waves. This permits low power users to co-exist in bands simultaneously used for higher 
power emissions. 
Unlicensed use also occurs in allocated bands.  The FCC again sets standards and 
provides type acceptance for manufacturers, but unlicensed users are permitted higher power due 
to the protections afforded by dedicated (unlicensed) bandwidth. See Table 9. Users in these 
bands are explicitly liable for interfering emissions they cause but are not protected from 
interference from others.
476  This means that unlicensed operators lack standing to assert claims 
against trespassers. Any tenancy enjoyed is via custom (as in transmission etiquette protecting 
multiple users from interference), economics (as when scarcity is not a factor).  
 
                                                         
474  Bill Whyman, PRECURSOR GROUP INDEPENDENT RESEARCH (Oct. 2, 2000). 
475  For a useful overview of unlicensed spectrum use, see: Charles Jackson, Dynamic Sharing of Radio Spectrum, in 
Rose and Ogielski, eds., WINLAB Focus on the U-NII and Radio Networks for Everything , (Kluwer, forthcoming 
2000). 
476  “Devices that run in an unlicensed band are subject to the following (seemingly contradictory) conditions: (1) 
They may not cause harmful interference; (2) they must accept any interference received, including interference that 
may cause undesired operation.” Carmen Nobel, FCC to Rule on Hotly Contested 2.4GHz Band, EWEEK (March 





Table 9. Licensed and Unlicensed Spectrum Allocations 
 
Band  Bandwidth  Use  Operators/Manufacturers 
(partial lists) 
902-928 MHz  26 MHz  Industrial, 
Scientific, Medical 
devices (ISM) 
Airlinx, CellNet, MetriCom, 
WaveRider 
824-894 MHz  50 MHz  Cellular  AT&T, Alltel, Airtouch, Bell 
Atlantic, BellSouth, Western 
Wireless 
811.5-866 MHz  14 MHz  SMRS  Nextel 
1850-1990 MHz  120 MHz  Licensed PCS  Sprint PCS, PacBell, Omnipoint 
1910-1930 MHz   20 MHz  Unlicensed PCS (voice, 
data) 
Airlinx, Lucent 
2150-2686 MHz  198 MHz  MDS/MMDS/ITFS Adaptive Broadband, Cisco, MCI, 
Nucentrix, BellSouth, Sprint 
2305-2360 MHz  30 MHz  WCS  BellSouth, MetriCom, Omnipoint 
2390-2483.5 MHz  93.5 MHZ  Unlicensed Data  BreezeCOM, Cisco, Nortel, Proxim, 
SPEEDCOM, SkyLynx, WaveRider 
4660-4685 MHz  25 MHz  GWCS   
5150-5850 MHz  300 MHz  Unlicensed Data  Adaptive Broadband, Airlinx, Cisco   
24.25-25.25 GHz  400 MHz  DEMS  Teligent 
 
27.5-31.3 GHz 
1.3 GHz  LMDS  HighSpeed.com, NextLink. 
SPEEDUS.COM, Western 
Wireless, WinStar 
38.6-40 GHz  1.4 GHz  39 GHz  AT&T, Advanced Radio 
Telecommunications, WinStar 
59-64 GHz  5 GHz  Unlicensed Data  Newly allocated 
MDS: Multipoint Distribution Services; MMDS: Multipoint/Multichannel Distribution Services; ITFS: Instructional 
Television Fixed Service; WCS: Wireless Communications Services; GWCS: General Wireless Communications 
Services; DEMS: Digital Electronic Messaging Services; LMDS: Local Multipoint Distribution Services 
 
 
Unlicensed access to radio spectrum has pluses and minuses versus licensed spectrum. 
Eliminating the licensing barrier spurs competition. Once the FCC proceedings open up 
particular airspace for unlicensed access, spectrum is allocated according to the demands of 
actual users. Where spectrum is not scarce, or in instances where the costs of interference are 
born symmetrically (by entrant and incumbent alike), unlicensed bands may provide valuable 
communications service to the public.  
Yet, wherever co-ordination between users is important to efficient spectrum utilization, 
open access is problematic. Indeed, this reality leads the FCC to mandate technical standards for 
unlicensed users, enforced through the equipment approval process. “Open access” is not truly 
open under the FCC’s unlicensed rules. Equipment regulation is used to prevent over-grazing. 




optimum level of communications remains a delicate balance, varying with local demands and 
changing technology. In the wilds of the Upper Yukon, unlicensed bands may never encounter 
serious signal degradation because demand for wireless services is modest. Service providers 
may cheaply and easily avoid interfering with one another. Yet, in the downtown business 
districts of cities, unlicensed bands––if allowed to offer popular services––are apt to become 
over-crowded because success signals new entry. 
A fundamental question is why, if spectrum sharing is highly efficient, it takes a 
government policy banning exclusive use to promote it. Why wouldn’t granting licensees the 
freedom to choose technical standards lead the market to iterate on such powerful new 
technologies? Given flexible private rights to control radio traffic, band managers could compete 
to attract communications traffic, charging subscribers, operators, or manufacturers for use of the 
spectrum. Indeed, firms commonly engage in licensing agreements wherein a patent or 
trademark owner permits shared use for a fee. Yet Benkler argues that free markets will not 
produce efficient sharing due to “collective action problems, risk of monopolization, and 
unnecessary transaction costs.”
477  Government policy is needed to pre-empt private rights, 
promoting unlicensed spectrum instead. 
The empirical assertion is uncompelling. Spread spectrum is just one of a number of 
frequency sharing methods routinely used by licensed wireless operators.
478  Licensees routinely 
enhance system capacity––when permitted under FCC rules––by employing digital algorithms or 
other methods enabling spectrum re-use. For instance, wireless broadband access offered by 
Sprint (operating with MMDS licenses) relies on “sectorization” to deliver higher bandwidth to 
customers. This is described as “following an old cable path,” although the approach is identical 
to “cellularization” used to provide additional capacity in analog or digital wireless telephony.
479  
As reported some years ago by the NEW YORK TIMES, even technologies that now appear 
mundane were borne out of the basic principle of spectrum re-use: 
 
                                                         
477  Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia, supra note __, 362. 
478  “Dynamic sharing is not a new concept in radio system architecture. Indeed, the earliest radio communications 
systems, maritime mobile communications systems in the first two decades of this [20
th ] century, made extensive 
use of dynamic sharing.” Jackson, Dynamic Sharing, supra note __, 3. Analog cellular systems, point-to-point and 
point-to-multipoint microwave, TDMA, and CDMA spread spectrum are examples of shared systems commonly in 
use today. See Table 10.  




Nature created an abundant electromagnetic spectrum, which ingenious 
scientists have exploited for radar, television and lasers. But that is small comfort 
to cellular telephone operators. The Federal Communications Commission has 
been stingy with the radio frequencies that make wireless telephone calls possible. 
But through clever design that largely prevents any two users from 
electronically bumping into each other, cellular telephones and the networks that 
serve them have coped with spectrum scarcity––up to a point.
480  
 
Digital systems employing spectrum re-use have been widely adopted in licensed bands, 
carrying far more traffic (measured by almost any metric) than unlicensed frequencies. See Table 
10. CDMA (delivered via licensed frequencies) is the standard used by 65 million mobile phone 
subscribers worldwide,
481  and these applications are certain to increase: “Operators on every 
major continent have chosen CDMA as their technology for 3G.”
482  The billions of dollars 
poured into 3G licenses by the U.K. and German wireless providers went to provide warm, safe, 
exclusive bands in which to build CDMA spread spectrum platforms.  
 
Table 10. Top Twelve U.S. Mobile Wireless Service Providers  
 
Provider  1Q00 Subscribers (mil.)  Technology 
SBC Communications  11.684  TDMA, AMPS 
AT&T Wireless  9.987  TDMA 
AirTouch  9.354  CDMA, AMPS 
Bell Atlantic Mobile  7.978  CDMA, AMPS 
GTE Wireless  7.418  CDMA, AMPS 
Sprint PCS  6.560  CDMA 
BellSouth  5.637  TDMA, AMPS 
ALLTEL  5.124  CDMA, AMPS 
Nextel  5.056  GSM 
US Cellular  2.707  AMPS, TDMA, CDMA 
Omnipoint/VoiceStream  2.103  GSM  
PrimeCo  1.527  CDMA, AMPS 
Sources: Merrill Lynch, The Matrix—1Q00 (June 20, 2000); various websites. 
 
                                                         
480  Anthony Ramirez, Next for the Cellular Phone, N.Y. TIMES (March 15, 1992), F7. The article went on to 
describe the means by which “digitizing can cram a lot more talk into the spectrum.” The transition from analog to 
digital cellular allowed much more intense use of given bandwidth, and squeezed the additional traffic by more 
intelligent routing of the electronic signals composing a mobile telephone call.  
481  Worldwide CDMA Subscribers Double, RCR (Sept. 4, 2000), 40. 




Meanwhile, congestion continues to plague many unlicensed frequencies.
483   Intense 
disputes over what standards underscore that “open access” is only nominally open, and that 
scarcity continues to force trade-offs between radiated power levels, equipment cost, 
functionality (e.g., mobile vs. fixed), bandwidth, and signal reliability.
484  To reduce interference, 
the FCC restricts unlicensed power emissions. Shared use with higher power limits is possible, 
but requires tighter coordination.  
The problem with unlicensed bands face is that restrictions will either be too lenient 
(Type I error) or too strict (Type II error). Hitting the optimum is theoretically possible, but will 
occur only in a (lucky) special case. There is no natural tendency for regulators to converge on 
this solution, while political forces reliably resist it. Private licensees or band managers, 
conversely, profit by discovering and implementing value-maximizing traffic strategies.   Capital 
markets are ruthless in efforts to squeeze full value from assets, both in eliminating static 
inefficiency and in applying new technologies promoting growth. The search for profit extends 
to allowing decentralized use of the band, regulation permitting.
485  
When unlicensed entry thrives, the characteristic pattern is that over-crowding ensues. 
The history of unlicensed is a chase up the dial: the 900 MHz ISM band became congested, 
leading the FCC to open up the 2.4 unlicensed band, which became crowded in major markets,
486  
leading the Commission to open up 300 MHz for the U-NII 5 GHz band.
487  The Department of 
Commerce now warns wireless service providers that spread spectrum is no panacea:  
 
A number of companies are manufacturing spread spectrum systems that 
operate under Part 15 rules as unlicensed point-to-point radios in the 2.4-GHz and 
5.8-GHz bands… 
                                                         
483  “How does one determine the reliability of such [wireless broadband] equipment, particularly in the presence of 
interference – always a potential problem in the unlicensed bands?” Dan Sweeney, Equipment for the Unlicensed—
Ad Hoc or Fully Adequate? BROADBAND WIRELESS BUSINESS (June/July 2000), 24.  
484  “The 2.4GHz band is unlicensed, meaning that pretty much anyone can use it, but the FCC still can regulate what 
goes on in the band, limiting the amount of the band each device uses as the commission sees fit.” Carmen Nobel, Is 
it Home Appliances vs. Bluetooth? PC WEEK (March 17, 2000), 
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2469855,00.html?chkpt=zdnntop. 
485  “The proof of the proposition that a centralized management algorithm can match or outperform a distributed 
algorithm based on the same information is obvious. One option for the centralized algorithm is to simulate the 
distributed algorithm…” Jackson, Dynamic Sharing, supra note __, 6.  
486  “‘It’s a pretty busy band,’ said one FCC official. ‘It’s getting pretty crowded.’” Carmen Nobel, Is it Home 
Appliances vs. Bluetooth? PC WEEK (March 17, 2000), 




These Part 15 radios have essentially created two new point-to-point 
microwave bands having very rapid growth. Although no licensing delays or cost 
apply to these radios, no protection against interference is implied or coordinated 
either. One manufacturer suggests that a useful strategy would be to install a 5.8 
GHz unlicensed link and begin operation immediately, while simultaneously 
applying for a license for operation in the 6-GHz or 6.5-GHz licensed bands. He 
can install a licensed radio on a permanent basis, perhaps moving the unlicensed 
radio to another new site where the cycle will be repeated… 
The use of the ISM [unlicensed industrial, scientific, medical] bands for 
high reliability communications is problematic, mainly because there is no 
assurance that today’s adequate performance will remain free of interference in 
the future… Eventually there may be too many additional systems to expect 
interference-free operation in crowded locations. Or, maybe not… 
 [The situation will be similar in the recently allocated] unlicensed 
national information infrastructure (U-NII) band. This 5-GHz band with 300 MHz 
total bandwidth is designed especially to support wideband WLANs [wireless 
local area networks]… As with other unlicensed applications, the possible growth 
of interference in this band due to uncoordinated use is a potential problem for 
which no one has sufficient experience to give a convincing answer yet.
488  
 
Metricom, a provider of unlicensed network access via unlicensed frequencies, has been 
singled out by Prof. Benkler as a prime example of how unlicensed spread spectrum can and 
should work: “The difference between [Metricom’s] Ricochet system and cellular and PCS 
providers is that it is provided not by a licensee or spectrum owner, but by a company that found 
a way to use an environment in which no one exercises control of spectrum use.”
489   In fact, 
Metricom’s experience in unlicensed is informative. Thus far, financial markets have yet to 
embrace unlicensed service providers. While opportunities for unlicensed operation are 
available, relatively few firms provide service and those that do are valued much less highly than 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
487  This was done in January 1997. Nick Wingfield, Wireless Networks Get Radio Patch, CNET N EWS.COM 
(January 9, 1997), www.news.cnet.com/category/0-1003-200-315692.html. 
488  Robert J. Matheson, Spectrum Usage for the Fixed Services, NTIA Report 00-378 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. 
of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Admin., March 2000), 6-7. 




firms operating on exclusive licenses. See Table 11. This reflects a business reality: Where an 
unlicensed firm successfully innovates, open access guarantees imitation. This not only results in 
competition, a problem seen throughout the economy, but may degrade wireless emissions––
perhaps severely. Barring ownership of a patent or other unique asset, economic success spells 




Table 11. Market Values of Licensed and Unlicensed Wireless Data Service Providers 
 
LICENSED 
Company  Annual Revenues  Market Capitalization 
Nextlink Communications  $190.3M  $4,250M 
Teligent, Inc.       6.2M  2,400M 
Winstar Communications   326.8M   2,250M 
Associated Group, Inc.    43.3M   1,290M 
CT Communications, Inc.     4.6M     444M 
American Mobile Satellite    99.1M     630M 
Advanced Radio Telecom          1M    309M 
Data Transmission Network   164.4M     290M 
Nucentrix Broadband Network    71.2M     215M 
SPEEDUS.COM     0.9M      78M 
IJNT.net, Inc.   2.5M  53M 
HighwayMaster Comm.    80.2M      39M 
DBS Industries, Inc.     0.0M      36M 
TOTAL LICENSED  $990.6M   $11,977M 
UNLICENSED 
Metricom, Inc.   $17.3M  $1,010M 
Cellnet Data Systems  18.6M  84M 
SkyLynx Communications  0.7M  24M 
TOTAL UNLICENSED  $36.6M  $1,117M 
Source: Yahoo!Finance, November 1999. 
 
Benkler’s showcase business example has itself abandoned the pure unlicensed spectrum 
model. Metricom, buying licenses for fixed wireless in the FCC’s April 1997 GWS auction, is 
shifting to licensed bands to support higher data rates and to economize on base stations: 
 
                                                         
490  In raising capital for wireless start-ups, David Redick (co-founder of FiberStreet, a very high capacity network 
access provider) and Bill Frezza (general partner, Adams Capital Management, and columnist, Internet Week) 
strongly argue that unlicensed business plans are anathema to investors. Redick’s view was stated to the author on 
August 18, 2000, in Saratoga, California. (The author served on the Board of Advisors to FiberStreet.) Frezza’s 
argument was made publicly at the Cato Institute/Forbes ASAP Technology & Society Conference (San Jose, CA; 
Nov. 4-5, 1999). See also, Bill Frezza, Open Spectrum Access: Profound Policy Or Fool’s Gold? INTERNET WEEK 




Our network will operate in the unlicensed 900 megahertz and 2.4 gigahertz 
frequency bands of spectrum. We also will operate in the 2.3 gigahertz frequency 
band pursuant to licenses purchased from the FCC in 1997. These licenses permit 
us to use the 2.3 gigahertz band in the Northeastern, Central and Western United 
States Regional Economic Areas, and in the St. Louis, Missouri, Portland, Oregon 
and Seattle, Washington Major Economic Areas. This licensed spectrum provides 
us with the ability to transmit at higher power in those regions and thus attain 
greater network coverage with fewer wired access points. In areas not covered by 
our licensed spectrum, we can achieve the same coverage results by deploying 
additional wired access points.
491  
 
 In addition to ponying up millions of dollars for licensed protection from interference, 
Metricom will likely migrate to more intensive use of licensed spectrum in the years to come. 
According to a warning issued to stockholders, spread spectrum technology does not guarantee 
interference-free transmissions:  
 
If we are unable to eliminate harmful interference caused by our products through 
technical or other means or if interference to our service caused by others causes 
the performance of our service to be unattractive to users, we or our users could 
be required to cease operations in the band in the affected locations. Additionally, 
while we design our equipment to operate in the presence of other users, in the 
event the license-free bands become unacceptably crowded, our business could be 
adversely affected.
492   
 
Some unlicensed users attempt to mimic a property rights solution to interference by 
homesteading frequency space in unlicensed bands.
493  Squatter’s rights may be effective in 
policing airwave traffic, even without legal enforcement, where the costs of interference are 
symmetric. Otherwise, FCC rule makings adjudicate competing claims by unlicensed spectrum 
                                                         
491  Metricom, Inc., Annual Report: SEC Form 10-K (March 24, 2000), 18. 
492  Metricom, Inc., Annual Report: SEC Form 10-K (March 24, 2000), 27. 
493  “Fuzion hopes to establish ‘squatter’s rights’ for use of the U-NII spectrum on as broad a basis as possible,’ 
[Fuzion vice president John] Wind said. ‘We’re the first ones anywhere to deploy this (AB) technology, but a lot of 
others are looking at it, including BellSouth,’ he added.” Fred Dawson, US West Looks to Broadband Wireless, 




users.  These demonstrate the standard administrative infirmities, producing use restrictions that 
are either too rigid or too lax.
494  The rule making process often consumes years, is highly 
politicized, and inevitably consumes rent seeking expenditures. For instance, in the unlicensed 
2.4 GHz band, opposing interests recently battled over standards. It was clear that, “regardless of 
the decision, someone’s not going to be happy.”
495   
The “Home RF” coalition
496  argued that Proxim’s RangeLan2 technology be allowed use 
of up to 5 MHz in the band––up from 1 MHz––to run wireless networking appliances. The wider 
bandwidth creates up to a ten-fold increase in speed, to 10 Mbps. Yet, it increases interference 
with other communications in the band. Rival companies supporting “Wi-Fi” technology
497  run 
up to 11 Mbps, and adamantly opposed the Home RF proposal. As 3Com, a WiFi supporter, 
wrote: “The Commission is proposing rule changes that would both crush a nascent industry and 
degrade more than a billion dollars of communications infrastructure… It would undermine the 
high-speed wireless LAN industry, which has just reached the state where widespread 
deployment is around the corner.”
498  
Notably, spread spectrum is not the solution to this problem, but the problem itself––
spread spectrum devices prefer wider bands, and interference across these frequencies disrupts 
other low power transmissions: 
 
Wi-Fi’s technology is “direct sequence,” meaning information flows 
through the same lane on a wireless “highway.” HomeRF’s technology is called, 
“frequency hopping,” meaning the information bounces from lane to lane as it 
travels to its destination. 
                                                         
494  The regulatory bias resulting from incumbent licensee influence at the FCC is also a factor. Licensees may 
attempt to intercede in rule makings either to promote too much, or too little, entry into unlicensed bands. Either 
market failure has the practical effect of protecting competing service providers.  
495  Carmen Nobel, FCC to Rule on Hotly Contested 2.4GHz Band, EWEEK (March 17, 2000), 
http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general/0,11011,2469855,00.html. 
496  Home RF, is supported by Proxim, Intel, Microlore, Siemens AG and Motorola. Ibid.  
497  Wi-Fi supporters include 3Com, Lucent, and Cisco. . Business Wire,  Future of Home Networking Rests on FCC, 
CNET INVESTOR (May 22, 2000), www.cnetinvestor.com/newsitem-fd-bloomberg.asp?symbol=923014. 




HomeRF wants to widen the lanes fivefold, so more information can flow 
through at a faster rate. Wi-Fi supporters are fighting against HomeRF’s proposal 
because they say it will interfere with their technology.
499  
 
Spectrum scarcity leads to a highly contentious “mess” at 2.4 GHz, a “tug-of-war” 
between mutually incompatible demands.
500  Despite the technical abundance assertion, 
unlicensed spectrum use is not free––which is why standards are called for, on the one hand, and 
fiercely debated, on the other. Unlicensed standard setting is likely to be more costly than 
alternative processes undertaken by band managers (licensees with liberal rights to determine 
spectrum use, or spectrum owners under a property rights regime) who internalize economic 
costs and benefits resulting from spectrum use decisions. That is because unlicensed spectrum 
standards are public goods and naturally tend to be underprovided, whereas economic agents 
enjoying private benefits from efficient standards will undertake all costly efforts (including 
search) in pursuit of compensatory benefits. This extends to the investment in research and 
technology innovation, mitigating the risks of appropriation. “’The opposition [to Home RF] is 
asking us to protect something that’s unlicensed,’ the FCC official said. ‘Unlicensed users aren’t 
protected by [sic] interference.’”
501  In the event, the FCC did not protect existing users, granting 





Table 12. Market Values of Exclusive-Use Wireless Licensees: Voice, Paging, Satellite TV 
 




Vodafone AirTouch PLC  5,510   69,200  
Sprint PCS Group    2,100M   38,800  
Nextel Communications  2,940   27,300  
Alltel Corporation   5,540   23,500  
VoiceStream Wireless   355   8,200  
                                                         
499  “A third wireless standard, called Bluetooth, also operates in the 2.4 GHz portion of the spectrum – and 
proponents are also against HomeRF’s proposal… [as it] ‘will cause harmful interference to Bluetooth products,’ 
Bluetooth supporters wrote in a recent letter to the FCC.” Business Wire, Future of Home Networking, supra note 
__. 
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502  Rex Crum, FCC Rules to Speed Up Home Networking, UPSIDETODAY (Aug. 31, 2000), 




United States Cellular     1,370   7,620  
Centurytel, Inc.   408   5,620  
Omnipoint   256   4,420  
Western Wireless    581   4,150  
Aerial Communications    211   2,660  
Triton PCS Holdings     55   2,480  
Centennial Cellular       409   1,740  
Globalstar Telecommunications  0  1,720  
Powertel, Inc.      224   1,650  
Price Communications   226   1,140  
CoreComm Limited   22   1,050  
Leap Wireless International      4  829  
Commnet Cellular Inc.  200   721  
Rural Cellular        149   461  
Clariti Telecommunications Int’l  28   321  
CFW Communications   12   290  
Arch Communications Group   442   240  
PageMart Wireless  324   193  
Paging Network, Inc.    1,040   98  
Shenandoah Telecommunications       4  94  
Shared Technologies Cellular        28   76  
Metrocall   569   63  
Iridium World Communications       2  60  
Aquis Communications   15   19  
Chadmore Wireless Group   5  8 
U.S. Digital Communications   2  6 
Teletouch Communications   52  3 
Northeast Digital Networks    1  1 
Hughes Electronics Corp.  6,920  15,800 
Pegasus  304  2,170 
EchoStar  1,370  21,600 
TOTAL  26,168  244,303 
Source: YAHOO!FINANCE, November 1999, January 2000. 
 
The essential benefit of unlicensed spectrum is allowing use of fallow airwaves without 
the barrier of FCC allocation and licensing. The trouble with the existing regime for licensed 
spectrum is that it affords excessive protection to incumbents. The problem with unlicensed 
rules, however, is that they afford too little protection. The regulatory approach may be salvaged, 
or at least understood, by dividing the issue of unlicensed into three component parts:  
(a) bands allocated to unlicensed spectrum use 
(b) localized low-power unlicensed spectrum use 
(c) long-distance low-power unlicensed spectrum use. 
 
Bands allocated to unlicensed spectrum use. There is no regulatory justification for 
regulating which bands offer service on an integrated versus open-access basis. An effective 
band manager may establish the optimal way to deliver services. The standard existing option is 




effectively mandated by FCC rules. Rules permitting contracting out would allow for the 
efficient construction of wireless parks or malls. Just as a shopping mall developer provides the 
infrastructure and ancillary facilities (common areas, parking, etc.), private developers exercising 
legal control of access to radio spectrum could promote frequency sharing by numerous users, 
establishing protocols to maximize value.  
The private de facto or de jure owner would enjoy significant advantages over a 
government regulator in discerning, and instituting, efficient standards. By utilizing contracts 
establishing terms of entry, both the band manager and spectrum users would have incentives to 
create long-run solutions yielding the most productive use of a given band. Users would 
negotiate terms in a market setting, paying for favorable terms depending upon their demand 
(determined by consumer preferences and the availability of alternatives).  While private contract 
enforcement is not costless, it side-steps the very expensive hold-ups inherent in FCC regulation 
of unlicensed bands. There, incumbent users essentially enjoy veto power over new allocations 
or rule changes, and can successfully hold up progressive improvements in band usage pending a 
generous share of the rents generated. 
Neither the monopoly problem nor the transaction cost problem is a serious objection to 
such an approach. Market power is directly attacked by liberal spectrum allocation policies. 
Rules that generally allow flexible, competitive use of bands is the most reliable remedy to 
market power; indeed, incumbent interests are protected by so-called unlicensed allocations that 
fail to offer serious competitive investments in the markets they serve. This is largely the case 
today, where substantial investments in wireless services are made almost exclusively in the 
licensed sector (see Tables 11 and 12). It is also straightforward that flexible rules for band 
managers will allow licensing of manufacturers of wireless equipment rather than individual 
users. While millions may use cordless phones, the effective owner of a band reserving spectrum 
space for cordless phone access can minimize transaction costs by collecting fees from a much 
smaller number of vendors. This mimics FCC procedures, as well as the widespread use of 
patent licensing. Literally thousands of firms generate substantial revenues (in some cases, most 
or all firm revenues) from licensing their technology for use by other firms. Mass market 
consumers purchase products––say, CDMA phones manufactured by Motorola or Ericsson––and 




access would be analogous, and many competing firms could simultaneously market devices or 
provide services in licensed or owned spectrum.  
  The argument that the market will under-provide such licensing agreements (or “open 
access” bands) is uncompelling. But, were it plausible, the solution would lie not in continued 
top-down allocation of unlicensed bands by regulators, but in incremental fixes within a 
competitive system. Those might include tax reductions for spectrum “parks,” or other 
inducements favoring contracting out over vertical integration.   
Localized low-power unlicensed spectrum. For devices used in very localized 
applications, there is a strong argument for open access. That is because effective control over 
airwave space is not sacrificed by allowing users to impose interference costs on themselves. The 
standard examples would entail local area network products for office or home use. It is not 
necessary to police emissions from a wireless printer-PC link––say, degraded UHF TV signals in 
an adjacent room––if the costs fall on the PC user and no other. The PC user simply adjusts 
his/her demand for the product, and use of the product, according to costs incurred. This demand 
effect influences seller behavior in product design and ultimate product sales. There is perhaps a 
labeling requirement on the part of the vendor, but free access to localized airwaves does not 
appear a public policy problem. A liberal spectrum regime would also create the opportunity for 
competing local area wireless standards. Not only would localized devices be given free access 
to spectrum, band managers would be free to use higher emission levels in exclusive use bands 
to promote alternatives. Indeed, technology suppliers could individually or through consortia 
purchase rights to spectrum, standardizing on preferred systems. In the recent debate over 
unlicensed local area networks, a competitive system would naturally gravitate to a standards 
competition decided by actual choices between Home RF, WiFi, and Bluetooth networks. 
Instead, under block allocation, the FCC imposes one set of transmission rules produced by 
compromise and optimized for none. It does so in its theoretical (even if politicized) model as to 
what will be best for the public interest, pre-empting an actual market test. 
Long-distance low-power unlicensed spectrum use. The FCC’s reticence to approve ultra-
wideband (UWB) technology as a generic low-power application is curious given the fact that 
legal devices like Pentium chips emit higher radiation levels in incidental operation (i.e., without 
providing wireless communications service). The agency’s reflex in separating intentional from 




from wireless communications service, the authority to “pollute” predictably encourages more 
congestion. If the technology proves valuable to consumers, potentially large increases in 
congestion result. The non-communications device emits pollution that is largely localized; a 
free ride on congestion does not materially affect manufacturer incentives to limit emissions 
because its harmful effects impact the customer. The cost of congestion is internalized. 
With UWB and other low-power technologies, emissions ride for many miles. Indeed, the 
systems compete with wide area networks and long-distance communications. Relieving entrants 
of responsibility for emissions allows pollution to be deposited in distant, and not easily 
identified, localities. The claim of UWB proponents is that the costs are small; power levels are 
so miniscule that even massive increases in UWB use will not amount to anything more than 
background noise. Of course, the background noise of today is the communications conduit of 
tomorrow––that is the precise claim of UWB champions. No one can ascertain how important 
the external damage will prove. Hence, the safe and effective solution to long-distance low-
power transmissions is to define property rights and treat the power increments used by low-
power service providers as exclusive use spectrum. They may be defined as “underlay rights,” 
composed only of low-power (extremely low, defined typically in millionths of a watt) blocks 
for emissions defined in frequency space.
503  Under existing procedures, for instance, the FCC 
could define a license as covering 5 millionths of a watt of power between 2 and 4 GHz, with 
similar power allocations being licensed from 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, 10-15, 15-20 GHz, and so on.
504  
Several licenses could be allocated per band, up to the ceiling set by the “noise floor” limits 
extended licensees transmitting over the underlay rights.  If UWB advocates are correct, licenses 
will be easily affordable for parties––perhaps consortia––purchasing rights in order to lease 
access to UWB manufacturers. That is because any one of the competitive licenses would serve 
to accommodate virtually an unlimited number of devices. Importantly, efficient algorithms 
allowing maximum bandwidth use would be possible given private control over access. 
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XII.  DEREGULATION PAST  
Important lessons are available in the numerous spectrum policy reforms taking place in 
the U.S. or abroad. We have learned that, despite (rational) political resistance from interest 
groups, allowing firms greater flexibility to use radio waves results in improvements for 
consumers without offsetting losses. Tragedy of the commons does not appear, nor do public 
goods suffer under-investment. As discussed below, both problems are strong reasons for 
liberalization. The short review of past reforms illustrates the orderly manner in which efficiency 
gains can be realized by shifting spectrum use decisions from administrative rule makings to 
markets. 
Perhaps the earliest identifiable domestic spectrum deregulation occurred in 1964. The 
Federal Communications Commission then allowed limited use of occupied frequencies by land 
mobile operators who assumed liability for any resulting interference.
505  This effectively (if 
partially) reallocated these frequencies according to market demand. Importantly, private 
responsibility policed interference––an alternative mechanism to public interest rules.
506   
Not many such examples are found until more recent times. In the early 1980s, the FCC 
approved general waivers requested by some licensees permitting enhanced use of spectrum 
beyond that originally planned in the initial allocation. One instance involved the sub-carrier 
channels used by broadcasters for paging, dispatch, data and other services. Another permitted 
instructional television licensees in the microwave band to lease their channel space to “wireless 
cable” companies.
 507  Television stations were permitted to use the vertical blanking interval for 
delivering additional signals, notably for closed captioning of TV programs and teletext data 
transfer.
508  In 1991, the FCC waiver granted Fleet Call allowed SMR dispatch licenses to be used 
for cellular telephone service, as detailed earlier in this paper.
509  This was a formidable departure 
from block allocation orthodoxy. 
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Common Carrier Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service 
Pursuant to the success of Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) as a wireless entrant 
in the long-distance telephone market,
510  the Federal Communications Commission received a 
number of applications to provide additional point-to-point fixed microwave radio service on a 
common carrier basis (CCPMRS). Many of these proposed services would create interference 
with each other. Instead of pursuing the standard spectrum allocation procedure, which would 
entail selecting among the mutually exclusive proposals, the Commission issued rules for all 
applicants to access the CCPMRS band.  
The essential features were as follows.
511  First, exclusive licenses were issued to 
microwave service providers. These licenses permitted access to unoccupied frequency space 
(i.e., the right to create non-interfering transmissions) and to "additional capacity... that they are 
likely" to require with future growth. To obtain such rights, CCPMRS licenses mandated that 
operators not interfere with any previously established communications service. Hence, de facto 
property rights to spectrum were awarded on an open entry basis. 
Second, applicants were themselves responsible for creating and filing engineering plans 
which would allow their service to be delivered in a non-interfering transmission mode. Third, 
the Commission did not mandate interference parameters. Instead, the definition of interference 
was left to users. FCC engineer and policy analyst John Williams described the outcome of this 
bold departure from precedent in a 1986 Commission study: 
 
Perhaps the interesting aspect of the CCPMRS technical regulations is what they 
do not contain. Except for the antenna point rule (and of course the general 
allocation constraint) there are no a priori  restrictions on the selection, location or 
orientation of specific frequency assignments. There are no prior allotments of 
channels to markets, as in the broadcast services; no pre-channelizations of the 
band, as in the-private microwave and most other services; and no minimum 
mileage separations as in the private land mobile services. Perhaps most notable 
of all is the absence of even a working definition of harmful interference. 
Individual licensees are allowed to set their own protection ratios. While this 
could theoretically lead to abuses or confusion, that apparently has not happened. 
                                                         




Whether because of the threat of appeal to the Commission or possible retaliation 
against one's own future applications, or perhaps just an unwritten code of ethics, 
there appear to be few cases in which licensees have been unreasonably protective 
of their facilities. In fact, while the Commission has not required it, a consensus 
appears to have emerged for adherence to a single, uniform set of interference 




Within a private rights framework, decentralized spectrum management proved effective: 
"the regulatory approach seems to be working quite well.
513   Administrative costs were shifted 
from regulators to private parties attempting to access spectrum: "These policies ensure that 
interference conflicts are resolved through private negotiations before applications are filed.”
514  
The change in liability created social gains by eliminating free rider and common property 
inefficiencies: "these policies allocate interference avoidance costs to applicants, thus 
encouraging system designs and frequency selections that minimize interference and [insure] that 
each new use ultimately implemented has a value at least as great as the cost of interference it 
causes.”
515  
PCS Rules v. the Cellular Allocation 
The contrast in regulatory strategies used to allocate spectrum for PCS vs. cellular is 
striking.
516   The cellular rule making was initiated in 1968, with licenses awarded (in the first 
thirty markets by comparative hearings, in the final 704 markets by lottery) between 1984 and 
1989. The PCS rule making officially opened in 1990, with licenses issued by auction between 
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1995 and (at least) 2000. While spectrum allocation advanced under similar administrative 
constraints, regulatory outcomes differed widely. PCS licenses were more numerous per market, 
granted operators relatively wide latitude in selecting standards and services, and encompassed 
larger regions. In an important FCC innovation, licenses contained “overlay rights,” allowing 
new PCS operators to access frequency space already in use, allocating it according to market 
incentives. 
Overlay Rights. The 1850-1990 MHz band allocated to PCS was already in use, 
providing about 4,500 point-to-point microwave links for railroads, oil drilling rigs, utilities, and 
local governments.
517  These incumbent users encumbered a small fraction of total band capacity, 
but possessed a strategic position in regulatory proceedings that could be used to block re-
allocation. The microwave incumbents strenuously argued that they provided crucial services to 
vital industries and to public safety. Any relocation of existing services was branded a threat to 
life and property.
 518  Political impasse ensued, stalling the PCS rule making.  
The FCC eventually resolved the situation by creating overlay rights.
519  These allowed 
PCS operators to use allocated spectrum while respecting (not interfering with) incumbents. Over 
a multi-year period incumbents would be relocated to higher frequencies.
520  If the PCS licensee 
desired an incumbent to move earlier than the deadline imposed, thus making valuable bandwidth 
available for use, it could negotiate compensation to achieve such a result. Despite bargaining 
costs,
521  the system basically worked. Airwaves were moved from an underutilized allocation and 
opened to more intense usage offering enhanced consumer surplus. Indeed, the ratio of benefits to 
opportunity costs in the PCS band re-allocation is startling.  
The upper bound on the cost of microwave relocation was established during the spectrum 
allocation debate. Incumbent microwave licensees sponsored a study estimating it would cost up 
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to $1 billion to relocate to unused frequencies provided by the FCC at 4, 6, and 12 GHz.
522  This 
implied that a nationwide swath of 140 MHz could be effectively "bought" for about $4 per pop, 
with existing users fully compensated for moving to different frequencies. This was approximately 
1.25% of the 1990 market value of cellular telephone licenses, allocated 50 MHz (25 MHz for 
each of two licenses per market).
523  Looked at from the reverse angle, there was an 80-to1 
productivity improvement in the re-allocation of 1850-1990 MHz from existing uses to PCS (not 
adjusting for the difference in bandwidth).
524  The ensuing auctions for PCS licenses brought in 
much less than the per-MHz-per-pop valuations for cellular telephone licenses, likely due to 
increased competitiveness (which distributes gains to consumers rather than producers). The PCS 
auctions, nonetheless, raised over ten billion dollars. Hence, the efficiency gains in re-allocating 
the 1850-1990 band from microwave to PCS, by the most conservative estimates, exceeded 
1000%.
525  Overlay rights help unlock these gains by allowing PCS licensees to use cost-benefit 
calculations to execute efficient trades. Overlays establish property rights for both incumbents and 
entrants. Market transactions then determine efficient resource use within the band, taking into 
account technology, embedded base, switching costs, investor risk, and consumer demand. In 
short, a textbook application of the Coase Theorem.
526  
License Flexibility over Standards and Services. The FCC mandated that cellular 
telephone systems be constructed according to the analog Advanced Mobile Phone Standard 
(AMPS), a decision that appears to have blocked technical progress and economic efficiency. 
According to one leading expert, "The story of analog cellular radio will be written in vivid 
hindsight as one of the classic technological miscues of modem history, on a par with, say, the 
Zeppelin airship.”
527  Digital technologies were permitted in 1988, but the FCC rule change came 
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late for metropolitan cellular systems (where the capacity advantages of digital technology are 
most valuable) having already completed or, at least, commenced construction.
528  This 
relaxation, interestingly, came in response to a request to mandate cellular carrier 
interoperability, with the Commission deciding to give individual licensees flexibility to choose 
a standard. The Commission soon after also relaxed prohibitions on services to be offered by 
cellular operators, permitting paging, for instance, in 1990.
529  
In contrast, PCS operators were given substantial freedom to select technical standards 
from the beginning. The result has been a standards competition among three digital mobile 
wireless rivals: GSM (global mobile service standard), TDMA (time division multiple access) 
and CDMA (code division multiple access). Each boasts advantages and disadvantages, and a 
healthy debate rages over which will prove the superior long-run technology. In fact, the 
adoption of each of the three standards by different PCS providers suggests that the competitive 
race is fairly close. That is because operators have strong incentives to select standards which 
consumers prefer and which will have long-run viability. Their selections factor in such 
considerations as the embedded base (pushing down equipment costs via economies of scale), 
functionality (including roaming capabilities), and expandability (including the capacity for 
emerging data services).  
The relatively broad PCS service definition embedded in the FCC’s rule making impacts 
directly on both the technology issue and voluntary reallocation of radio spectrum. The PCS 
licensee was permitted, via a 1996 amendment to the rules, to subdivide the license’s allocated 
bandwidth. In this manner, firms or other third parties wishing to utilize radio waves could lease 
bandwidth from the PCS licensee.
530  This is particularly important in the developing market for 
wireless, high-speed Internet access, and other innovative services for which demand is as yet 
uncertain.  
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Larger Service Areas. The atomized U.S. cellular market, creating some 734 non-
overlapping franchises, whereas no other major country created more than ten.
531  While the large 
number of licenses created by this policy was popular with Congress, it created substantial lags 
in licensing; even under the lottery method, individual applications had to be processed by the 
Commission. Moreover, after licenses were issued, the forced deconcentration of the national 
cellular market imposed high roaming costs on consumers and led to a long string of mergers, 
joint ventures and consolidations that is yet ongoing. While a fraction of total re-aggregation 
costs, the brokerage fees associated with license sales were alone estimated by the FCC at over 
$190 million annually.
532  
PCS licenses were delineated more broadly, with 51 Major Trading Areas (MTAs) and 
493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs), divisions made in a Rand McNally mapping of business 
markets in the United States. Two PCS licenses were issued in each MTA, four in each BTA 
map. (See Table 13.)  The advent of license auctions facilitated this process, allowing instant 
aggregation of licenses across markets. While the PCS auctions were broken into several parts, 
PCS operators could bid to acquire regional or national footprints. Aggregating licenses within a 
market, enabling bandwidth increases, was permitted up to a 45 MHz “spectrum cap.”
533  
 
Table 13. Cellular v. PCS Allocation 
 






Restrictions in addition to  
Spectrum Cap 
Cellular A  16-21  25 MHz  734  Wireline 
Cellular B  16-21  25 MHz  734  Non-wireline 
PCS A  7  30 MHz  51 (MTAs)   
PCS B  7  30 MHz  51 (MTAs)   
PCS C  11+  30 MHz  493 (BTAs)  Designated Entity 
PCS D  8  10 MHz  51 (BTAs)   
PCS E  8  10 MHz  51 (BTAs)   
PCS F  11+  10 MHz  493 (BTAs)  Designated Entity 
SMR  40+  10 MHz     
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More Spectrum, More Competitors. The PCS allocation notably spawned competition. 
The cellular allocation, while rejecting the “natural monopoly” argument suggesting only one 
licensee could survive per market, nonetheless produced a duopoly scheme that resulted in 
anemic rivalry. This is clearly seen in the price reaction to PCS entry. In 1998, an analyst cited 
by the FCC estimated that average mobile telephone rates fell 20 percent, while the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics puts the 1999 rate decline at 11.4%. These rate reductions, and concomitantly 
large increases in mobile telephone subscriber penetration, are attributed to the advent of PCS 
competition by the FCC.
534   
 This could be the result of additional spectrum in use or more competition between 
licensees. What demonstrates the anti-competitive output restriction of cellular providers under 
the original cell-phone duopoly is that the incumbents responded to PCS by dramatically 
increasing their subscribership. Rates have not fallen due to decreased pressure to access cellular 
systems; those bands are used more intensively than ever. New cellular capacity has been 
“found” via investments adding cell sites and base stations. Competitive entry created this pro-
consumer result––revealing an overly conservative license allocation in cellular. 
WCS and 39 GHz 
 Some post-PCS spectrum allocations have exhibited, and extended, the relatively liberal 
rules used successfully in PCS. In particular, the service definitions for “General Wireless 
Communications” and “39 GHz” have been broad, allowing latitude for market participants to 
determine spectrum deployments and technical standards. While the Commission has mitigated 
the effect (in the case of WCS) by imposing tight power limits effectively precluding valuable 
(mobile) wireless services, the marketplace model operates well over the range of choice 
allowed. 
Regulatory rigidity is defeated by vague service categories in radio station authorizations. 
Hence, licenses defined generically as “Wireless Communications Services” and “39 GHz” 
permit relatively flexible use. There is no “physical scarcity” of bureaucratically restrictive 
service titles, and this seemingly trivial turn in nomenclature is an indicator of policy progress. In 
WCS, the FCC permits licensees to "provide any fixed, mobile, radio location services, or 
satellite Digital Audio Radio Services (‘satellite DARS’), consistent with the international Radio 
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535  The service definition is pointedly broad, with the Commission specifically 
citing several types of permissible service. In addressing which of these services, if any, will 
ultimately be selected by the winning applicants, the Commission agnostically writes: "We 
anticipate that the most likely uses of WCS will be..."
536   
The Commission relies, albeit in a restrictive and perhaps overly conservative manner, on 
interference parameters in defining WCS licenses. It focuses on what power levels and emission 
standards will protect communications in adjacent bands.  
 
Geographic scope is also thrown open to the market in WCS: 
 
[W]e are proposing to allow WCS licensees to desegregate portions of their 
assigned spectrum and partition geographic service areas through a transfer of 
FCC license authority. In addition, licensees would be permitted to "franchise" 
portions of their spectrum and geographic service areas on a leased basis, where 
the WCS licensee would retain ultimate responsibility for meeting interference 
and other licensing requirements.
537  
 
The departure from previous FCC allocations, including PCS, is important. This newer 
methodology reverses the traditional block allocation process wherein the rule making focuses 
on the cost and benefits associated with the licensed service, and interference issues are decided 
when the specific technology to be used in the allocated band is mandated. When freedom is 
granted licensees to determine services and standards, then the Commission must establish 
explicit interference contours. 
 Similarly, the FCC allocation for 39 GHz was very liberal by historical standards: “39 
GHz licensees may provide fixed communications including point-to-point and point-to-
multipoint communications. Mobile communications are subject to the development of inter-
licensee and inter-service interference criteria.”
538  These licenses have been auctioned and are 
being incorporated into national fixed wireless broadband networks being constructed by 
Winstar and Advanced Radio Telecom. For these particular frequencies, the permissive 
regulatory regime comes close to the claim that it allows the market to allocate radio spectrum.  
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The FCC has found that the search for solutions to airwave congestion in open access 
bands naturally leads to property rights. Private Land Mobile Radio (PLMR) bands have 
traditionally been allocated on a shared basis, leading to unacceptable degrees of congestion. 
Despite the availability of new techniques to use PLMR frequencies more intensely, sharing 
rules have proven ineffective. The FCC’s Wireless Telecommunications Bureau recently 
considered the possible options, including “how certain market-based incentives such as 
exclusivity with the right to lease excess capacity, spectrum user fees, and/or competitive 
bidding can be introduced into the PLMR bands to promote more efficient use of this 
spectrum.”
539  
The Bureau noted that the in the PLMR bands used for community repeater stations 
“licensees sought and received regulatory relief from the FCC… on a non-profit cost-shared 
cooperation basis.” Such “multiple licensing” allowed prime relay stations to serve multiple 
users. The arrangement yielded such efficiencies that “third party entrepreneurs” went into 
business, investing in facilities offering service to licensees who technically “shared” the use of 
the frequency under FCC rules.
540   
 Before 1958, users of shared PLMR bands
541  were mandated to coordinate via direct 
negotiations. Then, however, private frequency coordinators were introduced to police 
transmissions so as to cause the “least amount of interference.”
542  While PLMR license 
applicants could bypass these coordinators by conducting their own “field study” to determine 
where they should be allowed to transmit, the Commission eliminated this option in 1986. This 
removed the FCC from the technical business of interference mitigation, after certifying one 
private frequency coordinator per band (except for the Specialized Mobile Radio services band, 
where multiple coordinators were allowed). This not only indicates the Commission’s concern 
over the necessity of maintaining coordination in shared bands, but indicates that the actual 
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logistics of directing traffic are best handled in complex, multiple-user situations by private firms 
or organizations––as per the revealed preference of the FCC.
543   
Senator Pressler's Proposal for TV Band Overlay Rights 
An ambitious proposal to promote spectrum liberalization was advanced by a powerful 
member of congress in the Spring of 1996. The legislation crossed over a Line of Regulatory 
Death, challenging not only the sanctity of FCC spectrum allocation, but brushing aside TV 
broadcasting’s special role in the palace guard surrounding “public interest” regulation. Not only 
did the idea fall into the waste bin of political non-starters, its author––Chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee––soon tumbled into the abyss. Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) was the only 
incumbent U.S. Senator to be defeated for re-election in Nov. 1996.  
 That the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee embraced a radical plan to 
improve competitiveness in the wireless communications sector, however, is meaningful. In 
hindsight, it is clear that had Pressler’s idea moved into law, the U.S. would today be far ahead 
of global competitors (as it is not, today) in developing and deploying so-called 3G wireless 
technology.  
On May 9, 1996, Pressler introduced a “discussion draft” of legislation he called the 
“Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Policy Reform and Privatization Act.”
544  The measure, 
said Pressler, was intended to continue the reform path begun in the Telecommunications Act, 
signed into law by President Clinton Feb. 8, 1996. Specifically, the Senator warned that without 
better regulatory approaches, “a vast array of new spectrum-based products, services, and 
technologies will go unrealized for the American people.”
545  To avert this outcome, and to 
jettison an “antiquated model [wherein] the Government––not consumers––decides who uses 
frequencies, what they are used for, and how they are used,”
546  the legislation laid out five major 
reforms.  
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1.  Exhaustive allocation and licensing. The FCC would be mandated to allocate 
all requested bands for private use, assigning licenses via auction. Existing 
wireless users in such bands would be protected from interference; entrants 
would have subordinate rights.  
2.  Full flexibility for existing licensees. This would allow wireless users to 
provide whatever services, via whatever standards, the market would support, 
subject only to non-interference rules. Licensees would essentially own, and be 
responsible for, the airspace within the interference contours of currently 
licensed services. “Simply put, frequencies should be treated more like private 
property.”
547  
3.  Spectrum privatization. The federal government, claiming “nearly one-third” 
of frequency space,
548  was ordered to “relinquish one-quarter of its spectrum 
stockpile.”
549   
4.  TV band overlay rights. TV broadcasters would receive new digital TV 
licenses, paying only a deposit (refunded when analog station licenses were 
turned back to the FCC). No standard would be mandated for digital TV, and 
broadcasters could use assigned channel bandwidth to provide non-TV 
services in addition to––entirely in place of––broadcasting. All radio spectrum 
in the 402 MHz TV band was to be allocated to overlay licenses assigned via 
auction. Winning bidders would have the right to use all bandwidth not 
encumbered by current analog TV or future digital TV stations, “A market-
based alternative to a Government mandated and dictated transition policy.”
550   
5.  Public safety. Instead of the FCC regulating local fire, police and emergency 
communications, blocks of spectrum rights would be granted to all 50 state 
officials (as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Virgin Islands). These jurisdictions would be free to use spectrum in a flexible, 
non-interfering manner. 
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The proposal was bold. It generated little support and, while a rival plan was advanced by 
Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) who would assume the Commerce Committee chair upon Pressler’s 
defeat,
551  neither were enacted. The spectrum allocation system was not liberalized, and the TV 
band is still vastly under-utilized, as analog and digital TV transmissions continue to use only a 
fraction of available bandwidth. (See discussion below.) 
New Zealand's "band management rights" 
 In the Radiocommunications Act of 1989, New Zealand undertook far-reaching reform of 
wireless telecommunications policy.
552  The measure introduced government plans to auction 
both "apparatus licenses" and "spectrum management rights." The former are analogous to 
licenses issued by the FCC––essentially operating permits for physical equipment and specific 
businesses. The latter category, however, allows private parties to determine radio wave usage. 
The band manager issues licenses to wireless operators (including itself), and is responsible for 
emissions generated within the band (including those that interfere with communications in other 
bands). The band management rights maximize spectrum flexibility, as rights are constrained 
only by interference parameters. As the New Zealand Ministry of Commerce states:  
 
A "management right" to a range of frequencies (i.e. frequency "band") entitles 
the owner of that right, known as the manager, to issue "licenses" either 
authorizing persons to transmit radio waves or to ensure specified levels of 
interference are not exceeded... A key characteristic of management rights is that 
they carry with them no requirement that limits use to any specific 
telecommunications or broadcasting application.
553  
 
 The Ministry of Commerce has produced thoughtful analyses of its mission in overseeing 
the provisions of the 1989 Radiocommunications Act.
554   New Zealand’s regulatory structure has 
adapted to band management rights by becoming more transparent, establishing clear rights for 
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market participants. The "Register of Radio Frequencies," a computerized publicly-accessible 
database, was created to track both technical and legal aspects of spectrum use.  "Management 
rights and licenses are recorded in a public register which also tracks mortgages, caveats and 
changes of ownership in a similar manner to land."
555  The Register invites entrepreneurs to 
assess available opportunities in providing wireless services: An underutilized band implies a 
profitable investment opportunity.  
The first band management rights covered spectrum previously targeted for cellular 
telephone or microwave, multipoint distribution service (MMDS). The management rights 
granted winning bidders gave licensees the freedom to utilize these frequencies for other 
services. Such users are subject to the incentives of economic efficiency the targeting of already 
allocated radio spectrum blocks allowed any efficiencies from the administrative planning 
already achieved (in coordination, of course, with international spectrum assignments and 
equipment standards popular elsewhere) while permitting band manager flexibility to take 
advantage competing alternatives which might be discovered. 
 
New Zealand band management rights were created with explicit borders defined by two 
metrics: 
 
• AFEL––adjacent frequencies emission limit 
• PL––protection limit 
 
The AFEL of band A is the maximum allowable "spillover" from A to other bands. The 
PL is the maximum level of interference from other bands. This is analogous to a "noise floor." 
While the initial rules prompted this PL to be set sufficiently high such that various low powered 
devices would easily fall under the floor (while keeping the Crown, which sells management 
rights to private parties, to escape liability for minor interference), the Ministry has proposed 
tightening the interference protection or abolishing it altogether. The technical reason is that 
certain new communications applications, including "spread spectrum," usefully operate in the 
low power "noise floor" zone, while the economic reason is that leaving any space without an 
effective owner may cause perverse resource use (a tragedy of the commons).  
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This view is reflected in the Ministry's bias against unlicensed, or "shared," spectrum.  
Private band managers have profit incentives to promote intensive use of their bandwidth by 
contracting with multiple users, networks, or wireless device manufacturers. A computer maker, 
for instance, could negotiate to produce wireless modems for local area networks by accessing 
spectrum space it is licensed to use by a private band manager. In commenting on requests to 
allocate "non-exclusive bands," the Ministry notes that shared use is entirely possible in privately 
managed bands where the band manager "retains responsibility for all transmission."
556  It goes 
on to say: "The concept of a non-exclusive management right is altogether different... The 
Ministry is not attracted to this concept. This could involve substantial transactions costs and 
intractable interference problems."
557   
The New Zealand market has experienced only moderate growth in its wireless 
telecommunications sector since spectrum deregulation. Robert Crandall notes that the 
regulatory model adopted still gave considerable discretion to administrators who decide which 
services shall be licensed and what bands shall be governed by management rights.
558  Crandall 
also believes the limited success is due to the difficulty in promoting new uses in a small market; 
scale economies in equipment manufacturing render such markets hostage to progress in larger 
countries.
559  Yet, one clear lesson is that defining spectrum rights in terms of generic interference 
parameters has not led to chaos. Regulators are not forced by wireless technology to limit rights, 
issuing only permits to transmit with specific equipment. Pablo Spiller and Carlo Cardillo find 
that this experience demonstrates that “spectrum property rights… are an immediately viable 
option.”
560   And some informed New Zealanders believe that their reforms will move their 
economy "beyond the protectionist and prescriptive model inherent in telecommunications since 
the ITU [International Telecommunications Union] was formed over 130 years ago."
561  
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Spectrum Liberalization in Guatemala
562 
 An even more interesting story is unfolding in Guatemala, the country with perhaps the 
most liberal radio spectrum regulatory policy in the world. There the wireless licensee gains an 
explicit right to radio frequencies: Titulo de Usufructo de Frequencia (TUF). Rather than TUFs 
being allocated and assigned by the state, users petition the state for rights to control unoccupied 
frequencies. The rights are awarded on request. Auctions are used when competing claims are 
made. Hence, the market––not bureaucrats––allocates radio waves. 
The spectrum allocation system was revamped in a sweeping November 1996 law.
563  
“The basic building block of Guatemala’s approach to the spectrum is that all spectrum not 
currently assigned to [users]… can be requested by any person.”
564   Allocation of Guatemalan 
radio spectrum is bottom-up. This sharply differs from top-down block allocation, with 
bandwidth use administratively determined. The apparent success of the reform provide clues as 
to the practical elements to be included in spectrum liberalization schemes elsewhere. 
First, an independent regulatory body was established, the Superintendent of 
Telecommunications (SIT). Under the previous state telecommunications monopoly, there were 
no private firms to regulate.
565  Alternatively, existing courts––or a newly established Spectrum 
Court (with technical expertise)––could have enforced the new law.
566  The newly created body 
was conceived as an administrator to enforce specified rules. The broad political discretion of the 
public interest standard is not allowed the SIT, which––like law enforcement agencies or the 
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courts––assumes a reactive role. Essentially, the SIT is constituted to respond to private claims 
and to adjudicate disputes over airwave rights.
567  
Second, a registry of all uses of the communications spectrum was produced by the SIT. 
This computerized database is, by law, easily accessible to the public. This was a vital step in 
creating transparency for private wireless users (and potential users). It effectively displays 
information on telecommunications opportunities, easing entry into unoccupied bands. 
Third, existing users were granted flexibility in the use of radio waves. Frequencies 
assigned to licenses may be employed according to market conditions so long as emissions are 
confined to the original bandwidth assigned. Since the state telecommunications monopoly, 
Guatel (now privatized under the name Telgua), was the dominant incumbent in Guatemala, this 
firm was grandfathered with over 900 frequency rights, as were radio and television broadcasters 
and the erstwhile cellular monopolist, ComCel.  
 Fourth, entrepreneurs, firms, or organizations wishing to access frequencies are allowed 
to petition the SIT for the right to use any unoccupied bandwidth. The process goes as follows: 
 
• A private party surveys existing spectrum use in the spectrum registry. 
• The party applies to the SIT for the right to unused frequencies. 
• The application is evaluated and public notice issued. Parties objecting to the 
proposed new use file formal complaints. Grounds for opposition are limited to 
technical interference.  
• Complaints, if any, are quickly adjudicated via binding arbitration. 
• Other spectrum users are allowed to file competing claims to requested bandwidth 
rights. 
• If no competing claims filed, then petitioner receives rights without auction (or 
payment). 
• If competing claims filed, then the SIT must quickly schedule competitive bidding 
process to determine ultimate licensee. 
• Rights extend 15 years and are renewable (without competitive bidding) at the 
discretion of the user. 
• Rights are freely tradable 
• Regulation is limited to interfering emissions. 
 
The result of this law is observed in the wireless license itself. (See license form, below.)  
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Instead of merely licensing a particular business or “radio station,” as in the U.S. (see Figure 9), 
the Guatemalan wireless licensee effectively owns the spectrum resource for a limited time 
period (fifteen years). The TUF is defined in a one-page form listing six basic variables: 
 
(a) frequency 
(b) location (included on actual TUFs but not a line item in the form) 
(c) hours of operation 
(d) maximum power transmitted 
(e) maximum power emitted at the border of adjacent frequencies 
(f) duration of right (beginning and ending) 
 
As in New Zealand, the small market status of Guatemala has a pronounced impact. Yet, 
the benefits of spectrum flexibility are apparent. Unlike El Salvador, where a similar 1996 
reform ended abruptly when the appointed regulator followed the law by issuing a petitioned 
radio license and was instantly sacked by the ruling party, the Guatemalan law has been 
observed.
568  Despite similar political pressures to protect incumbent interests, requested TUFs 
have generally been issued. All told, over 3,400 new rights were awarded under the spectrum 
reforms as of March 2000. See Table 14. Both the FM radio market and the cellular telephone 
markets have seen substantial entry since liberalization.
569  In the latter market, four operators are 
now licensed with three operational. (BellSouth plans to begin operations in late 2000.) Entry 





Table 14. Spectrum Rights Issued by Guatemalan SIT 
Source: SIT (March 2000) 
 




Rights issued by 
competitive bidding 
3724  930  918  1876 
100%  25.0%  24.7%  50.4% 
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569  The government did manage to delay the issuance of new licenses under the spectrum reform until after the state 
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While awaiting more comprehensive analysis, the preliminary results in Guatemala are 
strongly positive. Cell-phone subscribership rose from 64,197 at year-end 1997 to 570,000 as of 
August 2000. See Table 15. Annualized subscriber growth, 133%, was impressive both 
absolutely and relative to the same period growth in telephone lines supplied by the recently 
privatized monopoly system. Telgua saw its land line count increase just 17%, annualized, over 
the same 31-month period. In other words, cellular phone penetration rose from just 15% of 
wireline, to 89%. The steep and rapid rise in wireless is correlated with competitive entry under 
the new law, and is likely caused by it. The Guatemalan market would not be so competitive 
were regulators allowed more discretion. Indeed, only one other Central American country has as 
many as three cell-phone competitors.
570  Streamlining regulatory structure has allowed new 
competition to flourish, and an ambitious approach to marketplace spectrum allocation has seen 
an orderly transition to pro-consumer results. 
 
 
Table 15. Telephone Penetration in Guatemala, Year-end 1997 – Aug. 2000 
 
  Year-end 1997  Aug. 2000  Annual Growth Rate 
Cellular (total)  64,197  570,000  133% 
ComCel  64,197  240,000  67% 
Telgua  0  200,000  -- 
Telefonica  0  130,000  -- 
BellSouth  0  0  -- 
Telephone Land Lines   429,712  640,000  17% 
Sources: 1997 – ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database, 1999. 2000 – estimates of Ing. Enrique 
Castellanos, Director Comercial, Telgua (Sept. 1, 2000). 
 
XIII.  PRIVATIZING RADIO SPECTRUM  
As the airwaves grow ever more congested with modern wireless 
communications, the federal government is developing plans to open up the 
spectrum by in effect treating its frequencies as commodities to be bought and 
sold as routinely as pork bellies or soybeans in the open market.
571  
 
At an intellectual level, the idea of spectrum liberalization is uncontroversial today. 
Government planning inefficiently allocates resources, and the grinding rule making process 
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combines the failures of socialism with the special interest control associated with rent seeking in 
a capitalist economy.  The damage extends throughout the communications sector, where 
inefficiency hinders development of advanced information technologies. A wide range of 
government reports outline these failures,
572  as have studies in the academic literature since 
Ronald Coase’s seminal work.
573   
Meanwhile, the advantages of spectrum liberalization are increasingly manifest.
574  The 
rigidities of the spectrum allocation system trip leading competitors in the vaunted “race for 
bandwidth,” frustrating network formation. “What a tragedy it would be if, right as we’re on the 
verge of the Internet migrating to inexpensive handheld devices and offering real hopes of truly 
democratizing the technology, the movement would be stymied by overloading the spectrum,” 
comments FCC Chair William E. Kennard.
575  
Three paths are possible in the current “spectrum shortage” crisis.
576  First, the 
government can continue to address frequency allocation decisions through rule makings. The 
results of this process are well known. The FCC cites the problems inherent in this regulatory 
approach in advocating “a radical overhaul” of spectrum policies.
577  Second, policy makers may 
substantially scrap the present system, allowing markets to allocate spectrum in place of 
regulators. This requires changing the nature of radio spectrum rights, shifting the non-ownership 
regime to one of private property rights. These rights could then be used, and traded, to meet 
consumer demands without surmounting the obstacles posed by administrative rule makings. 
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Competition and profit incentives would substitute for “public interest” determinations by the 
FCC. This is the policy shift advocated in this paper. 
Third, federal regulators may elect to endorse reform in theory, while operationally co-
opting it. This is, in fact, the reflex already demonstrated. On May 31, 2000, the FCC held a half-
day hearing on the creation of secondary markets for radio spectrum. In November 2000 it plans 
to auction 700 MHz licenses allocated spectrum protected as “guard-bands” for adjacent public 
safety bands. A total of 6 MHz per market is allocated for licenses issued to “band managers” 
who may lease or disaggregate the frequencies with few limitations. The FCC Chair refers to the 
auction as “putting our toe into the water” of spectrum liberalization.
578  The reality, however, is 
that the FCC’s toe is soaked. For decades, experiments in market allocation have quietly 
provided mountains of practical evidence of consumer benefit. Timidly limiting today’s policy 
innovation will continue to stall innovative radio-based services now queuing at the FCC. 
The leap to markets challenges policy makers, bureaucrats, and incumbent 
telecommunications operators. Full license flexibility breaks down cartels. Easy entry for 
wireless innovators dilutes market shares of established service providers, reducing profits. 
Occasionally, this thrills regulators, who bravely side with consumers. The standard risk-averse 
regulatory response, however, is to defend stability. It is the politically safe choice. Regulation to 
limit competition creates rents, and these rents mold political coalitions. The regulator who 
boldly invites competition drives down rents––and quickly hears from Congress and the White 
House. The feedback signal enjoys clear reception. 
The normative goal of spectrum reform should be to enable market allocation of radio 
spectrum. FCC planning would yield to private, decentralized decisions determining radio wave 
use. Government would facilitate the definition and adjudication of rights, while allowing firms 
and individuals wide latitude to discover the most advantageous means for providing wireless 
service to the public. Just as the ultimate deployment of spectrum is not easily forecast, new 
regulatory institutions will largely depend on spontaneous development. Basic principles can 
fundamentally alter the legal framework, but specific rules and administrative details must be 
resolved in legal processes to follow such basic reforms.  Proposals of interested parties and trial 
and error will be required to fill in the details, as in the standard evolution of law. 
                                                         




Suggestions offered here may modestly prod the process. This paper approaches the 
practical issues of reform in the following way. First, in this section, it discusses the basic debate 
surrounding liberalization, offering answers to questions pointedly posed to challenge a move 
towards privatization of spectrum rights. Second, in the next section, the paper speculates about 
various measures that might be taken to advance competitive use of the radio spectrum. These 
reforms are roughly grouped according to ambitiousness: Deregulation Small, Medium, and 
Large. 
Opposition to Reform 
The tyranny of the status quo is real. Moving public policy is politically risky, 
particularly when simply criticizing the current system delivers many of the political benefits of 
actual deregulation. One recent public briefing held by two U.S. Senators demonstrated the basic 
strategy. Senator John D. Rockeller, IV (D-WV) and William Frist (R-TN) heard the testimony 
of a wireless operator complaining about his firm’s inability to gain access to spectrum to 
provide 3G services. This was cited as a hindrance to economic growth, technology 
development, and U.S. competitiveness––serious concerns for the U.S. Congress.  
Sen. Rockefeller took the complaint as such, and proceeded to grill a Clinton 
Administration spectrum policy maker. “These companies are very concerned that they are being 
held back by a lack of spectrum. The struggle highlights a much larger need, and that is to find a 
way for the U.S. government to engage in…strategic spectrum management.” NTIA chief 
Gregory L. Rohde, while conceding that spectrum allocation was “cumbersome,” “defended the 
government’s spectrum management policies, saying, ‘We do have a spectrum plan in this 
country. It’s just that it’s always changing.”
579  
The comical response demonstrates the low hurdle existing policies must clear. In 
practice, it is sufficient to have “a spectrum plan,” even if in reality there is no plan at all––and 
even if that plan is impeding economic opportunity for business and consumers alike. Even more 
striking, perhaps, was the Assistant Commerce Secretary’s embrace of the very system blocking 
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spectrum utilization as the answer to the wireless bandwidth bottleneck: “Mr. Rohde said U.S. 
officials need to assess 3G spectrum needs before proceeding with allocations, and they should 
explore ways that 3G users can share spectrum with incumbent users.”
580  That U.S. officials are 
“assessing” and “exploring” policy options is blocking market access to radio spectrum, leading 
to the very shortages of bandwidth that were the subject of the public hearing. 
The logical disconnect is not an anomaly. It is routine in the debate over spectrum policy 
that the processes actively sabotaging consumer interests will be advanced as solutions to such 
sabotage. Regulators have material reasons to advance further government process, while vested 
interests are eager to encourage dilatory public interest determinations with friendly testimony, 
papers, studies, lawsuits, and reports. In the contentiousness of a rent-seeking competition, 
arguments are strategically interjected into the public debate. The superior access to information 
enjoyed by vested interests, and the relatively high cost of processing conflicting arguments for 
observers (including journalists and voters), invites ambitious argumentation. Given the “public 
good” nature of public policy, mechanisms for sorting out plausible, good faith assertions from 
implausible, anti-competitive smoke screens are weak. Non-market failure is likely.
581   
When vested interests oppose reform, one standard strategy is to generate a substantial 
level of noise in the policy debate. Strident arguments, and attacks on opponents, create a 
confusing dataset for non-vested parties to decipher. This raises the costs of acquiring 
information for casual participants in the debate, shifting the balance of power to interested 
parties who oppose reform. In 1995, for instance, television broadcasters conducted a nationwide 
advertising campaign announcing that competitive bidding for digital TV licenses could spell 
"the end of free TV."
582  This was simply false: TV licenses are just that, and those holding them 
are mandated to provide continued TV broadcasting service (or the permit is revoked). Bidding 
for such licenses would have transferred wealth, but not affected the number of on-air stations. 
Yet, as revealed by their substantial investment in the ad campaign, broadcasters believed that 
dispensing misinformation furthered policy goals. 
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Chaos Will Result from Abandoning Central Allocation 
Responding to a 1995 proposal “that virtually all spectrum should be auctioned to the 
highest bidders who will use it for its ‘best’ purpose,” broadcast industry attorney Ellen P. 
Goodman wrote: “Some immediate problems come to mind that even Calvin Coolidge and 
Herbert Hoover (not noted as champions of big government) foresaw when they launched 
government spectrum management. Who would set and police interference curbs, particularly if 
the victims are consumers unaware that the defects in their television service are attributable to 
improperly made microwave ovens or malfunctioning pizza delivery radios?”
583   
Contrary to the assertion, chaos was not a product of the common law. As discussed at 
length above, radio broadcasting in the United States blossomed under priority-in-use rules. 
Central allocation of airwaves is neither necessary nor sufficient to maintain order. Even under 
public interest mandates, regulators have relied upon de facto property rights to maintain order. 
Regulators do not scan the airwaves for traffic violators, but simply enforce licensee rights. 
While harmful interference is quickly reported to authorities to resolve, very little takes place 
because it is not in the economic interest of private parties to invest in wireless communications 
without secure rights to use radio waves.  
Regulation looks orderly, but it creates a reverse chaos––too little use of radio waves. 
That can be worse than anarchy. It is most dangerous because it goes so easily undetected. Year 
after year vast tracks of valuable frequencies are walled off, while communications networks, 
inventors, and wireless entrepreneurs go begging for access to airwaves. So long as rights to 
spectrum are vested in private parties with freedom to contract, order is maintained by owners 
with recourse to enforcement.  
Broadcasting is Special 
Broadcasting has a very special place in American politics, regulation, and First 
Amendment jurisprudence. While the exceptional treatment afforded broadcasters was legally 
justified on the “unique” characteristics involved in the physical propagation of radio waves, 
particularly their allegedly limited number, it is ironic that––in terms of physics––radio and 
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television broadcasting is simply ordinary. As seen in auctioning over 8,000 FCC licenses since 
1994, characteristics of radio spectrum do not require assignment of rights by non-market 
methods. The excess demand created for broadcast licenses was purely an artifact of the FCC 
decision to price licenses at zero.  
The actual rationale for treating broadcasters to lucrative franchises, protecting them from 
competition, and then demanding that they perform obligations as “public trustees” was political. 
The bargain that created government spectrum allocation in 1927, and exists still, is the quid pro 
quo: lucrative licenses to broadcasters in exchange for content controls. Broadcasters gain rents, 
public officials gain some discretion over a powerful and influential component of the free press. 
That this press is otherwise protected by constitutional rights to free speech has forced the quid 
pro quo to be couched in vague terms such as “public interest, convenience and necessity.” But 
the system has withstood judicial scrutiny, and produced benefits for the coalition that forged 
this marriage of convenience some seven decades ago.
584   
The political equilibrium still resists reform. Ex-FCC Chair Reed Hundt, sometimes 
heard extolling the virtues of a free market in radio spectrum, advanced with even greater 
enthusiasm the polar opposite thesis that market competition for bandwidth would undermine the 
public interest in broadcast regulation. The argument was market failure in the under-production 
of public goods such as children’s educational programming or free time for political 
candidates.
585  Regulation, however, has not procured the public goods justifying limits on 
competition. Educational programming for children is seen on television––almost entirely by 
public broadcasting (direct subsidy) and cable television (not regulated).
586  Broadcast regulation, 
in deterring cable competition and continuing to protect “broadcast spectrum” from competitive 
entry harms development of child-friendly networks today. Robust public debate is heard over 
the airwaves––but far more of it has been heard since the FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine, a 
mandate that radio stations cover controversial issues from balanced perspectives, in 1987.
587  
Only with deregulation did the “talk” and “news/talk” formats become popular on both AM and 
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FM radio. The equal-time rule, a statutory requirement for broadcasters since 1927, has actively 
discouraged presidential debates.
588  TV networks have refused to cover debates with minor party 
candidates, and only by congressional measures undoing the equal time rule for presidential 
debates have voters been given the opportunity to see Republican and Democratic nominees 
face-off in national forums televised on broadcast TV. Even so, cable television provides far 
more coverage of debates in presidential primaries, and much more extensive reporting on 
election campaigns generally, than the broadcast networks. This is despite the regulatory 
obligation of broadcast licensees, and the unregulated status of cable networks such as CNN, 
CNBC, MSNBC, Fox News Channel, and C-SPAN.
589   
The irony is that broadcast deregulation had to occur in order that TV viewers would 
have the right to choose cable-only fare “Animal Planet” or “The Learning Channel” over public 
interest programming “Jerry Springer” or “Friends.” Opening up the airwaves to still more 
competition would further invigorate the programming competition––and quality upgrades––
wrought by cable and satellite. More extensive use of the TV Band for non-TV services could 
advance high-speed Internet service, making broadband more affordable and thereby more 
accessible to millions of households and small businesses. Allowing unoccupied TV channels to 
provide wireless 3G or other communications services would drive down wireless telephone 
access charges, encouraging mobile phone use among low-income and occasional users. 
Dispersion of ubiquitous, universal access promotes social goals, including public safety. Crime 
calls are made more often by people with wireless telephones. Storm warnings disseminate faster 
when wireless network access is cheap and ubiquitous. In contrast to the public goods promised 
by regulation, the social benefits of enhanced competition are real. 
Public Safety is Special 
Public safety is another key issue advanced in arguments opposing property rights to 
radio spectrum. As Professor Rob Frieden writes, “Even as billions of dollars chase wireless 
telephone and Internet-access spectrum, other types of spectrum… should remain in government 
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hands…[G]overnments must safeguard parts of the radio-frequency spectrum for users who 
should not have to bid for the privilege.”
590  
A daring and innovative 1951 article by University of Chicago law student Leo Herzel 
provided the first cogent assessment of the economics of radio spectrum allocation in the 
academic literature.
591  Herzel’s student note was mauled in a rebuttal by Dallas Smythe, a 
University of Illinois professor who had formerly served as Chief Economist of the FCC.
592  The 
response was so frantic and unpersuasive, in fact, that Coase, who had not been completely 
convinced by Herzel’s initial explanation, came to grasp it wholeheartedly: “if this was the best 
that could be brought against his proposal, Leo Herzel was clearly right.”
593  
Yet, the political marketplace would not be so unforgiving. The rhetorical response of 
Smythe, while “incredibly feeble” analytically,
594  contained a clove of garlic that opponents of 
reform have worn ever since. “Surely it is not seriously intended,” wrote Smythe, “that the non-
commercial radio users (such as police)… should compete with the dollar bids against the 
broadcast users for channel allocations.”
595  Herzel enthusiastically gushed, “It certainly is 
seriously suggested,”
596  and challenged Smythe to explain why––when police departments 
compete for all sorts of inputs––they should be peculiarly exempted from market participation 
here. Herzel’s argument has no serious opposition among contemporary economists, but it has 
remained a political non-starter. The system of block allocation is taken to improve public safety, 
with market allocation a threat to vital social services. 
The situation is analogous to saying that police officers should be paid $1 million per 
annum on the grounds that the local protection they provide is too important to shop for bargains 
in the labor market. Which brings up the public safety problem in creating special spectrum 
policies for public safety. Artificially inflated input prices create inefficiency. This is as true in 
providing public services as in any other economic endeavor. If public agencies overpay for 
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radio spectrum––or police officers––they automatically reduce the level of service they can 
provide for a given public expenditure.  
By choosing standards and setting rules for spectrum use at the federal level, the 
regulatory system produces something similar to the old Soviet economic model. Society 
foregoes cutting edge advances in wireless applications––applications that could make a wide 
range of public safety services far better in saving lives and protecting property. Your local fire 
department (wisely) does not ask a federal government agency to produce its emergency 
vehicles. Yet, their radio systems are allocated spectrum and given mandated technical standards 
by the FCC. 
There is no conflict generated by the co-existence of public subsidies and privately 
owned spectrum, just as the existence of private real estate is not a threat to the National Park 
Service or the Smithsonian. Indeed, tangible public benefits flow from enhanced competitiveness 
in wireless communications markets. Among these are the substantial gains to be made in crime 
control (from ubiquitous mobile phone use for citizens,
597  advanced wireless networks for police, 
and sophisticated wireless security devices
598 ), in medical treatment (particularly in out-patient 
monitoring), and in education (with such services as wireless Internet access yielding on-campus 
mobility). The Tennessee Disability Coalition has urged the FCC “to allow for the flexible use of 
[UWB] technology in order to maximize its benefits to people with disabilities…”
599 ––an 
exceedingly logical stance for citizens whose demand for advanced communications services is 
relatively intense. At bottom, benefits from development and dispersion of wireless technologies 
are distributed widely throughout society. Indeed, the FCC has touted recent spectrum-opening 
initiatives to address the “digital divide.”
600  
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Conversely, the rigidities of block allocation lead to catastrophic failures in the delivery 
of public safety services. Take the hypothetical case of a Northern California police department 
that uses an FCC police band license to communicate to officers. The license is “free,” and is 
embedded in a “public interest” allocation that has received administrative priority. Yet, the 
grant is extremely costly to society. 
This non-random example graphically illustrates the magnitude of loss associated with 
inefficient public sector communications. At approximately 10:45 pm on Friday, October 1, 
1993, twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was abducted at knife-point from her mother’s home in 
Petaluma, California. Eyewitnesses were present, and a distress call to police at 11:03 pm 
included a description of the kidnapper. At 11:09 pm, Petaluma police radioed this information 
to other law enforcement authorities; at 11:13 pm a more detailed description of the abductor 
was broadcast.  
At 11:42 pm, Sonoma Sheriffs received telephone call from a woman reporting 
suspicious behavior by an intruder on her property east of Santa Rosa, 20 miles north of 
Petaluma. Two deputies arrived at 12:08 am (Oct. 2). The officers found a driver whose white 
Ford Pinto had gotten stuck. They questioned the man, whose name was Richard Allen Davis, 
for 38 minutes. Davis told the officers he was “out sightseeing,” and announced that he was on 
parole. The deputies searched his vehicle, and radioed for a report on Davis. After determining 
that there was no outstanding warrant for Davis, the officers helped pull his car from a ditch, and 
departed the scene.
601  The Sonoma Sheriffs were unaware that a man fitting the description of 
Richard Allen Davis was wanted in a kidnapping reported just minutes prior just a few miles 
away. 
Davis was later arrested, convicted, and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of 
Polly Klaas.
602  His lawyer reported that, at the time he was questioned by the Sonoma Sheriffs, 
Polly Klaas was still alive. It is unknown if this is true. But it is brutally apparent that antiquated 
communications cost innocent lives. While Polly Klaas’ abduction was quickly reported to 
police, nearby officers on patrol did not receive this vital information until hours later.   
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It was delayed by what authorities labeled a “communication snafu.”
603   This occurred 
when the report issued by Petaluma police––by teletype––was identified “not for press release.” 
This prompted the Sonoma Sheriff’s office to refrain from issuing an all-points bulletin, which 
would be available to journalists or others (including criminals) scanning police bands.  Private 
communications networks, with priority information going quickly to all officers but not to the 
general public, are neither difficult nor expensive to construct. Indeed, the Sonoma Sheriff’s 
department response to the Polly Klaas tragedy was to request “a $500,000 computer system that 
will enable officers in squad cars to have ready access to confidential information about 
suspects.” Yet, it is chilling to note, if local police agencies had utilized state-of-the-art digital 
networks, instant distribution of priority, time-sensitive data could have averted tragedy. 
Modernization of wireless systems improves public safety, but block allocation stifles 
modernization. As Joel Brinkley writes, “In the mid-1980s, a new group was clamoring for 
[spectrum] space––the manufacturers and users of two-way radios. Police departments, 
ambulance services, commercial delivery companies. Motorola made most of these radios and 
led this lobby.”
604  The public safety lobbyists are still waiting for access to the unoccupied UHF 
spectrum they sought to use then. It remains largely vacant today. Access was initially blocked to 
reserve space for high-definition television, which is not likely to be provided.
605  And despite the 
existence of abundant unoccupied bandwidth after the digital TV license awards, transitional 
concerns (moving UHF TV stations) continue to delay the implementation of new services.
606    
Windfalls and Consumer Welfare 
It is sometimes asserted that large corporate interests will realize windfalls from 
liberalizing property rights to radio spectrum, and that monopoly control of wireless markets is a 
likely outcome.
607  In fact, loosening restrictions on spectrum use would relax barriers to enter 
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and promote competition, precisely why incumbent licensees have historically supported the 
spectrum allocation regime against reform.
608  Under current rules, large firms accumulate 
valuable licenses and exclude newcomers by forging alliances with regulators. If outsiders could 
access unused frequencies, competition would flourish.  
In any event, there is nothing to preclude traditional antitrust remedies in spectrum 
markets. The New Zealand government, pursuant to the Competition Act, re-auctioned a 
management rights band after just two firms (Bell South and Telecom New Zealand) emerged 
overwhelmingly dominant in previous rounds.
609  The FCC has imposed a “spectrum cap” of 45 
MHz to limit the market power of cell-phone operators. Given the 180 MHz allocated to 
commercial mobile radio services (cellular, PCS, and SMR) in each local market, this imposes 
about a 25% market capacity ceiling. U.S. antitrust agencies routinely examine 
telecommunications mergers, practices, and market structures for efficiency. 
Windfalls would attend a sharp move to property rights regime in spectrum, but they 
would accrue largely to equipment manufacturers and technology suppliers, firms benefiting 
from the intensification of local service competition. Operators with extensive sunk investments 
in existing technology would suffer negative returns, as would regulators, lobbyists, and public 
interest advocates with extensive human capital specific to the old regime. Members of the 
communications bar would probably lose on average, although it is surely true that in the 
transition to new rules many law firms would increase business. While intellectual property tied 
to the fading regulatory regime would be depreciated, the demand for new contracts, corporate 
forms, transactions, and property delineations would increase. For the knowledge base that is 
transferable to the new spectrum order, returns would be high. (The rolodex for FCC staff may 
decline in value; technical knowledge of spectrum and property law would likely increase.) 
Finally, the general public would gain substantially from enhanced spectrum efficiency, both 
directly as end users of wireless services, and generally as workers, consumers and taxpayers. 
Greater efficiency in enterprises using superior communications systems results in increasing 
productivity and profits, even while churning out better products at lower cost. 
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XIV.  DEREGULATION FUTURE  
Spectrum reform should be framed as an effort to move away from central administrative 
control (block allocation) to a regime of property rights.
610  Such a regime streamlines the process 
by which frequency users are protected from airwave “pollution.” Shifting spectrum allocation 
into rights delineation allows market competition to replace government planners. And devising 
methods for the efficient adjudication of interference claims strips incumbents of the power to 
fend off entry by manufacturing technical arguments. Because every additional use of airwaves 
increases the probability of interference with existing wireless services, even the most 
conceptually liberal allocation scheme can be defeated by overly conservative protections. 
Current regulatory procedures fail to expeditiously license innovative wireless services precisely 
because competitive concerns and interference issues are collapsed into one administrative 
proceeding.  Incumbents will naturally argue against any possible encroachment of their existing 
airwave rights, and are permitted to argue for more––protection from competition––at a price of 
zero. Efficient utilization of spectrum relies on minimalist procedures bounded by clear 
standards. Because the possible scenarios for spectrum liberalization are so diverse, this paper 
offers a series of reforms in three doses: Small, Medium, and Large. All are advanced as 
normative policy improvements; implementation strategy is beyond the scope of this essay. 
Small 
1.  Spectrum Registry. It is difficult to ascertain how spectrum is used in the United 
States. This is somewhat surprising; given the regulatory rigidities of the block allocation 
system, one might think that the precise nature of each band would be easily discernible. Just the 
reverse is true. The official log maintained by the FCC, the “Table of Frequency Allocations,”
611  
offers only a vague zoning guide. It lists broad classifications, which often overlap, and does not 
indicate actual uses, intensity of traffic, or other operational information. Hence, it does not 
reveal unoccupied or under-utilized frequency space. Legal and engineering firms specializing in 
researching spectrum allocation exist, but costs deter innovation. 
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Firms specialize in the investigation of allocation information. These firms, and others, 
ought to be given the opportunity to bid to create a spectrum registry that actually reveals what 
the Spectrum Inventory Table purports to––“information on how the radio spectrum is used in 
the United States so that you can select the most appropriate spectrum to support your needs and 
determine the impact of your proposed deployment on existing operations.”
612  Computerized and 
accessible online, this would lower costs of entrants seeking to use radio waves in innovative 
applications. The registry created by the Guatemalan Superintendent of Telecommunications 
might serve as a model. The system should be so transparent, user-friendly, and rich in detail, 
that journalists could access the database, reporting on spectrum allocation trade-offs to the 
general public. It is not necessary to devise such a system a priori. Competing vendors would be 
encouraged to bid to design and operate the mapping function.  
2. Privatize Public Safety Communications. Vital radio services could best be provided by 
market mechanisms, improving both the communications available to selected groups and the 
resources available to such groups. These added resources could fund further advancements in 
telecommunications, or other services of value to constituents. 
A remedy is to cede title to radio bands to public safety agencies. Local and state 
agencies, removed from block allocation restrictions, would be free to innovate. Quality 
improvements via re-allocation, similar to that engineered on the SMR band by Fleet Call/Nextel 
in 1991, would naturally follow. Federal, state or local governments could also invite private 
firms to submit bids to meet particular public safety needs. Competitive bidding lowers costs, 
introducing efficient technologies.
613  Local agencies with equity interest in radio spectrum could 
simultaneously generate revenues and improve service to the public.
614   
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The 1996 Pressler Plan included a provision to divest public safety bands to state 
governments. The states could then experiment with innovative policy responses. Police 
departments, for example, could pursue sophisticated wireless communications via design 
competitions held at regular intervals. Private bidders would take into account the market value 
of public safety bands. It is conceivable that monies generated by the flexible use policy would 
subsidize part, all, or more than all the cost of wireless communications for local and state 
agencies. Wherever franchise competitions are effectively managed, public safety services could 
be quickly modernized, instituting cutting-edge technology.  
3.  Create a federal spectrum budget. A vast portion of available radio space is consumed by 
federal (including military) use.
615  There is little disagreement that public sector spectrum use is 
inefficient, as no incentives exist to make it otherwise. If an agency manages to save bandwidth, 
it is not rewarded. Indeed, as investments in spectrum-saving technology are costly, the agency 
budget is taxed. The result is that governmental units do not economize on scarce spectrum 
inputs. Hence, equipment used in various public operations could be improved to deliver better 
service while making spectrum available for alternative uses.  
In recent years, Congress has directed the Department of Commerce to identify various 
quantities of bandwidth to transfer to the FCC for re-allocation from federal to private use. For 
instance, the PCS allocation of 140 MHz came from the so-called Emerging Technologies Band, 
220 MHz transferred to the FCC’s jurisdiction by legislation. This ad hoc method, where an act 
of Congress orders agencies to transfer a politically mandated quantity of bandwidth, is a 
mechanism for identifying underutilized frequencies. It is extremely cumbersome, political, and 
ad hoc. A more systematic method of evaluating government-controlled spectrum bands would 
deliver very substantial public benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
should be noted that CDMA can be used in many bands outside 800 MHz, and that the government later reneged on 
the property rights allocation, intervening to disrupt the military-built civilian CDMA network (called “Great 
Wall”), limited to four cities. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications eventually succeeded in blocking 
build-out of the Great Wall network, favoring development of a China Unicom network based on the GSM standard. 
GSM runs on 900 MHz – which the Ministry itself owns. Ibid. 
615  It is difficult to tell how much spectrum space is reserved for public use. Only a relatively small fraction of the 
spectrum below 300 GHz is reserved exclusively for public (1.4 percent) or private (5.5 percent) use. Over 93 
percent is allocated on a shared basis, meaning that access is difficult to categorize. In each shared band, actual 
deployment depends on the state of rule makings, progress in issuing licenses, and the cost of compliance with FCC 
rules. By the Department of Commerce’s estimate, the federal government has re-allocated over 5 GHz of radio 
spectrum from public to private use since 1978. Larry Irving, Spectrum Management: A Balancing Process, IEEE 




Privatizing radio spectrum rights would remedy this situation. Government would buy (or 
rent) the spectrum it desires to use at market prices. The government chooses to purchase all 
manner of vital inputs––from nuclear reactors, to labor, to Air Force fighter jets––rather than 
procure them by force. Mission critical supplies are not only available from the private sector, 
they are more efficiently obtained when competitively produced. The logic extends to radio 
services. 
In Small Deregulation, the suggested approach is for each agency using radio spectrum to 
complete bi-annual spectrum budgets (in collaboration with spectrum specialists at the FCC or 
Department of Commerce) identifying how assigned bands are used and the estimated benefits 
accruing from such use. The reports would be submitted to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
General Accounting Office, or the Office of Management and Budget. They would detail the use 
of wireless services, including: 
 
a. Bandwidth costs: How much could the bandwidth used by the agency be worth to 
private sector users licensed to provide the most lucrative services deliverable?  
b.  Contract costs: What would a private firm charge to provide an equally productive 
and reliable level of communications? What ancillary services or upgrades could 
be included, including other services to the public? 
 
Consulting firms or financial analysts could be retained to help produce such estimates. 
Public Comment would be invited. As an additional step, formal Requests for Proposals (RFPs) 
would allow firms to bid to provide wireless services to the government (as in the public safety 
wireless services market contemplated just above), offering packages of services for individual 
agencies. To invite serious bids, government agencies would have to catalogue current services 
and future demands and possess the authority to accept offers improving spectrum use. Such 
authority would necessarily entail relaxation of FCC spectrum allocation.  
Medium 
1.   Overlay rights––use the Pressler Plan to liberate the TV band. The 1996 Pressler 
proposal prescribed full flexibility for existing licensees coupled with the issuance of exhaustive 
overlay licenses in the TV band. Overlay rights, patterned after PCS licenses, would permit 




approach builds on existing rules and standards. Yet, it effectively frees bandwidth for uses 
valued by consumers. The components of this plan are as follows: 
  
• Grant existing wireless licensees complete flexibility. Since implicit interference contours 
have already been created in the allocation used to license existing broadcasters, 
deregulation is most straightforward here. Simply allow existing licensees to provide any 
service via any technology so long as the interference parameters currently in place are 
not abrogated. The transition to new services will lead users to request clarifications, as 
well as to demand new emission boundaries. These are analogous to emission boundary 
questions raised by a de novo entrant. The existence of licensed operators, however, 
should allow negotiated settlements among adjacent users. The Commission should 
implement arbitration procedures to facilitate efficient adjudication of disputes. 
• Overlay rights exhaustively license TV band. The TV band encompasses 402 MHz of 
prime, VHF/UHF radio spectrum (67 channels allocated 6 MHz each). The average U.S. 
television market (weighted by household size) receives 13 analog TV station 
broadcasts.
616  Each television station received an additional channel for digital 
broadcasting (DTV) in 1997. Analog channel licenses are scheduled for return to the FCC 
in 2006. The transition (and analog return) is delayed, however, wherever less than 85% 
of the local households are unable to receive DTV. Given this, it is likely that the 
transition will be delayed some years beyond 2006, as only 200,000 households (of over 
100 million TV households) had purchased DTV-compatible sets as of mid-2000.
617  If 
TV stations keep both their analog and digital channel licenses indefinitely, only 26 six 
MHz channels will be occupied in the average U.S. market. That leaves 41 (67––23) 
channels available for re-allocation. Yet, that process, when done by the FCC’s central 
planning mechanism, takes years and results in prolonging the rigidities found in block 
allocation. (See discussion of 700 MHz re-allocation, below.) A superior solution is to 
auction a number of national licenses––say five––with overlay rights. High bidders 
would win the right to use an 80.4 MHz band to provide any non-interfering service––
                                                         
616  Nielsen Media Research sources cited in, Congressional Budget Office, Completing the Transition to Digital 
Television (Sept. 1999), supra note __, I-4.  
617  By Spring 2000, when high-definition televisions had been on sale nearly three years, U.S. households had 
purchased only about 202,000 sets. By contrast, nearly 28 million analog TVs were purchased in 1999 alone. Su-Jin 




from broadcast TV or radio, to subscription telephone or Internet access. This would 
unleash an enormous swath of productive radio spectrum into the marketplace, and allow 
the United States to begin catching up (in particular) in the global race to 3G.
618  
  
2.  Underlay right––use an innovative scheme to unleash UWB. The overlay rights concept 
has a corollary. Underlay rights could give entrants the right to conduct low-power emissions 
beneath existing users. These operators would utilize the untapped communications capacity in 
the “noise floor,” as sophisticated systems filter out background interference. Rights could be 
exclusive over a particular frequency block, or be non-exclusive. In the latter instance, a finite 
number of operators could co-exist in a band, communicating underneath pre-existing high-
power emissions. Power limits would be set such that existing high-power communications 
proceed without material degradation. Underlay users co-existing in the same band, or across 
bands, could coordinate and partition capacity, subject to antitrust oversight.  
The shared arrangement would differ from open access in that underlay rights would be 
limited in number, with each controlling access to a fixed level of low-power emissions within a 
band. Pure unlicensed entry makes user coordination costly. Lacking spectrum rights, actions 
taken by parties to economize on available spectrum are threatened. Free riders can appropriate 
the benefits of efficient resource management. Underlay rights could remedy this by allowing 
owners to determine how a given low-power space is used. Technologies and services could then 
be crafted such that optimal band use was achievable; under- and over-exploitation both 
represent wealth losses to rights holders. With rights fully flexible and transferable, such rights 
would likely be acquired by UWB technology owners and licensed to manufacturers and/or 
service operators by contract. 
Incumbent operators could yet deter UWB by raising the specter of interference. Under 
the public interest standard, the argument is essentially free. The only cost-benefit weighting is 
                                                         
618  This approach offers a great improvement over current regulatory strategies for moving spectrum into productive 
use. In a recent news report entitled, “Wireless Future Tangled in Red Tape,” federal policy makers announced yet 
another delay in spectrum allocation for 3G – while characterizing it as fast-track regulation. “On Oct. 13, President 
Clinton announced a timeline for rearranging U.S. airwaves to make room for third-generation (3G) wireless 
technology… After the government frees up space now crowded by broadcasters, government agencies and others, it 
will host a mammoth auction in 2002.” Amy Doan, Wireless Future Tangled in Red Tape, FORBES.COM (Oct. 17, 
2000). Of course, the FCC has been telling prospective users of the TV band to be patient since at least 1985, when 
land mobile interests asked to use unoccupied UHF airwaves and were told to wait until high definition television 




political––and the politics favor incumbents. UWB has, in fact, been delayed for over a decade 
while various interests (including NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration) complain that 
the technology will interfere with important public safety communications.
619  In a more liberal 
regime, interference is resolved by entrant liability. Proof of financial viability––sufficient to 
indemnify for potential damages––would substitute for FCC adjudication of interference 
disputes. Entry would be permitted upon issuance of a credible guarantee that existing users in a 
band would not suffer material harm as per the transmissions of a UWB entrant. Such operators 
would compensate parties that do, in fact, suffer harm. Such an approach encourages private 
testing, and the emergence of a competitive certification market. Insurers, contracting with 
laboratories and engineering firms, would engage in due diligence before assuming liabilities. 
Products would need to satisfy scientific scrutiny, establishing credibility with investors 
guaranteeing that UWB use does indeed fit under existing communications.  
Large 
• Abolish the FCC and replace it with a Spectrum Court. One of the great historical ironies 
of economic policy is that Alfred Kahn, the Cornell University professor and dean of regulation 
economists,
620  was appointed to head the Civil Aeronautics Board by President Jimmy Carter. 
Kahn aggressively moved to dismantle the agency, ending the CAB’s anti-competitive role in 
fixing airline fares and blocking entry. With the able assistance of other CAB policy makers, and 
support from key congressional leaders, Kahn succeeded in phasing out the Board––once 
thought an impossibly radical policy solution. Kahn’s work has been widely praised by 
economists. Consumers are better off––by billions of dollars in cost savings––as per the 
departure of the CAB.
621   
But Kahn was disappointed when Pres. Carter tapped him CAB Chair; he wanted to head 
the FCC. Alas, the Administration already had Charles Ferris tapped for that slot. Of course, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
airwaves,” licensees will stall regulators, holding out for favorable terms. As seen in the PCS allocation, allowing 
overlay licensees to negotiate with incumbents is a much more effective airwave-clearing approach. 
619  “”[W]hile the FCC began talking with developers of ultrawideband technologies in 1989, the issue got nowhere 
until the mid-1990s when lobbyists and lawmakers pushed for action.” Mark Wigfield, Tiny New Economy 
Company Spends Heavily on Lobbying to Push U.S. to Test Technology, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 14, 2000), 
A16. 
620  Kahn’s book, The Economics of Regulation, Principles and Institutions  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), has 
been the standard text in its field since its first publication (in two volumes by John Wiley & Sons) in 1970.  
621  Steven Morrison and Clifford Winston, The Economic Effects of Airline Deregulation  (Washington, D.C.: The 




Kahn did well in his assigned role, but the question lingers: If he had been chosen to chair the 
FCC, might we today be blessed with competitive telecommunications markets, and harbor only 
fond memories of a defunct Federal Communications Commission?  
Not only can one imagine an Alfred Kahn-like solution to communications regulation, it 
is difficult to imagine the government’s block allocation system––with its wild forecasts of 
wireless service demand, imposed market structures, and political debates over optimal technical 
standards––surviving the new century.  The FCC’s marketplace is increasingly dominated by the 
likes of Intel, Cisco, Microsoft, Qualcomm, Nokia, Lucent, Compaq, H-P, AT&T, Sun, AOL, 
Nortel Networks, Oracle, Sycamore, Akamai, and Motorola. These are the most unpredictable 
network builders on the planet, and the economic structures they (and a multitude of competitors 
to be named later) are constructing will not conform to the guidelines of an FCC rule making. 
The long-run equilibrium is clear: The FCC will cease. The questions are: When? How? 
Soon and in favor of a Spectrum Court are the A+ answers. Once a spectrum registry is 
established (see Deregulation––Small), the next step is to invite new entrants into whatever 
vacant spectrum space they can find. Of course, abolition of FCC spectrum regulation would 
eliminate the public interest standard for gaining access to radio waves. It should be superceded 
by a statutory declaration that all non-interfering entry is lawful, and that private property rights 
to radio waves may be registered with the Spectrum Court. The common law rule of priority-in-
use, building on institutions and practices of wireless providers under the existing regime, would 
govern spectrum allocation. The following measures are appropriate: 
 
• Grant de novo entrants a presumptive right to use unoccupied frequencies. Remove any 
burden for establishing a “public interest” in enhanced competitive entry. Allow new 
competitors to access unoccupied, or underutilized, bands by petitioning the regulatory 
authority and claiming an interest in such usage. The Commission would have a fixed (short) 
time to allow responses, and a fixed (short) time to resolve interference disputes by binding 
arbitration. (No other opposition is allowed.) Wherever multiple requests are made for the 
same bandwidth, auctions will assign rights. Strict time limits will again apply. 
  
• Local area wireless devices are permissible. So long as low-power devices are localized, 
creating material signal degradation only within the user’s immediate jurisdiction, 




an individual household or office to internalize damage to alternative uses of the spectrum 
removes the necessity for imposing truly local spectrum ownership rights. 
 
• Grant complete flexibility to existing licensees. Remove regulatory constraints on licensees. 
The implied bandwidth contours remain. Any service the licensee can profitably supply is 
legal, so long as transmissions stay within the implied emission boundaries of the original 
radio station authorization. 
 
• Pure interference adjudication. As FCC experience has shown, the degree to which parties 
can agree on interference standards is surprising––when it is not profitable to quibble. The 
United States now has a long history of technical rulings establishing the substance of 
reasonable protections in spectrum use, and this body of precedent can form the basis of 
spectrum property law. The essential reform is to abandon administrative authorizations to 
operate “radio stations” in favor of private ownership of frequencies. Band owners will have 
profit incentives to maximize the competitive value of their airspace. Included in that 
maximization calculus will be proper incentives to protect against interference, presenting 
cogent arguments to courts as to what degree of protection is warranted. A technically 
sophisticated Spectrum Court, perhaps initially composed of Administrative Law Judges 
from a defunct FCC, could serve as the venue for such claims. An important aspect of such 
proceedings is that entrants could gain a right to proceed with allegedly interfering 
transmissions before final adjudication wherever they assume liability for damages. Indeed, 
parties indemnifying themselves against damage claims should be given wide latitude to 
provide service, as liability will privatize interference adjudication, increasing efficiency. 
 
This combination of institutions––a spectrum registry, binding arbitration with time 
limits, the option of immediate entry where liability is voluntarily assumed, and an expert 
Spectrum Court to back it all up––would encourage entry while protecting existing service 
providers from appropriation or interference. Fundamentally, it would replace the regulator with 
wide discretion with a regulator with little or no discretion––in short, a judge. The net effect 
would be to flip the top-down spectrum allocation structure. Users of spectrum would have the 
presumptive right to use whatever radio waves were unoccupied; service providers––and, via 




The success of this reform program would necessitate two further policy changes. 
 
• Recast Competition Policy. As spectrum regulation switches to a property regime, antitrust 
rules need to adapt. Under the current system, FCC rules clearly delineate how many firms 
are to offer particular wireless services. Under a more liberal regime, entry into a market may 
occur from many directions; only consumer demand and the cost of service limit market 
rivalry. Accordingly, spectrum ownership becomes a newly important concept in evaluating 
market concentration. Rules allowing open access to unclaimed bands will instantly provoke 
new antitrust determinations. The use of generally applicable competition policies and 
enforcement tools is a beneficial aspect of the transition to a liberal spectrum environment.
622  
 
• Congress imposes taxes, subsidies. When regulatory proceedings promote implicit transfers, 
no coherent accounting exists. Regulators can only estimate taxes paid through rent creating 
spectrum allocation policies, or the benefits implied by in-kind transfers. This is not 
conducive to informed policy making, democratic government, or to economic efficiency. 
Should the expertise of an independent agency be important to crafting legislation, Congress 
could rely on consultation with a Spectrum Court (or the Congressional Budget Office, 
General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service, etc.) to evaluate taxing and 
spending options, before taking legislative action. 
 
Market transactions––bounded by the standard protections of property, contract, and antitrust 
law––allocate radio spectrum under the proposed reforms. Owners assure the resource is 
deployed in its most valuable use, just as they do in wireline markets. There, where ownership 
rights in fiber optic transmission facilities are secure, bandwidth is routinely traded on multiple 
organized exchanges.
623   Rudiments of spectrum market formation are already visible when 
wireless service providers like Winstar engage in “capacity swaps” with Williams, a fiber optic 
network owner.
624  Rather than attempting to create such markets, regulators should allow traders 
                                                         
622  Michel Kerf and Damien Geradin, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. Sector-
Specific Regulation, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 919 (Fall 1999). 
623  Corey Grice, Enron Rings Opening Bell for Bandwidth Exchange, CNET N EWS.COM (Dec. 2, 1999); web page of 
RateXchange, “which will be the leading electronic exchange for global trading of telecommunications capacity,” 
www.ratexchange.com  (Jan. 27, 2000). 




to devise contracts, units, and auction mechanisms for transacting, just as they have in countless 
other markets.
 625    
 
 
Table 16. Spectrum Policy Liberalization Summary 
 
Small  Medium  Large 
Spectrum Registry  Overlay Rights – liberate the 
TV band 
Abolish FCC; grant private rights to bands under 
priority-in-use 
Competitive Bidding for 
Public Safety Services 
Underlay Rights – unleash 
UWB 
Create Spectrum Court (with Registry) to 
adjudicate claims under property law 
Federal Spectrum Budget    Binding arbitration for interference disputes 
    Use expert agency (NTIA?) to study markets, 
recommend taxes/subsidies 
 
XV.  THE FCC’S FATAL EMBRACE?  
Current restrictions on use prevent licensees from providing services which will benefit 
consumers because the government has decreed (sometimes more than 50 years ago) that a 
specific piece of spectrum should be used to provide a narrowly defined service. We have very 
little idea of what technological changes will occur in the next decade, not to mention the next 50 
years. In this age of digital convergence, we at the FCC must remove the roadblocks that prevent 
spectrum from flowing to its most valued uses…. 
There are some who argue that the Commission has a duty to “manage” the 
spectrum and therefore should determine each and every use. If technology or 
demand changes, the Commission can change the rules to allow the new, more 
valuable use. However, in the digital age, innovation is far too rapid for anyone to 
predict accurately what the best use of the spectrum will be five years from now. 
In addition, incumbents and competitors have incentives to slow down the FCC 
process and keep their protected status as long as possible. They may use the 
administrative process to block efficient spectrum use and retard innovation. 
 
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Dec. 1995
626  
                                                         
625  Huber states that a standardized spectrum package must precede a private market in spectrum rights, and that the 
government needs to define such units. Huber, Law & Disorder , supra note __, 72-73. That is demonstrably false. 
Markets typically form without government-defined commodity units, as have wireline bandwidth exchanges. 
626  Reed E. Hundt and Gregory L. Rosston, Spectrum Flexibility Will Promote Competition and the Public Interest, 




The substance of this argument is unexceptional: it simply restates the pitch for market 
allocation of radio spectrum made by Ronald Coase in 1959,
627  Harvey Levin in 1968
628  and 
1971,
629  Arthur DeVany, et al., in 1969,
630  Jora Minasian in 1975,
631  Douglas Webbink in 
1979,
632  or a host of analysts since.
633  Even the identity of the statement’s co-author, the then 
Federal Communications Commission Chair, was mundane: Chairman Hundt (appointed in 1993 
by Pres. William Clinton) was mimicking his predecessor, FCC Chairman Mark Fowler 
(appointed in 1981 by Pres. Ronald Reagan). In a 1982 article, Fowler had espoused 
deregulatory views, extending the argument to broadcasting.
634  Today, FCC Chairman William 
Kennard issues well-publicized calls for market mechanisms to remedy the “spectrum drought,” 
and agency experts concede that existing allocation mechanisms harm consumers and economic 
growth. Top policy makers in Congress, the FCC, and the Commerce Department, publicly 
denounce regulatory micro-management of spectrum, calling for markets to replace regulation. 
By consensus, spectrum liberalization is intellectually compelling.  
Yet, the system they ostensibly manage resists fundamental change. Indeed, while 
Chairman Hundt was busy touting his commitment to market allocation of radio spectrum, the 
Spectrum En Banc hearings held by Hundt’s FCC in March 1996 told panelists to discuss 
“Future Spectrum Demand” by addressing these questions: 
 
• How do we rank priority among various uses? 
• What methodology should be used to choose among competing demands? 
• How does international, long-range planning affect allocation policy? 
• What trends are driving demand for new services? 
• How accurately can future demand be forecast? 
• How can we improve our planning relative to changing demands?
635  
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634  Mark Fowler and Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 207 
(1982). 
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 The questions posed by an agenda-setter can decisively determine outcomes. So here 
with the Commission’s approach to spectrum allocation: the agency still attempts to plan band 
usage, top-down. Even as Chairman Kennard touted wireless bandwidth markets in early 2000, 
an unnamed FCC official was telling the NEW YORK TIMES: “There’s no mechanism to move 
spectrum to higher-valued uses, like in the coal, natural-gas or transport markets. That makes it 
difficult to match supply and demand.”
 636   
The reform rhetoric may be bold, but the centralized spectrum allocation structure erected 
stands firm. The FCC, not the market, allocates frequencies to competing uses. The agency, not 
the market, ranks demands. The “forecasts” used are actually guesses gleaned from a montage of 
industry executives, interest group lobbyists, and various experts. Answering the above En Banc 
questions, for example, were a billionaire cellular entrepreneur now developing a satellite 
telephone project with Bill Gates, spokespersons for Nortel Networks, MCI, the National 
Association of Broadcasters, a communications software consortium, and a non-profit 
organization lobbying for the disabled, a regulator, and an academic.
637  No one presented an 
econometric model of future demand, which––given the level of speculation required––would 
not have impressed the audience. Everyone, however, brought an opinion.
638   
 The Commission’s cognitive dissonance vis-à-vis reform is striking, as has been noted 
even by Commission members: 
 
Claims that FCC actions have promoted spectrum flexibility are 
“outrageous,” Mr. Furchtgott-Roth said. “There’s a practical disconnect between 
the rhetoric and actual practice on spectrum flexibility.” In fact, the FCC has 
“done a lot to restrict the use of spectrum,” he said. 
                                                         
636  FCC official quoted in, Kathy Chen, FCC May Let Firms Trade Licenses to Ease Congestion of Airwaves, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (March 14, 2000), online edition. 
637  Specifically, the individuals were: Craig McCaw, Chairman and CEO, Eagle River Communications; Richard 
Parlow, Associate Administrator, Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration; David Twyver, President, Wireless Networks Division, Nortel; Philip L. Verveer, Wilke, Farr and 
Gallagher; Chairman, Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee; Lynn Claudy, Senior Vice President of Science 
and Technology, National Association of Broadcasters; Peter Murray, Vice-President UTAM, for 
UTAM/WINForum; Susan Mayer, Senior Vice President Corporate Development, MCI Telecommunications 
Corporation; Tom Hazlett, Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute and Director, Program on 
Telecommunications Policy, University of California, Davis. 
638  The point is not that a formal forecasting model would have solved the problem. Quite the reverse: such 
testimony is not taken seriously. Regulators and lobbyists understand that projections are speculative. Dressing up 




If the FCC really wants to advance the concept of spectrum flexibility, it 
should “apply more property rights to the ownership of spectrum,” he said. “We 
should not restrict use, and we should make clear that there are substantial 
liabilities for interference” with other license-holders.
639  
  
Despite important incremental rule changes demonstrating the technical viability and 
economic efficacy of liberalization, the essential structure of spectrum allocation is unchanged 
from the Radio Act of 1927. Regulatory rigidities and lengthy rule makings continue to block 
new competition, frustrating wireless entrepreneurs and lowering the value of wireless 
technology to the American public. Even the cause of liberalization is swallowed up the FCC’s 
administrative process, as the Commission is now considering rules to create secondary markets 
in radio spectrum. Serious reforms may be strangled by the FCC’s loving embrace. 
The pose of the Commission is that it leads the way in promoting productive use of the 
airwaves, ushering new technologies to market, helping upstart rivals compete against 
established suppliers.
640  The less appealing reality, however, can be seen in ongoing Commission 
battles over ultra-wide band (UWB) and re-allocation of 700 MHz from TV to 3G. 
Ultra-wide band: 11 years and waiting. In a rare glimpse into the policy calculus facing 
new communications technology vendors, the WALL STREET JOURNAL recently reported on the 
lobbying efforts by a leading UWB supplier, Time Domain.
641  The company, based in 
Huntsville, Alabama, is aggressively attempting to generate political support for UWB.
642  Since 
late 1996, the company’s CEO, Ralph Petroff, has traveled to Washington, D.C. over 100 times. 
The firm has hired the prestigious Patton Boggs law firm to lobby the FCC, White House, and 
Congress. Former FCC commissioner Mimi Dawson has been retained for additional lobbying, 
as has Ray Cole––until 1999 a staffer with Sen. Richard Shelby, an Alabama Republican. It is 
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WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 14, 2000), A16.  
642  Recall that UWB technologies, while potentially powerful communications systems, emit minute levels of 
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yet an uphill battle. As another Time Domain lobbyist, former Clinton White House aide Greg 
Simon, says: “You have entrenched groups that view any change as bad before the facts are in.”  
As a start-up operation that hopes to bring new technology to the market, the tax levied by 
the spectrum allocation process is significant. On 1999 revenues of $700,000, Time Domain 
invested some $720,000 on efforts to pressure both legislators and FCC decision-makers––a 
lobbying-expense-to-sales ratio of 103%. Support has been received from numerous public 
officials, including FCC commissioners and Sen. Shelby, Time Domain’s home state champion. 
Shelby’s spokeswoman states that UWB foes should not be allowed to get the regulatory system 
“to crush emerging technology.” Shelby and Alabama Democrat, Rep. Robert Cramer, are 
pushing for federal funds to test UWB’s interference patterns. While UWB has been a topic of 
conversation at the FCC since 1989, an official proceeding was only opened in 1998. In May 
2000 the Commission ruled that it would go forward to issue rules for UWB.  
“Spectrum is the lifeblood of industry,” Petroff enthuses. The JOURNAL notes: 
“Ultrawideband’s solution is to turn ‘garbage’ spectrum––now occupied by background radio 
emissions of such devices as computers and electric shavers––into usable airwaves for a host of 
new devices.” But this potential opportunity for innovation and efficiency is stuck in 
administrative process. Government testing to resolve interference claims is ongoing. In the rule 
making opposing factions contest rivals’ claims as to the costs and benefits of UWB. The 
Commission is incapable of quickly adjudicating the public interest. Time Domain CEO Petroff 
says: “It’s awful what you have to do to get permission to transmit 50-millionths of a watt.” 
HDTV blocks land mobile in 1985, 3G in 2000. The TV band consists of 67 channels, 6 
MHz allocated to each, some 402 MHz in all. Since 1985 the FCC has walled off this band from 
competing users, particularly those wanting to offer public safety and mobile telephone service, 
on the grounds that advanced television would consume remaining capacity. That has proven 
false. Even after the issuance of a second TV license to every broadcast station in the United 
States for digital transmissions, the average market features just 26 TV licenses (13 analog and 
13 digital, many of the latter broadcasting little or no programming). While broadcasters and 
regulators have long argued that extensive intervals need be left vacant between local broadcasts 
(“taboo channels”), the current allocation vastly under-utilizes the band. With digital technology, 
not only can adjacent channels be used for broadcast or other services, but existing TV signals 




for data services (like Internet access). In short, a vast array of services could be provided 
without sacrificing current broadcasting programs.  
The waste of spectrum, from the beginning of television in the 1940s up through today, is 
striking. As explained by Internet pioneer and communications entrepreneur Paul Baran:
643  
 
In reality, the major spectrum hog is analog broadcast transmission. In the US and 
to an extent in other countries a spectrum analyzer will find much of the allocated 
VHF and UHF TV spectrum unused, even in big cities. The UHF television band 
is punctured with vast empty holes called taboo channels. These channels are left 
unoccupied because of the frequency selectivity limitation of early era television 
receivers. Today we know how to build far better receivers than when this early 
rule was adopted and when those frequencies were set aside. We should never 
forget that any transmission capacity not used is wasted forever. It’s water over a 
dam. And, there has been water pouring here for many, manv years, even during 
an endless spectrum drought.
644  
 
The inefficiency is hardly subtle. The 402 MHz allocated to TV service dwarfs that made 
available for cellular (50 MHz) and licensed PCS (120 Mhz) combined. As of June 1999, 82% of 
U.S. households subscribed to cable or satellite video service, meaning that a rapidly dwindling 
minority of Americans use over-the-air TV.
645  Subscription services and broadband Internet 
connections facilitated by cable modems and digital subscriber lines are clearly reducing 
broadcasting stations to adjunct status in the delivery of video programming. Meanwhile, the 
value of TV band spectrum soars for alternative applications such as 3G.  
The FCC has been conscious of the misallocation for years. In 1986, the FCC was about 
to allow mobile radio users to access vacant UHF TV channels, only to be deluged by the 
                                                         
643  Baran pioneered work on distributed communications networks, the basic element in Internet architecture. See 
Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Internet 
Pioneers, http://www.ibiblio.org/pioneers/baran.html.  
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broadcasting lobby’s HDTV gambit. High-definition was nowhere near ready for deployment, 
and there was zero evidence that consumers and broadcasters were willing to pay the costs of 
upgrading TV signals (including the spectrum costs). But within the public interest allocation 
system, the argument that fallow spectrum had to be preserved to deliver HDTV at some 
unspecified date could be used to delay new services.
646  It was; the band was frozen. The 
Commission was not oblivious of the social loss. In November 1992, an FCC staff report found 
that even the UHF-TV spectrum that was in use was worth up to nearly two hundred times as 
much when deployed in mobile wireless. The study recommended “voluntary re-allocation” be 
allowed, with TV stations permitted to sell or lease allocated spectrum to cellular operators.
647  In 
1996, then-Chairman Reed Hundt pledged to have the FCC itself re-allocate Channels 60-69 to 
mobile telephone service. Results are not yet realized.  
While the Commission has ruled that it will move four of the ten channels to public 
safety and will auction licenses allocated the spectrum from the other six (i.e., 36 MHz), 
administrative delays have ground the transition to a halt. The broadcasters have access to lower 
TV channel assignments, and guarantees of full compensation for moving costs (retooling to use 
the new frequencies, paid for by winning bidders in upcoming FCC auctions, analogous to the 
“overlay” right). Yet, station owners are holding out, refusing to move. Because they have the 
power, through a mixture of legal rights and political clout, to effectively block re-allocation, 
incumbent licensees do not see cost-recovery as just compensation. They eye the total value of 
the spectrum they are vacating––or a large fraction of it––as a just split of proceeds. As Lowell 
“Bud” Paxson, CEO of Paxson Communications, the largest owner of stations on channels 60-
69, puts it: “I kept telling everybody the name of the game is spectrum, spectrum, spectrum. I 
labored in a desert and built a network; now people are finding an oasis with oil under my 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
645  Federal Communications Commission, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markers for the 
Delivery of Video Programming: Sixth Annual Report, CS Docket No. 99-230 (Jan. 14, 2000), ¶5. 
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station license was allocated 6 MHz, meaning that the price/MHz was $0.9 million. The cellular license was 
allocated 25 MHz, for a price of $166.4 million/MHz – 185 times as much. (Note that while the Oxnard station 




sand…. I was a farmer and I got lucky. Now people want to build a mall on my farm… God 
bless America.”
648   
In fact, the spectrum does not belong to Paxson Communications (or General Electric, a 
32% shareholder), and the network––or “farm”––Paxson built has not created the value it now 
seeks to extract. Paxson may offer its UHF-TV programs equally well on a channel between 14 
and 59. Yet it refuses to go quietly, seeking to extract not compensation for the fruits of 
investment in broadcasting, but a pay-off to quit blocking efficient use of radio spectrum. The 
public interest allocation process has produced no resolution despite many years of effort. Now, 
“the transition has turned into a political quagmire.”
649   
U.S. wireless penetration lags many European and Asian countries.
650  Various factors 
influence this outcome,
651  a crucial one being time-to-market. While several countries had issued 
digital mobile phone licenses by March 1992,
652  the United States did not begin awarding digital 
PCS licenses until 1995.
653  Many countries are now issuing 3G licenses. The United Kingdom 
auctioned five in May 2000, receiving some $34 billion in total bids. Germany auctioned six in 
August 2000, receiving $45 billion.
654  Investors anticipate robust consumer demand for services.  
Despite the FCC’s commitment to a “flexible, market-based approach” as “the most 
appropriate method for determining service rules in this band,”
655  bureaucratic roadblocks deter 
access to radio spectrum. The Commission has been reticent to issue overlay rights to new 700 
MHz users. While that would shift band clearing to the private sector, it would raise bidder 
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uncertainty and heavily encumber the rights sold.
656  Prices offered at auction would be reduced 
accordingly. Given the high European 3G bids, negative political fall-out could result. The 
perverse outcome is that the government seeks to improve auction prices by delaying licenses to 
reach transitional agreements with broadcasters, keeping services from the public yet longer.
657  
Postponing license auctions scheduled for June 2000 and then (again) September 2000
658  
guarantees that the UHF TV band will be withheld from petitioners for a minimum of 16 years. 
See Table 8. The American economy, deprived of valuable spectrum inputs, is handicapped in 
the race to deploy advanced services. As former FCC official Rudy L. Baca writes,  
 
The lack of a coherent, efficient, forward-looking spectrum management policy 
and process could hinder U.S. wireless operators’ ability to compete in providing 
global interconnected “seamless” advanced communications… The reality of 
spectrum management in the U.S. in 2000, and for the foreseeable future, is 
chronic spectrum shortages… The total amount of spectrum available for 
commercial mobile uses in the U.S. is only 210 MHz compared to an average 
European allocation of 355 MHz…. Investors need to be aware that U.S. 
companies are relatively disadvantaged in “New Economy” growth in wireless  
Internet and E-commerce .
659   
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      The U.S. appears over-regulated––compared to the European Community. Until recently, 
EC countries were debating whether to privatize state monopoly PTTs. That U.S. spectrum 
allocation is parsimonious relative to these highly regulated economies is sobering. 
 Despite deregulatory bravado, U.S. policy makers still reflexively veer in the anti-
competitive direction––at least until safely out of the political hot seat. A good example is the 
contrasting policy approaches to 3G by the current and (immediately) former FCC Chairs. Reed 
Hundt, a consultant and venture capitalist since retiring from the Commission in 1997, has 
tagged the 36 MHz allocation out of channels 60-69 paltry: “we are still about 200 MHz short of 
what needs to be in commercial use.”
660  Hundt’s recommended solution is to sweep all UHF TV 
channels off the air, giving them the right to be carried on local cable television systems. “All 
told, that’s more than 300 MHz of spectrum––enough to serve the needs of wireless data over the 
next decade.”
661  
This goes a bit further than Hundt was willing to propose (let alone enact) as Chair––
about five times as far. William Kennard, the current FCC Chair, is not willing to ratchet up the 
UHF spectrum allocation. Indeed, he is attempting to assure investors (i.e., auction bidders) that 
there will not be “any move to hike the amount of spectrum” allocated for use.
662   As useful 
technologies now queue to gain access to unoccupied UHF frequencies even at 95 GHz,
663  public 
interest spectrum allocation continues to over-protect the radio resource.   
 Spectrum Scarcity in the Information Age  
Radio spectrum is vital to the New Economy. The frantic race for bandwidth reveals the 
increasing value of communications networks and the wireless links that form, connect, and 
extend them.  The vast investments being made in technologies intensifying the utilization of 
spectrum bandwidth demonstrates the continuing scarcity of frequency space, as do the price tags 
attached to licenses guaranteeing some measure of exclusivity in the use of radio waves. While 
efficiencies are driving spectacular increases in bandwidth throughput, there is no limit to the 
                                                         
660  Elisa Batista, Spectrum Auction Still on Horizon, WIRED NEWS (Aug. 1, 2000), 
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,37944,00.html. 
661  Ibid. Hundt’s notion that requisitioning cable and satellite system spectrum will ease wireless spectrum shortages 
is extremely dangerous, as “must-carry” rules already in place have taxed investment in new systems and seriously 
undermined consumer interests. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” under Turner Broadcasting v. 
FCC  (1997), 8 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141 (2000). 
662  Ibid. 




imaginative applications for wireless, applications driving quantum increases in demand for 
access to radio waves. 
Spectrum is a valuable, scarce commodity. Yet, telecommunications markets have been 
distorted by skewed rules. Wired bandwidth––“spectrum in a tube”––enjoys legal protections not 
available to wireless. The propertied interest enjoyed by the owner of fiber optic lines, coaxial 
cables, or copper telephone wires effectively draws sellers to where consumers will pay for 
bandwidth. But competition from wireless goes untapped, as consumer demands do not attract 
band owners––spectrum outside the tube cannot be private property. The result is under-
investment in the development and application of wireless conduits. While technology soars, 
networks grow and applications multiply, little utilized bands languish. The FCC identifies a 
“spectrum drought,” while frustrated builders of advanced systems bemoan the rigidities denying 
them access to airwaves. 
Property rights allow markets to allocate resources. Band owners striving to maximize 
values compete to supply users, investing in technology to improve operations, innovating in 
business models, network architectures, and consumer applications to encourage new traffic. 
Where free to do so, entrepreneurs eagerly mix and match systems, technologies, and 
frequencies, iterating on efficient solutions. Competitive markets discover low-cost ways to 
provide high-value services. Band managers endeavor to produce the preferred combination of 
traffic and signal quality––the static optimum––and are alert to adopt new methods or platforms 
yielding extra value through enhanced capacity––the dynamic optimum.  
Private markets police behavior. Capital owners are quick to eliminate managers who fail 
to maximize asset value, including who ignore opportunities to supply frequencies to 
manufacturers or users on an open entry (“unlicensed”) basis. The entire panoply of consumer 
bids, including those tied to complementary use with embedded capital, is exploited by profit 
maximizing managers. With full private rights attached, the passive licensee, offering services 
dictated by FCC rule makings, becomes an aggressive experimenter, an imaginative service 
packager, an evolving, morphing change agent driven to raise the value of bandwidth owned. 
The scramble to invent and re-invent profitable wireless businesses can be replaced by an 
administrative process, but it cannot be duplicated. Owners competing to succeed produce 
distinct results from those imposed by regulators forecasting spectrum values ex ante. There is 




market allocation as the solution to current bandwidth bottlenecks.  And while the structure of 
regulation is yet defended by incumbent interests, broadcasting––the key industry protected by 
regulation since the genesis of “public interest” allocation––is fading in social and economic 
importance.  Economic transformation in the tech sector is driving demand for unrestricted 
access to bandwidth, producing tensions challenging old rules.  
The cutting edge of reform appeared years ago, as quiet reductions in FCC micro-
management began. Important policy experiments have been performed in this country and 
elsewhere. The consumer benefits of market mechanisms have been manifest. Liberalization is 
settling in as conventional wisdom. Ronald Coase may be pleased to know that the joke is no 
longer on him. His suggestion of a market in bandwidth is not nearly so funny as a 16-year rule 
making for re-allocation of UHF-TV spectrum to Land Mobile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 